When you fall victim to fraud and have sent money to scammers, you often feel helpless when dealing with your bank. However, a decision by the Paris Judicial Court dated July 3, 2024, shows that there are remedies against the bank that hosted the fraudulent accounts. This collective case, involving 22 victims and the bank Ma French Bank, sheds new light on the liability of banking institutions in matters of fraud.
TJ Paris, 9th Ch. 2nd Sect., July 3, 2024, No. 23-06169
The Case in Brief: 22 Victims, One Common Pattern
Between 2021 and 2023, twenty-two individuals fell victim to scams following a pattern that has become sadly commonplace. On online sales platforms (marketplaces), they believed they were purchasing or reserving goods from private sellers. The amounts at stake varied considerably: from 299 euros for Mr. R. to 25,775 euros for Ms. XX, including 15,999 euros for Mr. W. who thought he was acquiring a substantial asset.
After making their transfers, none of these individuals received what they had paid for. The sellers had vanished, and the funds transferred had all ended up in accounts opened at Ma French Bank.
Faced with this situation, the victims attempted to obtain compensation through amicable channels. Their counsel sent three formal demands to the bank on April 29, June 25, and December 21, 2021. All went unanswered, or at least without a favorable outcome. This led the victims to bring the matter before the courts by writ of a judicial officer dated April 3, 2023.
The Legal Basis of the Claim: A Technical but Crucial Debate
The Dead End of Anti-Money Laundering Rules
To understand the stakes of this case, one must first grasp an essential legal point that the court decided very clearly. The victims initially relied on Articles L.561-5, L.561-5-1, L.561-2-1, and R.561-5-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, which impose strict due diligence and identity verification obligations on banks within the framework of anti-money laundering.
The court firmly rejected this legal basis, stating: “The due diligence and reporting obligations imposed on financial institutions under Articles L.561-5 to L.561-22 of the Monetary and Financial Code serve the sole purpose of combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. A victim of fraudulent conduct cannot therefore rely on non-compliance with these obligations to hold a banking institution liable and claim damages.”
This position is supported by well-established case law from the Court of Cassation, notably a ruling by the Commercial Chamber dated September 22, 2022. In other words, even if a bank has violated its anti-money laundering obligations, a mere fraud victim cannot directly rely on that violation to obtain compensation. These prudential rules serve the general interest and the stability of the financial system, not the individual protection of fraud victims.
This was a major obstacle for the victims, but the court would find another legal basis.
The Banker’s General Duty of Verification
The court indeed established a broader principle, independent of anti-money laundering rules: “Notwithstanding the repeal of the provisions of Article R.312-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code […], it is incumbent upon the banker to verify the identity of the applicant before opening an account, and failure to observe this obligation gives rise to liability toward persons who fall victim to conduct enabled by the use of the account.”
This obligation specifically requires the bank to “verify the identity and address of the applicant by obtaining an official document bearing their photograph, the references of which must be recorded and retained.”
And the court adds a critical element: “If the verifications are insufficient, the bank bears at least part of the loss arising from its failure.”
This reasoning is astute because it relies not on specific prudential rules (the violation of which benefits only the State) but on the general law of civil liability. It is Article 1240 of the Civil Code that applies here: “Any act whatsoever by a person that causes damage to another obliges the person by whose fault the damage occurred to make reparation.”
A Fragile but Innovative Legal Basis
However, one must acknowledge a certain fragility in this reasoning. The court itself notes that Article R.312-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code, which expressly set out this verification obligation, was repealed on February 14, 2020. The bank did not fail to point this out in its defense.
Furthermore, the court observes that “no information has been provided regarding the date on which the accounts were opened to enable the court to determine whether this provision applies to the present case.” In other words, it is not even known whether the fraudulent accounts were opened before or after the repeal of this provision.
Despite these uncertainties, the court upholds the existence of a general verification obligation on banks, independent of any specific statutory provision. This is a bold approach that reflects a logic of holding banking actors accountable.
The Reversal of the Burden of Proof: A Decisive Turning Point
Identifying the Fraudulent Accounts
A factual point is essential in the court’s reasoning. According to the judges, “in its written submissions, Ma French Bank acknowledges that the identity of the holders of the disputed accounts did not match that appearing on the transfer orders, from which it can be inferred that the said accounts were opened for the purpose of committing fraud.”
This finding is fundamental. The bank itself admits that the IBANs provided to the victims bore names different from those of the actual account holders. For example, a fraudster could provide an IBAN claiming to be “Jean Dupont – Car Sale,” while the account actually belonged to a certain “Ahmed B.” This discrepancy reveals that the accounts were necessarily opened for fraudulent purposes.
The bank attempted to downplay this fact by arguing that “it cannot be inferred from the fraudsters’ transmission to the claimants of IBANs falsely labeled in the name of purported sellers, which did not correspond to the actual account holders, that the latter’s accounts were necessarily opened following identity theft.”
In other words, Ma French Bank maintained that the accounts had indeed been opened under the true identity of their holders, and that only the names attached to the IBANs had been falsified by the fraudsters. But this argument did not convince the court.
The Bank Must Prove Its Due Diligence
Based on this finding, the court reverses the burden of proof in a manner particularly favorable to the victims: “Accordingly, it is without reversing the burden of proof that the court considers that it falls to the bank to demonstrate that it carried out the necessary verifications when opening the accounts that were used to commit the fraudulent acts.”
This sentence deserves close attention. Under the general law of civil liability, it is normally up to the victim to prove fault, harm, and causation. Here, the court considers that once it is established that the accounts were used for fraud, it is up to the bank to demonstrate that it properly fulfilled its verification obligations.
This reversal is based on Article 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, cited by the court: “It is for each party to prove, in accordance with the law, the facts necessary to support its claim.” The bank claims to have fulfilled its obligations? Then let it prove it!
Banking Secrecy Does Not Protect the Bank in Court
The Bank’s Argument
Faced with the victims’ requests to obtain disclosure of the documents used to open the fraudulent accounts, Ma French Bank invoked banking secrecy. It relied on Articles L.511-33 of the Monetary and Financial Code and 226-13 of the Criminal Code.
Its position was as follows: I cannot disclose this information to you because it is protected by banking secrecy, which is enforceable even against civil judges. If you want this information, apply to the judicial authorities in the context of criminal proceedings.
This is an argument that may seem formidable. After all, banking secrecy exists precisely to protect the confidentiality of information relating to a bank’s customers. How can the bank be asked to breach this secrecy?
The Court’s Response: Proportionality and the Right to Evidence
The court swept aside this argument with crystal-clear reasoning: “The banking institution may waive the banking secrecy established by Article L.511-33 of the Monetary and Financial Code when it is a party to proceedings brought against it, provided that the disclosure is indispensable to the exercise of its right to evidence and proportionate to the competing interests at stake.”
In other words, banking secrecy is not absolute. When a bank is sued, it must be able to defend itself, and to do so, it must be able to produce the documents that establish it acted properly. Conversely, its opponents must be able to access these documents to support their claims.
The court adds: “The production of documents enabling verification of the steps taken to verify the identity and address of the account holders meets, in the present case, this dual requirement” — that is, it is both indispensable and proportionate.
The Consequences of Refusing to Produce Documents
By refusing to disclose the supporting documents, Ma French Bank shot itself in the foot. The court draws the logical consequences: “By refusing to disclose the documents used to open the bank account, the bank fails to demonstrate the due diligence it carried out and therefore does not prove that it fulfilled its verification obligation when opening the disputed accounts.”
This is inescapable: since you refuse to show your supporting documents, the court considers that you have none, or that they are insufficient. Your liability is therefore established.
This solution has great practical significance. It means that banks can no longer hide behind banking secrecy to avoid having to justify the quality of their account-opening procedures. When they are brought before the courts, they must lay their cards on the table.
A Nuanced Judgment: The Necessary Vigilance of Victims
While the principle of liability was upheld, the court did not grant full compensation to all victims. The decision demonstrates genuine discernment by distinguishing between several situations according to the degree of care each victim exercised.
Full Compensation for 20 Victims
For the majority of claimants, the court awarded full compensation for their financial loss. The reasoning is clear: “Ma French Bank is therefore ordered to fully compensate the loss suffered by the claimants listed below, for whom there is no evidence that they made payment when they could legitimately have questioned the security of the transaction.”
The court adds: “Indeed, these claimants demonstrate that they requested and obtained a copy of an identity document from their counterpart, and no other element is alleged concerning them that could have aroused their suspicion.”
This is an important point: requesting a copy of the seller’s identity document is considered a reasonable precaution. Victims who did so and received no particular warning sign cannot be accused of imprudence.
Thus, Mr. L. was awarded 858.50 euros, Mr. U. 3,800 euros, Mr. J. 1,500 euros, and so on up to Mr. W. who was compensated in the amount of 15,499 euros for his loss.
The Case of Ms. XX: Warning Signs Ignored
The case of Ms. XX perfectly illustrates the limit of bank liability when the victim has herself been negligent. The court notes: “It appears from the evidence produced that she made a transfer of 21,525 euros on August 27, 2021, corresponding to the balance of the transaction, a first payment of 3,750 euros having been made on August 11, 2021.”
So far, nothing unusual. But the court continues: “And this despite the fact that she produces exchanges with the purported seller on the Leboncoin platform dated August 26, 2021, showing banners with the following message: ‘Your counterpart’s profile has been blocked on our site as a security measure… They will no longer be able to access messaging. Your time is valuable — move on by chatting with other members of leboncoin!'”
The timing is revealing: on August 26, Leboncoin blocks the seller’s profile and alerts Ms. XX. On August 27, she nonetheless makes a transfer of over 21,000 euros!
The court’s conclusion is unequivocal: “She therefore could not have been unaware of the risk of fraud to which she was exposing herself. It is therefore appropriate to consider that the claimant contributed at least in part through her negligence to the occurrence of her loss, which must consequently be compensated only at 50% with respect to the last payment.”
The calculation is as follows: 3,750 euros (first payment, before the alert) + (21,525 x 50%) = 14,512.50 euros. Ms. XX thus loses more than 10,000 euros due to her own imprudence, despite having been explicitly warned.
The Case of Mr. UV: Warnings from the Bank Itself
The story of Mr. UV is even more instructive. The court notes: “It appears from the complaint filed on September 28, 2021 by Mr. [O] [UV] that upon receipt of the invoice for the vehicle he believed he was purchasing through an advertisement on the Leboncoin website, he contacted Ma French Bank which, while confirming the existence in its books of the account to be credited, expressed its surprise at the professional nature of the account.”
Imagine the scene: Mr. UV, being cautious, calls Ma French Bank to verify the existence of the account before making his transfer of over 10,000 euros. The bank confirms the account’s existence but expresses “surprise” about its professional nature. This was a warning sign that should have prompted the utmost caution.
But that is not all: “Moreover, it appears from the evidence produced that the claimant received a second bank account statement the following day on the pretext that the accounting department of the purported selling company had made an error.”
Receiving a second bank account statement the next day under the pretext of an “accounting error” is a classic fraud tactic. Fraudsters use this to test their victim’s suspicion and create a sense of urgency to prevent them from thinking clearly.
The court concludes: “Therefore, it appears that Mr. [UV] clearly continued with the transaction notwithstanding elements that were of a nature to arouse suspicion as to the risk of fraud to his detriment.”
Consequence: compensation limited to 50%, i.e., 5,305.31 euros out of the 10,610.62 euros lost. Mr. UV bears half his loss for failing to heed the warnings.
A Fair Approach to Causation
This approach by the court illustrates the flexibility of causation theory in civil liability law. Even if the bank’s fault is established, it will only be held liable in proportion to its contribution to the damage.
When the victim has herself contributed to her own loss through negligence, particularly by ignoring obvious warning signs, the judge may reduce compensation accordingly. This is what legal practitioners call “apportionment of liability” or “contributory negligence.”
But be careful: this does not mean that every fraud victim is negligent. The court demonstrates this by awarding full compensation to 20 out of 22 victims. Negligence must be established by concrete evidence: ignored alerts, obvious inconsistencies not noticed, basic precautions not taken.
The Rejection of Non-Pecuniary Damages
All victims also sought, in addition to compensation for their financial loss, an amount of 500 euros per person for non-pecuniary damages. They pointed to the inconvenience resulting from their unsuccessful efforts to obtain restitution of their funds.
The court dismissed this claim in summary fashion: “However, the claimants do not prove the existence of non-pecuniary harm distinct from the material loss compensated. Consequently, their claim on this ground is dismissed.”
This solution may seem harsh, but it falls within established case law. Non-pecuniary harm is not presumed; it must be proven. Losing money, however unpleasant, constitutes material loss, not non-pecuniary harm.
To obtain compensation for non-pecuniary harm, it would have been necessary to demonstrate a specific injury: documented anxiety, health impact, medically confirmed psychological disorders, etc. The mere “inconvenience” of attempting to recover the funds is not sufficient.
This is an important point for any future similar action: if you wish to obtain compensation for non-pecuniary harm, you must document it precisely (medical certificates, witness statements, proof of psychological treatment, etc.).
Provisional Enforcement: A Swift Payment
One last technical element deserves mention. The court states: “This decision carries provisional enforcement by operation of law in accordance with the provisions of Article 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure in its version applicable to the present case, the proceedings having been initiated after December 31, 2019.”
What does this mean in practice? That even if Ma French Bank appeals this judgment (which is highly likely), it must still pay the amounts awarded without waiting for the appellate court’s decision. This is what is known as provisional enforcement by operation of law.
If the bank wins on appeal, the victims will of course have to repay the sums received. But in the meantime, they can obtain payment of their damages, which is particularly important for those in difficult financial situations following the fraud.
Practical Takeaways from This Decision
This case law provides several valuable lessons for victims of fraud:
1. The Receiving Bank Can Be Sued
This is the first key takeaway from this decision: even if you are not a customer of the bank that received the fraudulent funds, you can hold it liable if it failed in its verification obligations when opening the accounts.
Traditionally, victims would turn to their own bank (the one that executed the transfer) or attempt to file a criminal complaint. The idea of suing the bank that received the funds in civil proceedings was uncommon. This decision shows that it is a viable approach.
2. Collective Action Is Possible and Effective
The fact that 22 victims joined forces clearly gave more weight to their claim. This made it possible to:
- Share legal and procedural costs
- Demonstrate the existence of an organized fraudulent scheme
- Make it more difficult for the bank to shift responsibility onto individual behaviors
- Create a more balanced power dynamic against a banking institution
If you find yourself the victim of fraud and discover that other people have lost money through the same fraudulent accounts, do not hesitate to contact them to consider a joint action.
3. Demand Transparency from the Bank
The decision is very clear: “The banking institution may waive the banking secrecy established by Article L.511-33 of the Monetary and Financial Code when it is a party to proceedings brought against it.”
This means that you can and should demand that the bank produce the supporting documents for the verifications carried out when opening the accounts. If it refuses, as Ma French Bank did, the court will draw adverse inferences.
In your formal demand and then in your statement of claim, do not hesitate to explicitly request disclosure of:
- The identity documents provided when the accounts were opened
- Proof of address
- Any verification procedures implemented
- Any communications with the account holders
4. Document Your Own Precautions
The court paid close attention to the victims’ behavior. For 20 of them, it noted that “they demonstrate that they requested and obtained a copy of an identity document from their counterpart.”
This simple but effective precaution enabled them to obtain full compensation. Conversely, those who ignored warning signs saw their compensation reduced by half.
In practical terms, if you are conducting a transaction with a stranger on the internet:
- Systematically request a copy of their identity document
- Keep all communications (messages, emails, screenshots of listings)
- Note in writing any inconsistency or suspicious element
- If you receive an alert (from the platform, from your bank, from anyone), do not proceed without verifying
These elements will be essential if you later need to prove that you were not negligent.
5. React Quickly and Methodically
The victims in this case acted in an exemplary manner procedurally:
- They filed a criminal complaint for fraud
- They sent several formal demands to the bank (April 29, June 25, and December 21, 2021)
- Faced with no response, they brought the matter before the courts (statement of claim dated April 3, 2023)
This progressive approach is recommended. It allows you to:
- Build a solid case file
- Demonstrate your good faith and willingness to find an amicable solution
- Start the clock running (particularly for potential late-payment interest)
- Preserve your rights before limitation periods expire
6. Do Not Overestimate the Legal Difficulties
Many victims give up on going to court because they think it is too complicated, too lengthy, too costly. This decision shows that it is possible, and that judges can be pragmatic.
Admittedly, the legal issues are technical (on what legal basis should the claim be founded? How to reconcile banking secrecy with the right to evidence?). But with a good lawyer, these obstacles can be overcome. And the reversal of the burden of proof effected by this court greatly facilitates the victims’ task.
Limitations and Uncertainties Not to Be Overlooked
However, it would be imprudent to present this decision as a cure-all. Several limitations and uncertainties must be highlighted.
1. A Non-Final First-Instance Decision
This decision was issued by the Paris Judicial Court, a first-instance court. It may be appealed before the Paris Court of Appeal, and potentially subject to an appeal to the Court of Cassation.
Given the financial stakes (over 70,000 euros in total) and especially the issue of principle (bank liability regarding the opening of fraudulent accounts), it is highly likely that Ma French Bank will appeal.
The Court of Appeal could take a different position, particularly on:
- The very existence of a general verification obligation in the absence of any statutory provision in force
- The scope of banking secrecy and its exceptions
- The reversal of the burden of proof
- The apportionment of liability with the victims
Until a Court of Appeal judgment, or even a Court of Cassation ruling, confirms this approach, it cannot be considered established case law.
2. A Contestable Legal Basis
The court itself acknowledges the fragility of its legal basis. Article R.312-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code, which expressly imposed an identity verification obligation upon account opening, was repealed on February 14, 2020.
The court maintains the existence of a general obligation “notwithstanding the repeal” of this provision, but without really explaining from where this obligation now derives. Is it a general principle of law? An implied obligation arising from the public service mission of banks? A simple application of Article 1240 of the Civil Code?
This legal uncertainty could be exploited on appeal by the bank, which could argue that in the absence of any statutory provision, no specific obligation rests upon it beyond the general law.
3. The Difficult Interaction with Anti-Money Laundering Rules
The court clearly set aside Articles L.561-5 et seq. of the Monetary and Financial Code as a basis for the victims’ claim. This is consistent with the case law of the Court of Cassation.
But this creates a paradoxical situation: banks are subject to strict identity verification obligations within the framework of anti-money laundering (with heavy administrative and criminal sanctions for non-compliance), yet these same obligations cannot be relied upon by fraud victims to obtain compensation.
This dichotomy is difficult for litigants to understand. It could encourage the legislature to intervene and create a clear legal basis for victims’ claims.
4. Possible Variations Depending on the Circumstances
This decision concerns fraud through marketplaces, with transfers to accounts apparently opened with false or stolen identities. Other configurations could give rise to different outcomes:
- What happens if the account was opened with a genuine identity but subsequently misappropriated by a third party?
- What happens if the bank proves it carried out every possible verification (facial recognition, document verification by an expert, confirmation phone calls) but a particularly sophisticated fraudster managed to deceive it?
- What happens if the amount at stake is very small (a few dozen euros) and the verifications required would be disproportionate?
The judge will have to adapt the solution to the circumstances of each case, making it difficult to predict future decisions.
Toward Legislative Change?
This decision implicitly raises a broader question: should the legislature not create a clear legal framework for bank liability in matters of fraud?
European Initiatives
At the European level, several texts already govern the liability of payment service providers:
- The Payment Services Directive (PSD2) imposes strong authentication and payment security obligations
- The eIDAS Regulation governs electronic identification and trust services
- Draft anti-money laundering regulations are under development
However, these texts primarily aim at prevention and transaction security, not at compensating victims.
Examples from Other Countries
Some countries have adopted legislation that is more protective of fraud victims:
- In the United Kingdom, a voluntary code of conduct adopted by the major banks provides for reimbursement of fraud victims in certain cases
- In the Netherlands, banks have established a guarantee system for fraud victims
- In Australia, a banking code imposes due diligence obligations on banks and provides for reimbursement mechanisms
France could draw inspiration from these examples to clarify bank obligations and victims’ rights.
Academic Proposals
Some authors suggest creating a compensation fund for victims of banking fraud, funded by contributions from banking institutions. Others propose legislating minimum verification standards for account opening, with a presumption of liability in the event of non-compliance.
Pending any legislative reform, it is through case law, decision by decision, that the contours of bank liability will be shaped.
What to Do If You Are the Victim of a Similar Fraud
Drawing on the lessons of this decision, here is a practical guide for victims of bank transfer fraud.
1. React Immediately
As soon as you discover the fraud:
Contact your bank to dispute the transactions in writing and attempt to block or recall the transfer. Even if the chances of success are slim (funds are often withdrawn very quickly), some banks can initiate a “recall” procedure.
Contact the receiving bank (the one where the fraudster’s account is held). Explain the situation and request the account be frozen and the funds returned. Send an email or a registered letter to maintain a written record.
Immediately gather all supporting documents:
- The listing that gave rise to the transaction
- Communications with the purported seller (messages, emails, text messages)
- Transfer order
- Copy of identity document if you requested one
- Any suspicious element you may have noted
2. File a Criminal Complaint
If you are the victim of fraud and your bank asks you to file a complaint with the police, this is primarily to verify the reality and credibility of your report.
It is also to gather evidence against you: without realizing it, when filing your complaint you may disclose information that the bank will later use against you to accuse you of negligence if you seek reimbursement of the fraudulent transactions.
Do not delay in filing a complaint but, if possible, consult a lawyer beforehand and, failing that, avoid mentioning anything that could allow the bank to deny your reimbursement request on grounds of negligence.
4. Check Whether There Are Other Victims
Search online to see if other people are complaining about the same seller, the same account, or the same modus operandi. You can:
- Post on fraud victim forums
- Search on social media
- Contact consumer protection organizations such as UFC-Que Choisir or other consumer advocacy associations
If you identify other victims, consider a collective action. It is more effective and less costly for each individual.
5. Consult a Lawyer
If the bank does not respond to your formal demand, consult a lawyer specializing in banking law.
The lawyer will be able to:
- Assess your chances of success
- Advise you on procedural strategy (interim relief, full proceedings, etc.)
- Draft the statement of claim
- Represent you before the court
Tips to Avoid Becoming a Victim
Finally, prevention is better than cure. Here are some golden rules to minimize risk:
On Sales Platforms
Prefer in-person transactions with cash payment or transfer after the goods have been handed over. If this is not possible (bulky item, significant distance), use a secure payment system offered by the platform (where available).
Beware of prices that are too low. If a car worth 20,000 euros is listed at 12,000 euros, there is probably something fishy going on.
Check the seller’s profile: how long the account has existed, number of listings, reviews. A profile created two days ago with a single listing and no reviews should arouse your suspicion.
Require proof:
- Photos of the item with a personalized element (a piece of paper with your name and the date)
- Copy of the vehicle registration document for a vehicle
- Purchase invoice for a recent item
- Seller’s identity document
Watch for warning signs:
- A seller who refuses to call you or meet in person
- Pressure to pay quickly (“I have other interested buyers”)
- A last-minute change of bank details
- Poor spelling and phrasing
- A seller claiming to be abroad
For Bank Transfers
Never make a transfer to a stranger without having verified their identity. Systematically request a copy of their identity document and check it is consistent with the name on the bank details.
Check the bank details:
- Does the account holder’s name match the seller?
- Is the stated address consistent with the listing?
- Do the first two letters of the IBAN correspond to the stated country?
Split payments if possible. For a major purchase, offer a deposit and then the balance upon delivery.
Prefer secure payment methods:
- Card payment (possibility of chargeback)
- Online payment services with buyer protection (PayPal, etc.)
- Transfer with a bank that offers a protection service
Beware of intermediaries who offer to “secure” the transaction for a fee. This is often an additional scam.
When in Doubt
Do not hesitate to walk away. If something seems suspicious, even if you cannot pinpoint exactly what, abandon the transaction. Your intuition may save you from significant losses.
Seek advice from those around you, specialized forums, or even your bank before making a large transfer to an unknown person.
Do your research on the seller: type their name, phone number, and email into a search engine. Check whether they have already been reported on anti-scam websites.
Conclusion: A Hopeful Decision, but Caution Is Warranted
The decision of the Paris Judicial Court dated July 3, 2024, undeniably represents a step forward for victims of banking fraud. It affirms loudly and clearly that banks bear a responsibility in the prevention of fraud, and that they cannot simply open accounts without seriously verifying the identity of their customers.
The major contributions of this decision are:
- Recognition of a general verification obligation on banks when opening accounts, independent of anti-money laundering rules
- Reversal of the burden of proof: it is for the bank to demonstrate that it properly verified the account holder’s identity
- The bank’s inability to shelter behind banking secrecy when it is a party to proceedings
- A nuanced approach to liability that takes into account the victim’s behavior without systematically disqualifying them
For the 70,000 euros in total that the awards represent, and the 22 victims who will (at least provisionally) recover part of their funds, this is an important victory.
But caution is warranted. This decision is merely a first-instance judgment, subject to appeal and cassation. Its legal basis is fragile, and the Court of Appeal could adopt a different position. It will take several years and probably several converging decisions before truly established case law is formed.
In the meantime, this decision provides a roadmap for fraud victims who wish to take action against banks that received fraudulent funds. It shows that with a well-prepared case, a well-conducted collective action, and sound legal arguments, it is possible to prevail.
It also sends a signal to banking institutions: the ease of opening accounts must not come at the expense of security. Banks that, through negligence or the pursuit of profit at all costs, settle for superficial verifications, expose themselves to having to compensate the victims of the fraud they enabled.
Let us hope that this decision, whether or not it is upheld on appeal, will help bring about a change in banking practices toward greater vigilance, and will encourage victims not to remain passive in the face of the fraud they have suffered. Justice may sometimes be slow and complex, but it remains an essential recourse for asserting your rights and obtaining compensation.
