The ruling delivered by the 2nd chamber of the Court of Appeal of Pau on 19 January 2026 (No. 24/01687) provides an interesting illustration of the banker’s duty of vigilance (devoir de vigilance). In a context of increasing wire transfer fraud, the judges clarify the criteria for a “flagrant” material anomaly and redefine the balance of responsibilities between the payment service provider and the victims of social engineering.
CA Pau, 2e ch. sect. 1, 19 janv. 2026, n° 24/01687
I. Factual Background: A Textbook Case of Real Estate Fraud
The case originated from a real estate acquisition project. In 2020, the spouses [H]-[S] began the process of financing a purchase for their son. After using a rate comparison website, they were contacted by an alleged adviser from Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA).
After exchanges by email, this individual made the granting of a loan of 242,920 euros conditional upon the payment of a personal contribution of 65,390 euros into an account to be opened in the books of BBVA. On 24 November 2020, the clients provided their Crédit Agricole branch with a bank account identification document (relevé d’identité bancaire, RIB) for the execution of the wire transfer. In reality, the funds were diverted to an account opened in Portugal (Novo Banco) and immediately closed after receipt.
The clients then sued the bank, alleging that it had failed in its duty of vigilance in the face of a document which, according to them, presented manifest anomalies.
II. The Court of Appeal’s Decision
1. The Nature of the Liability Engaged
The Court of Appeal of Pau began by clarifying the legal basis of the action, dismissing the appellant’s arguments in favour of extra-contractual liability:
- With respect to the account holders: The liability is of a contractual nature, based on Article 1231-1 of the Civil Code. The banker is bound by a duty of vigilance in the execution of authorised wire transfer orders.
- With respect to the injured third party (the son): Liability is sought on tortious grounds (Article 1240 of the Civil Code) due to the damage caused by the contractual breach committed towards the parents.
2. The Triumph of the Apparent Anomaly over the Duty of Non-Interference
The banker is traditionally bound by a duty of non-interference (devoir de non-ingérence). The banker must not interfere in the client’s affairs nor verify the appropriateness of a transaction. However, this principle yields in the presence of an apparent anomaly, whether material or intellectual.
In this case, the Court found the existence of a “flagrant” material anomaly on the RIB. It noted that the document presented inconsistencies that a normally diligent professional could not have ignored:
- Geographic and identity contradiction: The RIB displayed the BBVA logo (a Spanish bank) but contained a country code “PT” (Portugal). The SWIFT code “BESCPTL” explicitly designated the bank Novo Banco and not BBVA.
- Non-compliance with SEPA standards: The RIB designated a “beneficiary” instead of the account holder and omitted the latter’s address, contrary to the standards in force in France, Spain and Portugal.
- Aberrant references: The document contained an obscure reference (“BBVA 1812”) and did not mention any branch or banking agency.
For the Court, this “insurmountable contradiction” between the bank’s visual identity (Spain) and the unique identifier (Portugal) required the bank to suspend the execution of the order.
III. Apportionment of Liability: The Sanction of Imprudence
The interest of the ruling also lies in the treatment of the victims’ fault. The bank argued that the clients were solely responsible for their loss pursuant to Article L. 133-21 of the Monetary and Financial Code (Code monétaire et financier), which discharges the service provider if the unique identifier provided is inaccurate.
The Court rejected this total exoneration but found negligent fault on the part of the [H] parties:
- They negotiated a significant mortgage by email with an unknown contact.
- They did not question the coherence of making a contribution payment to Spain when they were dealing with a French notary.
Conclusion of the Court: While the clients were imprudent, the bank’s fault was deemed preponderant because it possessed the technical tools to prevent the damage. Consequently, the Court of Appeal overturned the first-instance judgment (which had assigned 50% liability) and ordered the bank to bear 75% of the financial loss.
IV. Awards
Summary of awards
- Damages (financial loss): €49,042.50 (75% of the diverted sum).
- Moral damages: Dismissed (the loss resulting from the victims’ own imprudence).
- Article 700 of the CPC: €3,000 in respect of legal costs.
Significance of the Ruling
This decision firmly reminds credit institutions that the duty of non-interference is not a “blank cheque”. When confronted with a RIB whose technical components (IBAN/BIC) contradict its formal appearance (Logo/Bank name), the banker must exercise its role as gatekeeper. The automation of wire transfers does not exempt the bank from detecting obvious material anomalies.
