The rise of online trading platforms, particularly in highly speculative areas such as Forex (foreign exchange market) and binary options, has been accompanied by a surge in massive fraud. The resulting disputes involve not only the liability of fraudulent brokers, but also that of the actors who facilitate the movement of funds: Payment Service Providers (PSPs).
Two major decisions of the Court of Cassation, handed down on 1 October 2025 (Cass. com., 1 October 2025, No. 22-23.136), and of the Court of Appeal of Rennes (CA Rennes, 3rd chamber, 3 June 2025), reinforce the duty of vigilance of PSPs when their clients’ accounts are used as intermediaries to channel fraudulent funds, particularly in the context of atypical investments.
I. The duty of vigilance of PSPs: an obligation beyond simple payment execution
The cases examined involve payment service providers whose clients’ accounts were used to receive funds from defrauded investors, before these funds were redirected to fraudulent entities abroad.
The principle of non-interference and its limits
The principle of non-interference (non-immixtion) means that the PSP is not required to judge the appropriateness of transactions initiated by its clients. However, case law consistently holds that this principle yields to the duty of vigilance when the transactions present characteristics of an apparent anomaly.
The intellectual anomalies identified by case law
In the Court of Cassation ruling of 1 October 2025, the anomalies characterizing the breach of the duty of vigilance included:
- Unusual volume and frequency of transactions on the accounts;
- Discrepancy between the nature of the transactions and the client’s business profile;
- International transfers to countries known for their lack of financial regulation;
- Listing by the AMF (Autorite des Marches Financiers) of the entities to which the funds were directed.
II. The PSP’s failure: indifference to warning signs
The courts found that the PSPs had been indifferent to multiple warning signs:
- Accounts receiving large sums from numerous individual investors with no apparent commercial justification;
- Systematic retransfer of funds to foreign entities, particularly in jurisdictions with weak financial oversight;
- The entities receiving the funds were on AMF blacklists, information that was publicly available.
The Court of Cassation upheld the Court of Appeal’s finding that these elements should have prompted the PSP to conduct additional verifications and, if necessary, to suspend the transactions.
III. Apportionment of liability: investor responsibility
A crucial aspect of these rulings is the apportionment of liability. While the PSPs are held responsible for their breach of the duty of vigilance, the courts also recognize the contributory negligence of the investors.
The victims had invested in products:
- Offering returns that were obviously unrealistic;
- Through unregulated platforms, some of which were on the AMF blacklist;
- Without having conducted basic due diligence (such as checking the AMF’s list of authorized entities).
The apportionment typically results in the investor bearing a share of their own loss, generally between 30% and 50%, depending on the degree of imprudence demonstrated.
IV. Practical consequences
These decisions reinforce the requirement of prudence for investors: compensation is systematically reduced when the victim has not carried out the minimum verifications (such as consulting the AMF lists) that would have prevented the loss. In the context of atypical investments, vigilance therefore remains a shared responsibility, but the requirement of diligence towards the professionals who structure the market is undeniably strengthened.
