Bank Liability in Cases of Scams: Criteria for an Apparent Anomaly (Cass. com., 4 February 2026, No. 24-19.196)

French Supreme Court, Commercial, Financial and Economic Chamber, 4 February 2026, No. M 24-19.196

What was the background to this investment scam case?

On 22 July 2021, a retired customer holding an account with the Crédit mutuel branch in Condom went to his bank’s counter to make a transfer of €30,000. The sum was intended for an account held in Spain, in order to make an investment presented as being for the benefit of the company Orange Bank.

Some time after this transaction, the customer realised that he had been the victim of an investment scam. The funds transferred were never invested in any legitimate financial product, and the supposed investment opportunity was merely a fraudulent scheme designed to take his money.

In this situation, the customer turned against his bank, considering that it should have detected the suspicious nature of the transaction and warned him before executing the transfer. He therefore sued it, alleging a breach of its duty of vigilance and claiming full reimbursement of the sum debited (€30,000) as well as damages.

The Agen Court of Appeal (cour d’appel), in a judgment delivered on 11 June 2024, had found in favour of the customer. It had ordered the bank to pay him €30,000 in damages, considering that the banking institution had breached its duty of vigilance.

Dissatisfied with this decision, the Crédit mutuel branch in Condom lodged an appeal on points of law. It challenged the Court of Appeal’s analysis, arguing that no apparent anomaly justified its interfering in its customer’s affairs and calling into question the legitimacy of the transaction requested.

What is the banker’s principle of non-interference?

The principle of non-interference is one of the fundamental pillars of the relationship between a bank and its customer. It flows directly from the contractual nature and the trust that must govern this relationship. This principle means that the banker must refrain from interfering in its customer’s decisions and affairs, except in very particular circumstances.

This rule rests on several legal and practical justifications:

• Respect for the customer’s autonomy of will, as the customer remains free to manage his assets as he sees fit, without interference from his banking institution.
• The protection of banking secrecy and the confidentiality of transactions, which are fundamental obligations of the banker.
• The practical impossibility for a bank to systematically verify the purpose and legitimacy of each transaction carried out by its thousands or millions of customers.
• The need for fluidity and speed in the execution of banking orders, which could not be ensured if each transaction had to be subject to in-depth investigation.

However, this principle of non-interference is not absolute. It has limits where the bank detects, or should detect, apparent anomalies in the operation of the account. In these specific situations, the banker’s duty of vigilance takes over and may oblige it to warn its customer, or even to refuse to execute a manifestly suspicious transaction.

In its judgment of 4 February 2026, the Supreme Court recalls that “the banker, bound by an obligation not to interfere in its customer’s affairs, must warn him only where there are apparent anomalies that a reasonably diligent professional could easily detect”. This precise wording perfectly sums up the delicate balance that every banking institution must strike.

What is meant by “apparent anomaly” in the operation of the account?

The notion of “apparent anomaly” is the central criterion for determining when the banker must exceptionally step out of its reserve and intervene to protect its customer. Although essential, this notion is not exhaustively defined by statute. It has been gradually clarified and delimited by case law.

An apparent anomaly is characterised by several cumulative elements:

• Objectivity: the anomaly must result from concrete and verifiable facts, and not from mere subjective impressions or moral considerations about the expediency of a transaction.
• Apparentness: the anomaly must be visible and detectable without any special investigation, that is, it must “jump out” at the professional examining the account.
• Ease of detection: detecting the anomaly must not require in-depth research, complex verifications or intimate knowledge of the customer’s personal situation.
• The reasonably diligent professional test: the anomaly must be capable of being detected by a reasonably attentive and competent banker placed in the same circumstances.

It is important to stress that an apparent anomaly is not the same as the mere unusual nature of a transaction. Many customers occasionally carry out transactions that depart from their banking habits without this constituting an anomaly calling for intervention by the bank.

What criteria had the Court of Appeal applied?

In the case at hand, the Agen Court of Appeal had considered that several elements, taken together, characterised an apparent anomaly justifying the bank in questioning its customer before executing the €30,000 transfer. The lower court judges had noted in particular the following circumstances:

• The customer was retired, and therefore no longer received any income from professional activity.
• He had only a low monthly income.
• He had never previously made a transfer to a bank located abroad, even within the European Union.
• He did not usually make any financial investments from the accounts held with the bank.
• The amount of the transfer (€30,000) was entirely unusual in light of his ordinary banking transactions.
• This amount appeared disproportionate in relation to his usual income.

On the basis of these findings, the Court of Appeal had deduced that the disputed transfer was sufficiently atypical for the bank to be required, before executing it, to “question its customer precisely, or even carry out some checks”.

According to the appeal judges’ reasoning, the combination of these various factors should have alerted a reasonably diligent banker to the potential risk this transaction represented for its customer. By refraining from any verification steps, the bank had therefore breached its duty of vigilance, thereby incurring liability.

Why did the Supreme Court overturn these criteria?

The Supreme Court adopted a radically different position from that of the Court of Appeal. It quashed the Agen judgment on the ground that the elements relied on by the lower court judges were “grounds unsuited to establishing the existence of apparent anomalies”.

This censure rests on a rigorous analysis of what a genuine apparent anomaly must be. For the highest court, the circumstances noted by the Court of Appeal do not cross the threshold necessary to oblige the bank to intervene. Let us examine the reasons for this position:

Retired status and level of income: The fact that a customer is retired and has a modest income is not in itself an abnormal circumstance. Many retired people manage their savings and make investments, including significant ones, without this being suspicious. The bank is not to pass judgment on the fit between a customer’s apparent lifestyle and his asset management decisions.

The absence of any previous transfer abroad: The fact that a customer has never previously made an international transfer does not make the first transfer of this kind abnormal. Every transaction, however unusual, necessarily takes place for a first time. In a context of internationalised trade and free movement of capital within the European Union, a transfer to Spain is not intrinsically suspicious.

The absence of any habit of investing: Likewise, the fact that a customer has never made an investment from his account does not make his decision to do so abnormal. It may simply reflect an evolution in his asset strategy or the realisation of a carefully considered project.

The unusual nature and the amount: While the amount of €30,000 may seem high in light of the customer’s ordinary transactions, it does not for that reason constitute an apparent anomaly where it remains below the credit balance of the account. The customer had the necessary funds and therefore had the financial capacity to carry out this transaction without putting his account into debit.

In essence, the Supreme Court considers that the criteria applied by the Court of Appeal relate more to a subjective assessment of the expediency of an investment than to the objective detection of an apparent anomaly. Obliging the bank to intervene in such circumstances would amount to requiring it to pass judgment on the relevance of its customers’ asset choices, which would greatly exceed its role and breach the principle of non-interference.

The highest court therefore concludes that “by grounds unsuited to establishing the existence of apparent anomalies, the Court of Appeal failed to give a legal basis to its decision”. The judgment is quashed and the case is referred back to the Toulouse Court of Appeal, which will have to rule again taking this analysis into account.

What circumstances genuinely characterise an apparent anomaly?

Given the censure of criteria that might seem relevant at first sight, it is legitimate to ask: which circumstances then make it possible to characterise a genuine apparent anomaly justifying the bank’s intervention?

The judgment of 4 February 2026 forms part of a line of case law that identifies several categories of situations in which an apparent anomaly may be found. Without claiming to be exhaustive, the following circumstances may be noted which, according to banking case law, are capable of characterising an apparent anomaly:

The account being put into debit

Where a payment transaction puts the customer’s account into debit, or aggravates an existing overdraft, this is a strong warning signal. The bank must then be particularly vigilant, because its customer is about to commit funds that he does not have.

This situation is all the more problematic where the overdraft has not been previously authorised by the bank. The anomaly is then manifest: the customer is attempting to spend more than he has, which may reflect either an error, a situation of financial distress, or a fraudulent manoeuvre.

Manifest incompatibility with the customer’s assets

Beyond the mere question of income, it is the overall compatibility of the transaction with the customer’s known financial situation that must be examined. If the bank has precise information on the assets held by its customer (accounts, investments, real estate), it may be in a position to note that a transaction manifestly exceeds his real financial capacity.

For example, case law has in certain cases noted that a corporate customer “had in its bank account a sum far greater than the amount of the transfers and owned substantial real estate assets”. The absence of any incompatibility with its assets then ruled out any apparent anomaly.

The assessment must remain measured: the bank is not required to know in detail all of its customer’s assets, but simply to take into account the information of which it actually has knowledge in the context of the banking relationship.

The beneficiary appearing on a blacklist

The Financial Markets Authority (Autorité des marchés financiers, AMF) regularly publishes blacklists identifying entities that offer unauthorised investments in France or that are the subject of warnings for fraudulent practices. These publicly accessible lists are an essential tool for preventing investment scams.

Where the beneficiary of a transfer appears on one of these blacklists, the apparent anomaly is established beyond dispute. The bank has objective and easily verifiable information that must necessarily lead it to warn its customer and, where appropriate, to refuse to execute the transaction.

However, it should be noted that in the case decided by the Supreme Court on 4 February 2026, nothing indicated that the recipient bank (in Spain) or the entity that was the beneficiary of the transfer was the subject of such a warning. The absence of any AMF warning was therefore a factor in the bank’s favour.

Location in a particular risk zone

Not all countries present the same level of financial security. Certain jurisdictions are known for their opacity, their tolerance of money laundering, or for serving as bases for international scam networks. These countries appear on lists drawn up by international organisations (FATF, the European Union, etc.).

Where a transfer is destined for an account located in one of these high-risk countries, the bank must show heightened vigilance. The anomaly lies not in the foreign destination as such, but in the fact that this destination presents documented and known risks.

In this case, the transfer was destined for Spain, a Member State of the European Union with a harmonised banking regulatory framework and a level of security equivalent to that of France. This circumstance could not therefore constitute an apparent anomaly.

The bank’s knowledge of the nature of the investments

In some cases, the bank may know the exact purpose of the transfer requested by its customer. This knowledge may result from exchanges with the customer, from documents presented at the counter, or from the precise wording of the transfer.

Where the bank knows that the funds are intended for a particularly risky or atypical type of investment, or one notoriously used in fraudulent schemes (cryptocurrencies on unregulated platforms, “exotic” investments promising unrealistic returns, etc.), it may be required to warn its customer of the risks incurred.

However, this obligation presupposes actual and precise knowledge of the destination of the funds. The mere mention of “investment” or the name of a company is generally not enough to characterise an apparent anomaly, unless that name is immediately identifiable as that of a fraudulent entity.

What are the practical consequences for victims of investment scams?

The Supreme Court’s decision of 4 February 2026 has important implications for everyone who, having fallen victim to an investment scam, is considering turning against their bank to obtain compensation. It marks a firm line of case law that considerably restricts the cases in which the banker’s liability can be engaged.

A strengthening of restrictive case law

The Supreme Court adopts a strict position on the characterisation of an apparent anomaly. The judgment of 4 February 2026 illustrates this rigour by setting aside criteria which, taken individually or cumulatively, are not enough to oblige the bank to intervene.

This line of case law results in the rejection of arguments based solely on the unusual nature of transactions, in particular:

• The high amount of the transaction compared with the customer’s usual transactions.
• The foreign destination of the funds, particularly within the European Union.
• The change in the customer’s banking habits.
• The customer’s profile (retired, modest income).
• The absence of any history of similar investments.

This restrictive case law is explained by the Supreme Court’s wish to preserve the balance between two imperatives: protecting customers against scams, while respecting their autonomy and avoiding imposing on banks a generalised and intrusive surveillance that would be incompatible with the normal functioning of the banking system.

The burden of proof lies with the victim

In practice, this development in case law results in a heavier evidentiary burden on scam victims wishing to engage their bank’s liability.

It is no longer enough to show that the transaction was unusual or that it turned out, with hindsight, to be a scam. The victim must establish that, at the time the bank executed the transfer order, objective, apparent and easily detectable anomalies should have alerted a reasonably diligent professional.

This proof is often difficult to provide, because it presupposes showing that the bank had precise information which, if properly analysed, would have revealed the fraudulent nature of the transaction. Yet in most investment scams, the fraudsters take care to conceal their true nature and to present their transactions in a perfectly legitimate light.

The importance of prevention and information

In the face of this restrictive case law, prevention becomes a major issue. Potential scam victims can no longer count on systematic intervention by their bank to protect them. They must therefore develop their own vigilance and inform themselves about the risks associated with the various types of investment.

Public authorities, and in particular the AMF, play an essential role in this prevention by:

• Regularly publishing blacklists of unauthorised or suspicious entities.
• Running information campaigns on the most common scam techniques.
• Providing tools to check that a financial intermediary is duly authorised.
• Alerting the public to the “warning signs” that should prompt caution (unrealistic return promises, pressure to invest quickly, requests for transfers abroad, etc.).

Alternative remedies

Where the bank’s liability cannot be established for lack of a characterised apparent anomaly, scam victims nevertheless have other remedies available:

Filing a criminal complaint: Fraud (escroquerie) is a criminal offence punished by Article 313-1 of the Criminal Code (Code pénal). Filing a complaint can trigger an investigation that may lead to the identification and conviction of the perpetrators. If they are found and convicted, the victim may obtain damages in the criminal trial.

Action against intermediaries: In certain fraudulent schemes, several intermediaries intervene in succession. Depending on the circumstances, their liability may be sought if they contributed, even unwittingly, to the commission of the scam.

Compensation schemes: In certain specific cases (in particular where the scam was facilitated by identity theft or computer hacking), compensation schemes may be called upon, either with the bank or with insurance bodies.

How can you protect yourself and what should you do in the event of a scam?

Given the limits of the protection offered by banks, as they result from recent case law, it is essential to adopt prudent reflexes and to know how to react quickly if you suspect a scam.

Prudent reflexes before any investment

Before making any investment, particularly if it is offered to you by canvassing (by telephone, email or social media), several essential checks are required:

Check the intermediary’s authorisation: Consult the register of authorised financial intermediaries (REGAFI), accessible on the website of the ACPR (Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority, Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution) or that of the AMF. Any intermediary offering investment services in France must be registered there.

Consult the blacklists: Systematically check that the entity offering you an investment does not appear on the AMF blacklists. These lists are regularly updated and freely accessible on the Authority’s website.

Be wary of promises of excessive returns: Any investment guaranteeing returns far above market rates (for example, more than 8 to 10% a year without risk) should immediately arouse your suspicion. In a low-interest-rate environment, such promises are unrealistic.

Take time to think: Scammers often use psychological pressure techniques to obtain a quick decision (“limited offer”, “unique opportunity”, “limited places”). Never let yourself be rushed. A serious investment can wait until you have taken the time to find out more.

Ask for complete documentation: Insist on receiving detailed documentation on the proposed investment: nature of the product, risks, fees, exit conditions, precise identity of the issuer, etc. The absence of such information, or a refusal to provide it, is a major warning signal.

Seek independent advice: Before investing a significant sum, do not hesitate to ask the opinion of an independent professional (wealth management adviser, chartered accountant, specialist lawyer) or to discuss it with those around you.

The immediate reaction if you suspect a scam

If, after making a transfer, you suspect that you have been the victim of a scam, every hour counts. Here are the steps to take urgently:

Contact your bank immediately: As soon as doubt sets in, contact your bank adviser or your bank’s customer service to report the suspicious transaction. Depending on when you act, it is sometimes possible to block the transfer before it is definitively executed or to request its recall from the recipient bank.

File a complaint without delay: Go to the police station or gendarmerie to file a complaint. The sooner the complaint is filed, the greater the chances of recovering the funds or identifying the perpetrators. You can also make a report on the National Police’s THESEE platform, which specialises in scams.

Report the scam to the AMF: The Financial Markets Authority (Autorité des marchés financiers) collects reports of financial scams. Your testimony may help identify new fraudulent networks and protect other savers.

Keep all the evidence: Gather and keep all items of evidence: emails, text messages, telephone recordings if you have them, documentation received, bank statements, screenshots of websites, etc. These items will be essential for the investigation and for any legal action.

Get legal support: Given the complexity of the procedures and the difficulty of obtaining redress, support from a lawyer specialising in banking law is strongly recommended. A professional can analyse your situation, identify the liabilities engaged, and advise you on the most appropriate litigation strategy.

Support from a banking law lawyer

Faced with an investment scam and the growing difficulties in obtaining redress from your bank, turning to a banking law lawyer offers several decisive advantages:

Precise legal analysis of your situation: An experienced lawyer can quickly determine whether, in your particular case, the conditions of an apparent anomaly are met under the criteria of current case law. This avoids bringing proceedings doomed to failure and directs your action towards the most promising avenues.

Building a solid case: The lawyer will know how to identify the relevant evidence, gather it and present it in a way that maximises your chances of success. In particular, the lawyer can obtain information from the bank through specific procedures (disclosure of documents, investigative measures, etc.).

Mastery of procedures: Banking litigation follows precise procedural rules. A banking law lawyer knows these rules and will comply with the time limits, formalities and arrangements for bringing proceedings before the competent courts.

Negotiation with the bank: In some cases, an amicable solution can be found with the banking institution, in particular where it wishes to avoid litigation. The lawyer can conduct this negotiation from a position of strength, putting forward the factual and legal elements favourable to your case.

Representation before the courts: If legal action proves necessary, the lawyer will represent you before the competent court, present your arguments with the required technical expertise, and defend your interests effectively.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment of 4 February 2026 marks an important step in defining banks’ duties of vigilance in the event of an investment scam. By quashing the criteria applied by the Agen Court of Appeal, the highest court reaffirms that only objective, apparent and easily detectable anomalies can oblige the banker to step out of its reserve and warn its customer.

This position in the case law, which favours the principle of the banker’s non-interference in its customer’s affairs, now places the burden of vigilance mainly on savers themselves. They can no longer count on systematic intervention by their banking institution to protect them against fraudulent investment offers.

In the face of this reality, prevention becomes an absolute imperative. Before any investment, particularly if it is offered to you by canvassing, take the time to check the intermediary’s authorisation, to consult the AMF blacklists, and to seek advice from independent professionals. If in doubt, refrain: no investment, however tempting, justifies taking reckless risks with your savings.

If, despite all precautions, you fall victim to a scam, act immediately: contact your bank, file a complaint, report the facts to the competent authorities, and get support from a banking law lawyer. Even if current case law makes it harder to engage the bank’s liability, every situation has its particularities, and a thorough legal analysis may reveal unsuspected remedies.

Banking law is constantly evolving, with court decisions and legislative changes. It is therefore essential to surround yourself with professionals who are up to date with these developments in order to defend your rights effectively and maximise your chances of obtaining redress.

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