Bank Power of Attorney and Vulnerable Customer: The Duty of Vigilance Prevails (CA Paris, Pôle 5 ch. 6, 4 February 2026, No. 24/00766)

Paris Court of Appeal, Pôle 5 ch. 6, 4 February 2026, No. 24/00766

I. The Factual Background: A Contested Power of Attorney in an Emergency

A. The Situation of the Hospitalised Customer

The case originates in a particularly delicate family situation. Ms G. T., a long-standing customer of Banque Populaire Rives since 1 April 1972, had been in hospital since the end of August 2021 with a serious illness, in this case advanced-stage cancer. This loyal customer, an account holder for nearly fifty years, was in a position of evident vulnerability, bedridden in hospital and unable to go to a branch to manage her banking affairs herself.

In this difficult medical context, the question of how to arrange the management of her assets arose acutely. The customer had apparently wished to delegate the management of her accounts to a trusted relative, in this case her brother, Mr S. T. It is in this configuration that the dispute took shape, one that would later set the deceased’s family against the bank.

It should be noted that Ms G. T. had no children. Her statutory heirs were therefore her brother and her two nieces, Ms C. T. and Ms M. T. This family composition will matter in analysing the presumed intentions of the deceased and the motivations of her brother when he presented himself at the bank.

B. The Steps Taken by the Brother as Proxy

On 21 October 2021, roughly two months after his sister’s hospitalisation, Mr S. T. went to the Banque Populaire branch with a power of attorney dated 14 October 2021. This power of attorney, drawn up under private signature (sous seing privé), gave him, in his view, a general mandate to act on his hospitalised sister’s bank account.

But Mr T.’s approach was not limited to a simple request for recognition as proxy. From this first visit, he made concrete and substantial financial requests which immediately caught the bank adviser’s attention. These requests included in particular a transfer of €50,000 to his own personal bank account, as well as payment of two cheques made out to his two daughters.

A particularly troubling element deserves emphasis: during his meeting with the bank adviser, Mr T. disclosed that he had already filled in the two cheques before even coming to the branch and before even being approved as proxy. These cheques, which the bank’s later production would show to be for €39,603.40 each (and not €31,000 as initially stated), had been signed by Mr T. himself. This haste and this anticipation of the transactions before even obtaining the bank’s approval constitute a first warning sign.

The meeting report drawn up by the bank adviser on 21 October 2021 documents these elements precisely. It records that Mr T. requested an urgent appointment, that he described his sister as “ill and unreachable”, and that he justified the requested transactions by “his sister’s wishes”. This very wording raises questions: how can a person who is unreachable have expressed her wishes regarding such precise and substantial transactions?

C. The Bank’s Cautious Reaction

Faced with this situation, Banque Populaire adopted a cautious stance which would form the heart of the dispute. The adviser immediately informed Mr T. that the power of attorney presented, being a document under private signature, was not acceptable as it stood for the transactions requested.

This first reaction was followed, on 23 October 2021, by a formal request for a medical certificate. The purpose of this certificate was to attest that Ms G. T. had informed and conscious consent at the time she signed the power of attorney and at the time she wished the requested transactions to be carried out. This request appears all the more legitimate as the customer was hospitalised for a serious illness potentially capable of impairing her faculties of discernment.

The medical certificate was produced on 26 October 2021. In the meantime, however, the initial power of attorney had been supplemented on 22 October 2021 by a certification drawn up by a notary. But this certification had a notable feature: it was strictly limited to authenticating Ms G. T.’s signature on the document. The notary had taken care to state explicitly that this certification related neither to the validity and effectiveness of the document, nor to the signatory’s legal capacity to sign it.

This restrictive wording by the notary is in itself a significant element. By limiting himself to certifying the signature without ruling on the capacity or the validity of the instrument, the notary left a doubt as to the signatory’s full capacity to consent to the transactions contemplated, particularly in the context of hospitalisation for a serious illness.

Faced with these insufficient elements to remove all uncertainty, the bank took an additional step on 28 October 2021 by requesting that a power of attorney be signed by authentic instrument (acte authentique), that is, drawn up before a notary in the forms required to guarantee the customer’s free and informed consent. This requirement, which may seem burdensome, aimed to obtain maximum assurance as to the account holder’s real wishes.

Unfortunately, this verification procedure would not have time to be completed. Ms G. T. died in November 2021, only a few days after the bank’s last request. This death, which occurred before the authentic power of attorney could actually be put in place, definitively sealed the impossibility of carrying out the transactions initially requested and paved the way for the litigation between the heirs and the bank.

II. The Court Proceedings: From First Instance to Appeal

A. The Heirs’ Arguments

By writs of 18 and 22 March 2022 (exploits), several months after the death of their relative, Mr S. T. and Ms C. T. and Ms M. T. summoned Banque Populaire Rives before the Paris Court of First Instance (tribunal judiciaire). Their action rested on two main grounds: first, serious fault by the bank in refusing to accept the power of attorney given by Ms G. T. to her brother, and second, a breach of the duty to advise (devoir de conseil) towards the deceased regarding the arrangements applicable to the power of attorney.

The T. family members put forward several legal arguments to challenge the position taken by the bank. First, they stressed that the bank produced no document showing that Ms G. T. had accepted the general terms and conditions on which it relied. This challenge sought to call into question the enforceability of the contractual provisions allowing the bank to require a power of attorney by notarial instrument.

The claimants also argued that the general terms produced nowhere stipulated a requirement of notarial form for the power of attorney. On their interpretation, the power of attorney under private signature presented on 21 October 2021 should have been regarded as sufficient to allow the requested transactions to be carried out.

An important argument also concerned the bank’s presumed knowledge of its customer’s family situation. The claimants argued that the bank could not have been unaware that they were Ms G. T.’s sole heirs, since she had no children. They added that the bank held all the legal documentation evidencing the close legal ties of the siblings, in particular because the account of a company that the deceased had managed with her brother was held in that same bank’s books.

On the merits, the T. family members claimed to establish the deceased’s donative intent (intention libérale). In their view, this intent resulted from the signing of the power of attorney of 14 October 2021 and from the fact that her brother and nieces were her statutory heirs. Their reasoning rested on the idea that Ms G. T. wished to make gifts of movable property by hand-to-hand delivery (dons manuels) during her lifetime in order to optimise the transfer of her estate.

It is on this basis that they developed their claim for compensation. The heirs argued that the bank’s demands, which they described as unfounded, for putting the power of attorney in place had caused them considerable financial loss. According to their calculation, the failure of the gifts to take effect before Ms G. T.’s death brought the sums concerned into the estate, thereby exposing them to additional taxation of more than €58,000 in inheritance tax.

They also disputed the applicability of the tax allowances put forward by the bank to minimise their loss. Their argument rested on the idea that the sums in dispute should not have ended up in the estate and therefore should not have been subject to tax had the bank accepted the power of attorney and allowed the transactions to be carried out before the death.

Finally, the claimants also sought compensation for non-material damage distinct from the financial loss, as well as reimbursement of cheque rejection fees they had had to bear as a result of the bank’s refusal.

B. The Bank’s Defence

Banque Populaire Rives put forward a defence structured around several complementary lines. Its argument aimed to show not only the absence of fault on its part, but also the absence of a causal link between its conduct and the loss alleged by the heirs.

On the first aspect, the bank recalled the precise factual context of Mr T.’s appearance on 21 October 2021. It stressed that he had come with a general power of attorney drawn up while his sister was hospitalised with a serious illness, accompanied immediately by a request for a transfer for his own benefit and for payment of two cheques that he had filled in for the benefit of his daughters before any approval by the bank.

The bank insisted in particular on the abnormal circumstances surrounding this request. It noted that the power of attorney dated 14 October 2021 had been supplemented on 22 October 2021 by a mere notary’s certification relating only to Ms G. T.’s signature, and not to the validity and effectiveness of the document, nor to the signatory’s legal capacity.

The bank recalled that when a power of attorney is set up, it is usual for the customer and the proxy to attend the branch together, so as to allow the bank to verify the customer’s consent directly. It argued that this could not have been the case here for Ms G. T., who was hospitalised and therefore unable to travel.

In these circumstances, the bank argued that it was entitled to require a medical certificate, then consent given in authentic form in accordance with the contractual provisions it relied on. It justified these requests by the legitimate questions raised by the situation: if Ms G. T. was capable of signing the power of attorney, why had she not filled in the corresponding cheques herself? Why had these cheques been drawn up by her brother before he had even been approved as proxy?

The bank added an important textual argument: the power of attorney of 14 October 2021 contained no mention of the proxy’s right to carry out transactions affecting the customer’s assets, and more particularly to make gifts (libéralités). Yet the transactions requested (a €50,000 transfer to the proxy’s personal account and cheques for his daughters’ benefit) resembled gifts more than ordinary acts of management.

As to the complaint of a breach of the duty to advise on the arrangements for setting up the power of attorney, the bank argued that it was merely the account-holding bank and was bound by a duty of non-interference in its customer’s affairs. It was not for it to take the place of the notary in determining who was an heir or in advising its customer on the organisation of her succession.

On causation and loss, the bank developed a particularly thorough argument. It first disputed that the causal link between its alleged fault and the inheritance taxation was established. It stressed that the failure to put the power of attorney in place before the death did not result from excessive caution on its part, but from a lack of foresight by the family itself in completing this formality.

The bank pointed out that Mr T. himself acknowledged in his submissions that he had been informed since August 2021 of the advanced stage of his sister’s cancer. If the family really wished to put in place a power of attorney to facilitate the management of the accounts and possibly make gifts, it therefore had several weeks to organise this step in the appropriate forms. Last-minute haste could not be attributed to the bank.

In addition, the bank firmly disputed that the alleged gifts had been shown. It stressed that a distinction had to be drawn between the deceased’s presumed donative intent, which had never been formally expressed for the transfers requested, and her brother’s wish to avoid paying inheritance tax. This distinction is fundamental: a power of attorney to manage an account is not equivalent to an authorisation to make gifts to oneself.

In the alternative, the bank recalled the tax allowance rules applicable to successions in order to challenge the quantum of the alleged loss. It argued that even if the sums had entered the estate, the heirs benefited from statutory allowances significantly reducing the real tax impact.

Finally, as to the non-material damage alleged, the bank’s defence took a firm tone. It stressed that it was, to say the least, misplaced to claim that it had shown no efficiency in approving Mr T. as proxy when it had handled the file in only seven days in a particularly sensitive and delicate context requiring thorough verification. This speed of handling, far from constituting a failing, testified on the contrary to the seriousness with which the bank had approached the request.

C. The First-Instance Judgment

By judgment of 31 October 2023, the Paris Court of First Instance, 9th chamber, 2nd section, dismissed all the claims made by the T. family members against the bank. This first-instance decision fully upheld the position defended by the bank.

The court considered that Banque Populaire had committed no fault in handling the request to set up the power of attorney. The first-instance judges found that the bank had, on the contrary, acted prudently and in compliance with its professional obligations by requiring additional documents to verify its customer’s consent.

This assessment logically led to the rejection of the heirs’ compensation claims, for both financial loss and non-material damage. The court also ordered the unsuccessful claimants to pay the bank €3,000 under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure (code de procédure civile), as well as the costs of the proceedings.

Dissatisfied with this decision, the T. family members appealed the judgment, thus opening the second phase of the proceedings before the Paris Court of Appeal. In their final submissions served electronically on 20 March 2024, they sought full reversal of the first-instance judgment and an order that the bank pay €58,309.64 for financial loss, €15,000 for non-material damage, reimbursement of the cheque rejection fees, and a cumulative €10,000 under Article 700 (€5,000 for the first instance and €5,000 for the appeal).

Banque Populaire, in its final submissions served on 28 May 2024, sought for its part outright confirmation of the judgment under appeal, dismissal of the opposing claims, and an order that the appellants pay it a further €5,000 in irrecoverable appeal costs.

After the closing order of 4 November 2025, the case was set down for the hearing of 9 December 2025 before Pôle 5, chamber 6 of the Paris Court of Appeal. It was at the end of this hearing that the court delivered its judgment on 4 February 2026, whose jurisprudential contributions we analyse here.

III. The Banker’s Duty of Vigilance: An Established Principle of Case Law

A. The Principle of Non-Interference in the Customer’s Affairs

The starting point of the Court of Appeal’s legal analysis is to recall a cardinal principle of banking law: the banker holding an account is bound by a duty of non-interference in its customer’s affairs. This principle, constantly reaffirmed by the case law, is the corollary of freedom of contract and of the autonomy in managing assets enjoyed by every account holder.

In concrete terms, this duty of non-interference means that the bank must not monitor its customer’s affairs, nor set itself up as an unsolicited adviser on the management of his or her assets. The banker need not assess the economic appropriateness of the transactions requested by its customer, nor question the relevance of his or her financial choices. Its role is limited to carrying out the instructions received, in compliance with the contractual provisions and applicable legal rules.

This duty of reserve is justified by several considerations. First, it guarantees the confidentiality of the customer’s affairs and preserves his or her freedom of management. Second, it protects the banker from excessive liability that would result from interfering in decisions that are for the customer’s judgement alone. Finally, it keeps banking operations flowing smoothly by preventing each transaction from undergoing an in-depth examination of its economic relevance.

In the particular context of bank powers of attorney, this principle of non-interference implies that the bank need not systematically verify that the proxy is actually acting in the principal’s interest, nor monitor the use made of the powers conferred. Once the power of attorney has been properly set up and the proxy approved, the bank must in principle carry out the orders given by the proxy as if they came from the account holder personally.

B. The Exception: The Duty of Vigilance in the Presence of Anomalies

However, and this is the major lesson of the judgment under comment, the principle of non-interference is subject to an important exception when the banker is confronted with an apparent anomaly. The Paris Court of Appeal thus recalls that the duty of non-interference gives way to the banker’s duty of vigilance.

This case-law exception rests on a logic of customer protection and fraud prevention. Where a transaction displays unusual or suspicious features, the banker cannot hide behind its duty of non-interference to turn a blind eye and blindly execute the order received. It must on the contrary exercise its professional vigilance and, where appropriate, refuse to process the transaction until doubts have been dispelled.

The notion of apparent anomaly, which triggers this heightened duty of vigilance, has both a material and an intellectual dimension. The anomaly may be material where it results from the very form of the transaction or the documents presented: manifestly different signatures, incomplete documents or documents bearing suspicious erasures, formal inconsistencies, and so on. The anomaly is intellectual where it stems from the circumstances surrounding the transaction or its content: amounts disproportionate to the habits of the account, unusual beneficiaries, transactions unrelated to the purpose of the account, and so on.

What matters is that the anomaly be apparent, that is, capable of being detected by a normally diligent professional carrying out his or her business with the care and attention required. The banker is not required to conduct an in-depth investigation into every transaction, but must show the attention that can legitimately be expected of a banking professional.

When such an anomaly is detected, the duty of vigilance requires the banker to take several measures. It must first refrain from executing the suspicious transaction until the necessary checks have been carried out. It must then contact the customer who holds the account, and not merely the proxy or the person giving the order, to verify that the transaction does reflect his or her wishes. If necessary, it may require additional documents or enhanced guarantees before proceeding to execute the order.

This duty of vigilance protects both the customer against unwanted transactions (abuse of weakness, inheritance capture, misuse of a power of attorney) and the bank against later liability for having facilitated a fraudulent transaction or one contrary to the account holder’s interests.

C. The Applicable Case Law

The Paris Court of Appeal does not merely state this principle in the abstract. It takes care to anchor it in the settled case law of the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation), citing three leading judgments of the Commercial Chamber.

The first judgment cited is that of the Commercial Chamber of 10 December 2003 (appeal No. 00-18.653, published in the Bulletin civil 2003, IV, No. 200). This decision, which has become a leading authority on the subject, laid down the general framework for the interplay between the duty of non-interference and the banker’s duty of vigilance. It established that while the banker must not monitor its customer’s affairs, it must nevertheless refuse to process a transaction when it notes an apparent anomaly.

The second leading judgment is that of the Commercial Chamber of 7 July 2009 (appeal No. 08-18.251, published in the Bulletin 2009, IV, No. 93). This decision clarified the contours of the notion of apparent anomaly and confirmed that it may be material or intellectual in nature. It also recalled that the assessment of whether an anomaly exists falls within the sovereign discretion of the trial judges.

Finally, the third judgment mentioned is a more recent one of the Commercial Chamber of 25 September 2019 (appeals Nos. 18-15.965 and 18-16.421, unpublished). This decision reaffirmed these principles in the specific context of transactions carried out by a proxy, confirming that the banker’s vigilance must be particularly sharp where the proxy appears to be the economic beneficiary of the transactions he carries out in the principal’s name.

These three judgments thus form a coherent body of case law that guides the judges’ assessment when they are faced with a dispute between a customer (or his or her heirs) and the bank over a contested transaction. The Paris Court of Appeal’s explicit reference to these decisions testifies to its wish to follow this settled line of authority and to guarantee the predictability of the applicable law.

It should be stressed that this case law strikes a subtle balance between potentially conflicting interests. On the one hand, it preserves the freedom and confidentiality of the customer’s affairs by limiting the banker’s power of investigation to suspicious situations alone. On the other, it protects the vulnerable customer against abuse by imposing on the banker an effective duty of vigilance when circumstances so require.

The implementation of these principles therefore requires an assessment in concreto of each situation. The judges must examine all the factual circumstances to determine whether, in the case at hand, the transaction did display abnormal features justifying the banker’s refusal to execute it without further verification. It is precisely this exercise of concrete assessment that the Paris Court of Appeal carried out in the case before us.

IV. The Court’s Analysis: Anomalies Justifying Heightened Vigilance

A. The Abnormal Circumstances Identified

The Paris Court of Appeal’s judgment stands out for the thoroughness with which it analyses the factual circumstances of the case to identify the anomalies justifying the bank’s heightened vigilance. This in-depth analysis deserves to be set out in detail, as it is a genuine user’s manual for practitioners faced with similar situations.

The first anomaly identified by the court concerns the medical context of the request for a power of attorney. It was common ground between the parties that Ms G. T. had been hospitalised with a serious illness since the end of August 2021. This prolonged hospitalisation, in the context of advanced-stage cancer, was a first warning sign. A seriously ill person in hospital may have impaired discernment, whether because of the illness itself, the medication, or the state of physical and psychological weakness the situation produces.

The second anomaly lay in the bank’s inability to speak directly with its customer. As the court recalls, it is usual when a power of attorney is set up for the customer and the proxy to come to the branch together. This practice allows the bank adviser to verify directly, through an exchange with the account holder, that she properly understands the scope of the power of attorney she is signing and freely consents to granting the mandate. Here, Ms G. T.’s hospitalisation made this direct verification impossible, which all the more justified the bank in requiring additional guarantees.

The third anomaly, a particularly significant one, concerned the nature and characteristics of the power of attorney presented. The document dated 14 October 2021 was a simple instrument under private signature conferring a general mandate. Yet this type of power of attorney, when it is meant to produce significant effects on the principal’s assets, legitimately raises questions about the conditions in which consent was obtained, especially when the principal is hospitalised.

What is more, the initial power of attorney had been supplemented on 22 October 2021 by a certification from a notary. But this certification had a particular feature which the court stresses emphatically: it was strictly limited to certifying that the signature affixed to the document was indeed that of Ms G. T. The notary had taken care to state explicitly that this certification related neither to the validity and effectiveness of the document, nor to the signatory’s legal capacity to sign it. In other words, the notary authenticated the signature without ruling on the signatory’s mental capacity to understand what she was signing.

This restrictive wording by the notary was in itself a major warning sign. If the notary, a legal professional used to receiving consents, had considered it necessary to expressly limit the scope of his certification, there was manifestly a doubt as to Ms G. T.’s full capacity to validly consent to the instrument. This notarial reservation, far from reassuring the bank, should on the contrary have reinforced its caution.

The fourth anomaly, and not the least, lay in the financial requests made at the same time as the power of attorney was presented. The report of the meeting of 21 October 2021 revealed that Mr T. was not content to request approval as proxy in order then to manage his sister’s account normally. He immediately asked to carry out substantial financial transactions: a €50,000 transfer for his own benefit and payment of two cheques in favour of his daughters.

Yet these transactions themselves displayed suspicious features. On the one hand, the proxy requested a large transfer to his personal account, raising the question of a possible conflict of interest. On the other hand, the cheques for the benefit of his daughters resembled gifts more than ordinary acts of banking management. The power of attorney presented, moreover, contained no mention of the proxy’s right to carry out transactions affecting assets, still less to make gifts.

The fifth anomaly, a particularly revealing one, concerned the fact that Mr T. had filled in and signed the two cheques even before presenting himself at the branch to be approved as proxy. This detail, which might seem trivial, is in fact highly significant. It reveals suspicious haste and anticipation, as if the putative proxy already regarded the transactions as a done deal before even obtaining the necessary bank approval.

More troubling still, the cheques in question, whose exact amount was revealed by the bank’s later production, were each for €39,603.40, a markedly higher figure than the €31,000 initially stated at the meeting. This discrepancy, which may result from a simple lapse of memory or a rough rounding, nevertheless contributed to the overall suspicious nature of the approach.

Finally, the sixth anomaly identified by the court lay in a logical inconsistency pointed out by the bank itself: if Ms G. T. was able to sign the power of attorney on 14 October 2021, why had she not filled in the corresponding cheques herself? Why had her brother taken care of this formality before even having the legal power to do so? This legitimate question reinforced doubts about the reality of the customer’s consent to the requested transactions.

B. The Legitimate Verification of Consent

In view of all these abnormal circumstances, the Paris Court of Appeal considers that the banker holding the account was fully entitled to verify, before carrying out any transaction, that its customer was capable of making them and had actually expressed the wish to proceed.

This assessment is the heart of the legal reasoning developed by the judgment. The court does not merely assert in the abstract the existence of a duty of vigilance; it shows concretely, on the facts of the case, that the anomalies noted fully justified the bank in suspending execution of the requested transactions pending additional guarantees.

The wording adopted by the court deserves emphasis. It speaks of verifying that the customer was “capable” of making the transactions, which refers to the legal notion of capacity of discernment, distinct from general legal capacity. A person may be legally capable (an adult not under protective measures) while temporarily having impaired discernment because of illness, medication, or psychological pressure. It is precisely this present capacity of discernment that the bank had to make sure to verify.

The court also mentions the need to verify that the customer “had actually expressed the wish” to carry out the transactions. This wording is important because it distinguishes two things: on the one hand, the signing of a general power of attorney giving a mandate to her brother, and on the other, the specific wish to carry out the concrete transactions requested (a €50,000 transfer and cheques for the nieces). The power of attorney conferred a general power, but it did not show that the customer had expressly wished those particular transactions to be carried out immediately.

This distinction is legally fundamental. A general proxy admittedly has broad power to manage the principal’s account, but this power must be exercised in the principal’s interest and in accordance with his or her instructions, express or presumed. Where the proxy carries out transactions that benefit him directly or that resemble gifts, the presumption that these transactions reflect the principal’s wishes is rebutted, and it is for the proxy to show that they were specifically authorised.

The verification step taken by the bank therefore appeared not only legitimate but necessary in the circumstances. By refraining from immediately executing the orders given by Mr T. and requiring additional guarantees as to its customer’s consent, the bank committed no fault. On the contrary, it fully discharged its duty of vigilance designed to protect the interests of the account holder.

C. Proportionate Measures

The Court of Appeal does not stop at validating the principle of verifying the customer’s consent. It also examines the concrete measures taken by the bank to carry out this verification and considers that they were proportionate to the circumstances.

The first measure taken by the bank, from 23 October 2021, was to request a medical certificate attesting that Ms G. T. had informed and conscious consent. This request appears perfectly justified given the customer’s state of health. Such a certificate, drawn up by a doctor who had examined the patient, made it possible to ensure that despite her hospitalisation for a serious illness, she retained her full mental faculties to take decisions about her assets.

This medical certificate was indeed produced on 26 October 2021, only three days after the request. This speed shows that the family had access to the treating doctor and could obtain the necessary documents. However, the bank apparently did not regard this certificate as sufficient in view of all the anomalies noted, which led it to make a second request.

This second request, made on 28 October 2021, concerned the signing of a power of attorney by authentic instrument, that is, drawn up before a notary. The court considers that this requirement was also well founded. The authentic instrument indeed offers greater guarantees than a document under private signature: the notary verifies the identity and capacity of the parties, makes sure of their free and informed consent, reads the instrument to them and explains its legal scope. In the context of a person hospitalised with a serious illness, these additional guarantees appeared fully justified.

The court observes that this requirement of authenticity could moreover find a contractual basis in the bank’s general terms and conditions. Although the enforceability of these general terms had been contested in the absence of production of the account opening agreement, the provisions relied on explicitly stated that “a power of attorney by notarial instrument may, where appropriate, be requested by the Bank”. This contractual right, even if its use was meant to remain exceptional, was fully applicable in a situation as suspicious as the one at hand.

The judgment implicitly underlines an important temporal element: between Mr T.’s first appearance on 21 October 2021 and the request for an authentic power of attorney on 28 October, only seven days had elapsed. This period appears remarkably short for handling such a delicate file, requiring thorough verification. Far from being excessively slow, this speed of handling testified on the contrary to the seriousness with which the bank had examined the request.

The proportionality of the measures taken is also shown by their gradual nature. The bank did not immediately issue a definitive refusal; it requested additional documents step by step: first a medical certificate, then, when that proved insufficient in the circumstances, an authentic power of attorney. This step-by-step approach demonstrates a concern to reconcile the protection of the customer with the real possibility of putting the power of attorney in place if the conditions were met.

Finally, the court notes that the failure to put the power of attorney effectively in place before Ms G. T.’s death did not result from excessive caution on the bank’s part, but from the family’s lack of foresight in completing this formality. This element is crucial for assessing causation, because it shifts responsibility for the delay from the bank to the family itself.

As the judgment observes, Mr T. himself acknowledged in his submissions that he had been informed since August 2021 of the advanced stage of his sister’s cancer. If the family really wished to put in place a power of attorney to facilitate the management of the account and possibly make gifts, it therefore had nearly two months to organise this step in the appropriate forms. Waiting until mid-October to draw up a power of attorney under private signature, and then presenting himself at the bank with requests for immediate transactions, amounted to last-minute management for which the bank could not be held responsible.

V. The Question of the General Terms and the Form of the Power of Attorney

A. The Contested Enforceability of the General Terms

An important procedural aspect of the judgment deserves analysis: the question of whether the bank’s general terms and conditions could be enforced against Ms G. T.’s account. This question had a technical dimension but potentially significant legal consequences.

The T. family members argued that the bank produced no document showing that their relative had accepted the general terms on which it relied. This challenge sought to deprive the bank of the contractual basis allowing it to require a power of attorney by notarial instrument, since that right was expressly provided for in the general terms put before the court.

The Paris Court of Appeal decides this question clearly. It observes that, since the bank failed to produce Ms G. T.’s account opening agreement or any other document, the general terms relied on cannot be regarded as applicable to the account, given that the heirs dispute their applicability.

This position follows the classic case law on the enforceability of general terms. For a contractual document to be enforceable against a customer, it must still be shown that the customer knew of it and accepted it, expressly or tacitly. In the absence of production of the account opening agreement, which would normally have contained a reference to the applicable general terms and the customer’s signature, the bank could not establish this acceptance.

This solution may seem harsh on the bank, which is deprived of a potentially useful contractual argument. It nevertheless recalls a fundamental rule of banking law: the burden of proving the enforceability of contractual provisions lies on the professional, who must be able to produce the contractual documents signed by the customer.

In the context of a banking relationship that began in 1972, more than fifty years before the dispute, it is understandable that the bank did not keep the original account opening agreement. The legal obligations to retain banking documents do not extend over such a period. Nevertheless, this lack of contractual proof works against the bank when the applicability of the general terms is contested.

However, and this is a major lesson of the judgment, this inability to rely on the general terms ultimately has no bearing on the outcome of the dispute. The court bases its decision not on a contractual provision authorising the bank to require a notarial power of attorney, but on the direct application of the duty of vigilance arising from the case law. In other words, even without a contractual basis, the bank was legally bound to verify its customer’s consent in the abnormal circumstances of the case.

B. The Form of the Power of Attorney: The Requirement of an Authentic Instrument

Independently of the question of the general terms, the judgment provides important clarifications on the forms of bank power of attorney and the guarantees each offers.

The T. family members argued that the general terms produced nowhere stipulated a requirement of notarial form for the power of attorney. They deduced from this that the power of attorney under private signature of 14 October 2021 should have been regarded as sufficient. This argument, which might seem admissible from a purely formal standpoint, overlooked the fundamental distinction between situations of ordinary management and suspicious situations.

Indeed, the general terms cited in the judgment provided that “the power of attorney is formalised on a specific document made available by the Bank, signed by each joint holder and by the proxy”. This provision concerns normal situations in which a power of attorney is set up, when the customer comes to the branch with the proxy he or she has chosen and nothing casts doubt on his or her free and informed consent.

But the same general terms added immediately: “Furthermore, a power of attorney by notarial instrument may, where appropriate, be requested by the Bank”. This wording, which leaves the bank a margin of discretion (“may”), allows it precisely to require an enhanced form when circumstances justify it. The “where appropriate” refers to situations in which the ordinary form does not offer sufficient guarantees, in particular where the customer is vulnerable or the contemplated transactions are of a suspicious nature.

The court’s analysis thus reveals that the question whether the general terms were enforceable and whether they expressly provided for the possibility of requiring a notarial form was ultimately only incidental. The real basis of the bank’s requirement lay in the duty of vigilance imposed by the case law, which is a legal obligation binding on all banking institutions regardless of their contractual provisions.

This approach offers a considerable advantage in terms of legal certainty. It prevents the protection of the vulnerable customer from depending on the more or less precise content of the general terms applicable to his or her account. Even if those terms provide no right to require an authentic form, the bank remains bound, by virtue of its general duty of vigilance, to refuse a suspicious power of attorney and to obtain the guarantees necessary to verify the customer’s consent.

C. The Notary’s Limited Certification

A particularly instructive element of the judgment concerns the analysis of the notarial certification affixed on 22 October 2021 to the initial power of attorney. This certification, far from reassuring the bank, on the contrary reinforced its doubts because of the limitations expressly stated by the notary.

The court stresses that the notary had taken care to state that his certification related only to Ms G. T.’s signature, and not to the validity and effectiveness of the document, nor to the signatory’s legal capacity to sign it. These reservations deserve to be decoded because they illuminate the limits of this type of certification.

When a notary certifies a signature, he attests that he has verified the signatory’s identity and has observed that the signature affixed to the document in his presence is indeed that of the identified person. This certification has significant evidential value: it establishes almost conclusively that the named person did sign the document. However, it goes no further.

In particular, certification of a signature does not mean that the notary has verified the content of the instrument, nor that he has made sure the signatory understood its scope, nor that he has checked the signatory’s mental capacity to consent validly. A notary may perfectly well certify a person’s signature while having doubts about his or her capacity of discernment, hence the importance of the reservations he may make.

In this case, the fact that the notary expressly stated that he did not certify the signatory’s legal capacity was a major warning sign. If the notary, a professional used to assessing the capacity of the persons who appear before him, had thought it useful to make such a reservation, there was manifestly a serious doubt about that capacity. Perhaps the person showed signs of extreme fatigue, confusion or influence by a third party. Perhaps the notary had been made aware of the customer’s serious state of health and did not wish to incur liability by certifying her full capacity.

This notarial reservation, instead of dispelling the bank’s doubts as the claimants probably hoped, should on the contrary have reinforced them. It meant in substance: “I certify that it is indeed Ms G. T. who signed this document, but I make no statement as to whether she was in a state to understand what she was signing”. In the context of a person hospitalised with advanced-stage cancer, this reservation took on its full meaning and fully justified the bank in requiring a more solemn form of power of attorney.

The difference between a simple certification of signature and an authentic instrument drawn up by the notary is therefore considerable. In the latter case, the notary receives the parties, reads the instrument to them, makes sure they understand it, verifies their capacity to consent, and engages his professional liability on all these points. The authentic instrument thus offers maximum assurance as to the parties’ free and informed consent, which justified the bank in requiring it in the circumstances of the case.

VI. The Losses Alleged and the Absence of a Causal Link

A. The Tax-Related Financial Loss

At the heart of the T. family members’ claims was a claim for compensation of €58,309.64 for their financial loss. This amount corresponded, in their view, to the additional inheritance tax they had had to pay because of the impossibility of carrying out the contemplated hand-to-hand gifts before their relative’s death.

Their reasoning rested on an apparently attractive logic: had the bank accepted the power of attorney and allowed the transactions requested on 21 October 2021 to be carried out, the corresponding sums (€50,000 by transfer and €79,206.80 in total for the two cheques) would have left Ms G. T.’s estate during her lifetime, in the form of hand-to-hand gifts. These gifts would have benefited from the tax allowances applicable to gifts, and the sums given would not have been included in the estate. As a result, the heirs would have paid less inheritance tax.

Conversely, since the death occurred before the transactions could be carried out, the sums concerned remained in the deceased’s account and were included in the estate, giving rise to the calculation of inheritance tax at the rate applicable given the degree of kinship and the total value of the estate. Hence the alleged financial loss, corresponding to the difference between the tax that would have resulted from the gifts and that actually borne in the succession.

This reasoning, although technically constructed, ran up against several substantive objections which the court accepts. First, it presupposed that the requested transactions were actually gifts, that is, legal acts by which Ms G. T. intended to voluntarily and irrevocably divest herself of part of her assets in favour of her brother and nieces. Yet this classification as a gift was in no way established.

Next, the reasoning ignored the rules on the collation of gifts in successions (rapport successoral). Even if the gifts had been made during the donor’s lifetime, they could have been subject to collation to the estate if they had been made to presumptive heirs, as was the case here since the beneficiaries of the sums were precisely those who were to inherit. The alleged tax saving could therefore be greatly overstated.

Finally and above all, the reasoning disregarded the rules applicable to the causal link. To obtain compensation for a loss, it is not enough to show that a fault was committed and that a loss was suffered; it must also be established that the loss is the direct and certain consequence of the alleged fault. Here, this causal link was lacking.

B. Donative Intent Not Shown

A central element of the bank’s argument, which the court accepts, concerned the lack of proof of Ms G. T.’s donative intent. The T. family members argued that this intent resulted from the signing of the power of attorney and from the fact that the beneficiaries of the transactions were her heirs. But this presumption was not enough to establish the reality of an intention to give.

The bank rightly pointed out that two things had to be distinguished: on the one hand, Ms G. T.’s presumed donative intent, and on the other, Mr T.’s expressed wish to avoid paying inheritance tax. This distinction is legally fundamental.

Giving one’s brother a power of attorney to manage one’s bank account during a hospital stay does not necessarily mean authorising him to make large transfers to himself or to write cheques for his children. A general power of attorney confers a power of management, which must be exercised in the principal’s interest, but it does not in itself constitute an authorisation to dispose of assets for the benefit of the proxy or his family.

What is more, the circumstances in which the transactions had been requested raised serious doubts about the reality of any donative intent. Ms G. T. was hospitalised, described as “unreachable” by her brother, and the cheques had been filled in before the proxy was even approved. How can it be asserted with certainty that these transactions reflected the customer’s wishes and not her brother’s initiative?

The court implicitly stresses that Ms G. T. had never expressly manifested a donative intent for the transfers requested. The claimants relied only on presumptions: the status of the beneficiaries as heirs, the existence of the power of attorney, and the end-of-life context. But these elements, however understandable on a human level, did not constitute sufficient legal proof of an intention to give.

It should be added that even if a donative intent had existed, it would have had to be given effect in the required forms. Gifts of money, when they exceed a certain amount or take place in a sensitive family context, call for particular precautions to avoid any later dispute. A gift by cheque or transfer, although legally possible, carries risks of proof and interpretation that should be anticipated.

In the present case, the fact that the transactions were requested in haste, while the donor was hospitalised and unable to confirm her wishes personally, made the classification of these transactions as gifts particularly delicate. The bank’s caution, in refusing to take part in transactions whose legal nature and conformity with the customer’s real wishes remained doubtful, therefore appeared fully justified.

C. The Break in the Causal Link

Beyond the question of donative intent, the court identifies a decisive legal obstacle to the compensation claimed: the absence of a causal link between the bank’s conduct and the alleged tax loss.

The judgment formulates this absence of causation particularly clearly: “the failure to put the power of attorney in place before the death of [G] [T] does not result from excessive caution on its part, but from a lack of foresight by the family in putting this formality in place”. This wording completely reverses the perspective adopted by the claimants.

According to the T. family members, the tax loss resulted directly from the bank’s wrongful refusal to accept the power of attorney. Had the bank accepted the power of attorney under private signature as early as 21 October 2021, the transactions could have been carried out before the death in November, and the tax loss would have been avoided. On this logic, it was indeed the bank’s conduct that was the direct cause of the damage.

The court adopts a radically different analysis. It considers that the true cause of the impossibility of carrying out the transactions before the death lies not in the bank’s conduct, which handled the file promptly (only seven days between the first request and the requirement of an authentic power of attorney), but in the family’s lack of foresight.

This analysis rests on a decisive temporal element: Mr T. himself acknowledged having been informed since August 2021 of the advanced stage of his sister’s cancer. Yet the power of attorney was drawn up only on 14 October 2021, and Mr T. presented himself at the bank only on 21 October. Between learning of the seriousness of the illness and the steps taken, nearly two months went by.

If the family really wished to put in place an arrangement allowing Mr T. to manage his sister’s account and possibly make gifts in anticipation of the succession, it therefore had ample time to organise these steps in the appropriate forms. From August or September, it could have had an authentic power of attorney drawn up by a notary who would have come to the hospital. It could also, had that been Ms G. T.’s wish, have arranged formal gifts with the assistance of a notary.

Yet nothing of the kind was done. The family waited until mid-October to draw up a power of attorney under private signature, offering insufficient guarantees given the situation. Then, from the first visit to the branch, it requested the immediate execution of significant transactions, without having taken the time to put the appropriate legal structures in place. This last-minute management, characterised by urgency and improvisation, is the family’s responsibility alone and not the bank’s.

The bank also observes, with a certain irony, that it was to say the least misplaced to reproach it for a lack of efficiency when it had handled the file in only seven days in a particularly delicate context requiring thorough verification. This speed of handling, far from constituting a failing, testified on the contrary to the seriousness with which the bank had approached the situation.

This analysis of causation logically leads the court to rule out any liability on the bank’s part for the alleged tax loss. Even assuming that this loss exists and can be quantified (which, as we have seen, was debatable), it could not be attributed to the bank since it had committed no fault and the damage resulted directly from the family’s insufficient foresight.

This solution accords with the general principles of civil liability law. Under Article 1240 of the Civil Code (code civil) (formerly Article 1382), liability can be incurred only if three cumulative conditions are met: a fault, a loss, and a causal link between the fault and the loss. Here, the first condition (fault) was already lacking, the bank having on the contrary fulfilled its duty of vigilance. But even had a fault been found, the third condition (the causal link) would have barred any order against the bank, since the loss resulted not from the bank’s conduct but from the family’s lack of preparation.

It may be added that the court’s acceptance of the bank’s reasoning on the absence of causation has an important educational dimension. It reminds families of the importance of anticipating situations of vulnerability among their relatives. When a person is struck by a serious illness, the legal structures making it possible to ensure the management of his or her affairs should be put in place as soon as possible: authentic power of attorney, advance protection mandate (mandat de protection future), or even a judicial protection measure if the person is no longer in a state to consent validly. Waiting until the last moment, then reproaching the bank for exercising its vigilance, is not a legally viable strategy.

VII. The Scope of the Decision: Practical Lessons

A. For Banking Institutions

The Paris Court of Appeal’s judgment of 4 February 2026 is a decision particularly favourable to banking institutions faced with requests to set up powers of attorney in suspicious circumstances. It bolsters their position by validating a cautious approach and recognising the primacy of the duty of vigilance over the obligation to execute orders quickly.

The first lesson for banks concerns identifying the warning signs that justify heightened vigilance. The judgment draws up a near-exhaustive list of the anomalies that should lead to suspending execution of a power of attorney request: a hospitalised or seriously ill customer, inability to speak directly with the customer, a power of attorney under private signature in a sensitive context, a notarial certification limited to the signature without attestation of capacity, a proxy who is the direct or indirect beneficiary of the transactions requested, large amounts, transactions pre-filled before approval of the proxy, and urgency invoked without clear justification.

In the presence of one or more of these signs, banking institutions are not only authorised but legally bound to refuse to execute the requested transactions until further verifications have been carried out. This duty of vigilance takes precedence over any consideration of speed or smooth running of operations.

The second lesson concerns the verification measures the bank may legitimately require. The judgment explicitly validates two types of request: first, production of a medical certificate attesting that the customer has informed and conscious consent, and second, the requirement of a power of attorney by authentic instrument. These two measures, far from being excessive requirements, appear as proportionate guarantees in situations presenting risks of abuse.

Banks may therefore rely on this judgment to justify such requests to their customers or proxies. It is advisable to document carefully the reasons why these verifications are required, identifying precisely the anomalies noted, so as to be able, where necessary, to justify the soundness of this caution later on.

The third lesson concerns the importance of speed of handling. The judgment stresses that the bank handled the file in only seven days, which testified to remarkable seriousness and efficiency given the complexity of the situation. This promptness played an important role in the court’s assessment, which considered that the verification period could not be described as excessive.

Banking institutions must therefore take care to handle these sensitive files diligently, even if they require thorough verification. The aim is not to issue a definitive refusal or let the request drag on indefinitely, but to quickly request the necessary additional documents and process the file as soon as they are produced.

The fourth lesson concerns the interplay between contractual provisions and the case-law duty of vigilance. The judgment recalls that even in the absence of enforceable contractual provisions allowing the bank to require an authentic power of attorney, the bank remains bound by its general duty of vigilance arising from the case law. This solution protects institutions against challenges based on the absence or inapplicability of their general terms.

It nevertheless remains advisable for general terms to provide expressly for this right, as was the case in the case under comment. This contractual provision, even if not indispensable, makes it easier to justify the bank’s requirements and prevents the debate from crystallising solely on the application of case-law principles that customers sometimes overlook.

Finally, the judgment reminds banks that they need not interfere in their customers’ succession plans or advise them on how to organise their succession. The bank is an account holder’s bank, not a notary or wealth adviser. Its role is limited to verifying that the transactions requested reflect the account holder’s present and informed wishes, without having to assess their tax or succession advantages.

B. For Customers and Their Families

The judgment also contains important lessons for customers and their relatives who are considering setting up a bank power of attorney, particularly in a context of illness or vulnerability.

The first lesson, and undoubtedly the most important, is the need to plan ahead. When a person is struck by a serious illness or their health deteriorates, it is essential to organise the management of their banking and asset affairs as soon as possible. Waiting until the last weeks or days to set up a power of attorney exposes one to practical and legal difficulties that can make it impossible to carry out the desired transactions.

This planning should ideally take place while the person retains the full extent of their faculties of discernment and can travel or receive a notary in good conditions. Setting up an authentic power of attorney drawn up by a notary offers maximum guarantees and avoids any later dispute over the validity of consent.

The second lesson concerns the choice of the form of the power of attorney. The judgment illustrates the limits of the power of attorney under private signature in sensitive situations. Even when supplemented by a notarial certification limited to the signature, this type of power of attorney is not enough to dispel the bank’s legitimate doubts about the customer’s consent when the customer is hospitalised with a serious illness.

It is therefore strongly recommended, whenever one plans to entrust a third party with extensive powers over one’s bank accounts, particularly if those powers include the ability to carry out significant transactions affecting assets, to use an authentic power of attorney drawn up by notarial instrument. The cost of this formality (generally a few hundred euros) is more than offset by the legal certainty it provides.

The third lesson concerns the distinction between a power of attorney and an authorisation to dispose. Giving a relative a power of attorney to manage one’s account does not mean authorising him to make large transfers for his own benefit or that of his family. If that is the intention, it should be stated expressly in the power of attorney and, better still, the desired gifts should be formally arranged with the assistance of a notary.

The fourth lesson concerns understanding the role of the bank. Customers and their families must understand that when the bank requires additional verifications, it is not engaging in administrative obstruction, but fulfilling its legal duty of vigilance designed precisely to protect the vulnerable customer. The purpose of this vigilance is not to complicate procedures unnecessarily, but to prevent people weakened by illness from falling victim to abuse of weakness or inheritance capture.

Rather than viewing the bank’s requests as obstacles, they should be seen as additional guarantees that the transactions do reflect the account holder’s wishes. This perspective makes it possible to approach exchanges with the bank more constructively and to supply the requested documents quickly.

The fifth lesson concerns tax consequences. The judgment illustrates the risks of last-minute estate planning. Heirs cannot blame the bank for the tax consequences resulting from their own lack of foresight. If gifts were desired to optimise the transfer of the estate, it was for the family to arrange them in good time, with appropriate advice.

It should be recalled that transactions carried out in an emergency, particularly shortly before a death, may be challenged by other heirs or by the tax authorities. A gift made in the last days or weeks of the donor’s life necessarily raises questions about the freedom of consent and may be requalified or subject to collation to the estate. Legal certainty therefore means arranging such transactions well in advance, in a calm setting, with the assistance of qualified professionals.

C. The Importance of Advance Estate Planning

Beyond the technical lessons on bank powers of attorney, the judgment under comment illustrates more generally the crucial importance of early and considered estate planning. This dimension deserves to be developed because it is often the weak point of family wealth strategies.

Estate planning must not be improvised in an emergency, as death approaches. It requires, on the contrary, thorough reflection, carried out calmly, on several aspects: identifying the heirs and their respective needs, valuing the assets to be transferred, tax optimisation of the transfer, protection of the surviving spouse, organising the management of assets during any period of vulnerability, and so on.

This reflection should ideally take place well before illness or old age affects the faculties of discernment. The earlier the planning, the more flexibility and scope for optimisation it offers. Conversely, when one waits until the final moments, room for manoeuvre shrinks considerably and legal risks increase.

Advance planning makes it possible in particular to put in place suitable legal tools: gifts with successive or residual beneficiaries (libéralités graduelles ou résiduelles), dismemberment of ownership, advance protection mandates, civil companies (sociétés civiles), life insurance contracts, and so on. These instruments, which take time to be properly structured, make it possible to optimise the transfer while securing the transactions against possible later challenges.

In the particular case of bank powers of attorney, advance planning offers several decisive advantages. It makes it possible to draw up the power of attorney at a time when the person has all of their faculties, thus avoiding any doubt about the validity of their consent. It leaves time to choose the appropriate form (preferably authentic) and to define precisely the extent of the powers conferred. It also allows the proxy to be approved by the bank in good conditions, in the presence of the principal, before urgency arises.

The judgment under comment is in this respect a textbook case of what not to do. The family waited two months after the announcement of the advanced stage of the illness to draw up a power of attorney, and it was presented to the bank only in a context of urgency, with requests for immediate transactions. This last-minute management led to the failure of the project and to the tax consequences the family lamented.

Had the power of attorney been drawn up as early as August, by authentic instrument, with the principal and the proxy presenting themselves jointly to the bank for approval, the desired transactions could probably have been carried out without difficulty in the following weeks. The death in November would have left enough time to implement the plan, if indeed it reflected the deceased’s wishes.

This lesson applies moreover beyond bank powers of attorney alone. It applies to the whole organisation of one’s assets in the face of illness or ageing. The earlier one plans, the more options and legal certainty one has. The longer one waits, the more constraints accumulate and the more legal risks increase. The role of the notary and the specialist lawyer is precisely to support this reflection and organisation upstream, when all the conditions are met to act in the best circumstances.

Finally, it should be stressed that advance planning is not merely a matter of tax optimisation. It also has an essential human dimension: it allows one to organise one’s affairs calmly, to take the time to explain one’s choices to one’s relatives, to avoid the family tensions that can arise from decisions taken in an emergency, and to concentrate, when the time comes, on supporting the sick person rather than on administrative and banking formalities.

The Paris Court of Appeal’s judgment of 4 February 2026, by confirming that the bank committed no fault in exercising its vigilance towards a suspicious power of attorney, ultimately recalls a simple but fundamental truth: in matters of succession and the transfer of assets, planning ahead is not an option but a necessity. Families who neglect it expose themselves to practical difficulties, additional tax costs, and avoidable litigation whose outcome, as this judgment shows, will generally go against them.

Conclusion

The judgment delivered by the Paris Court of Appeal on 4 February 2026 is a reference decision on the banker’s duty of vigilance as applied to powers of attorney. By fully upholding the first-instance judgment that dismissed the claims of the heirs of a deceased customer, the court strongly reaffirms that the banker holding an account, although subject to a general principle of non-interference in its customer’s affairs, must exercise heightened vigilance when it notes apparent anomalies.

The major contribution of this decision lies in the precise and detailed identification of the circumstances justifying the bank in suspending execution of a request to set up a power of attorney: hospitalisation of the customer with a serious illness, inability to speak directly with her, a power of attorney under private signature bearing a limited notarial certification, a proxy who is the beneficiary of the transactions requested, large amounts, and transactions pre-filled before approval. In the presence of such warning signs, the bank not only may but must require additional guarantees to verify the free and informed consent of its customer.

The judgment explicitly validates two verification measures: the request for a medical certificate attesting to the customer’s informed consent, and the requirement of a power of attorney by authentic instrument. These requests, far from being abusive obstacles, appear as proportionate guarantees intended to protect the vulnerable customer against possible abuse. The seven-day handling time between the first request and the requirement of an authentic power of attorney moreover testified to remarkable seriousness and efficiency on the bank’s part.

On causation, the court reverses the perspective by considering that the impossibility of carrying out the transactions before the death did not result from an alleged excess of caution by the bank, but from the family’s lack of foresight. Informed for two months of the seriousness of the illness, it had ample time to organise the necessary formalities in the appropriate forms. This analysis recalls that estate planning cannot be improvised in an emergency and that the consequences of late organisation cannot be attributed to the bank.

Beyond the case at hand, this judgment delivers valuable practical lessons for all concerned. For banking institutions, it bolsters a cautious approach in suspicious situations and confirms the primacy of the duty of vigilance over speed of execution. For customers and their families, it recalls the crucial importance of planning ahead for the management of assets in case of vulnerability, of preferring authentic forms for powers of attorney affecting assets, and of clearly distinguishing the power of day-to-day management from the authorisation to dispose of assets.

This case law follows a settled line of the French Supreme Court, illustrated by the judgments of 2003, 2009 and 2019, which strike a subtle balance between the customer’s freedom of contract and protection against abuse. It recalls that banking law, far from being a mere law of contracts, has a strong protective dimension that binds credit institutions and that justifies, in sensitive situations, their giving priority to legal certainty over commercial fluidity.

For banking law practitioners and specialist lawyers, this judgment is an argumentative tool of the first importance. It makes it possible to advise effectively customers faced with verification requests from their bank, by explaining to them that these requests are not administrative obstruction but a legal duty of vigilance. It also makes it possible to defend banking institutions unfairly challenged by heirs disappointed by the tax consequences of their own lack of preparation.

Ultimately, the judgment of 4 February 2026 recalls a fundamental truth: for the transfer of assets to be effective and secure, it requires planning, reflection and professional support. Last-minute solutions, improvised in the emergency of a hospitalisation or the imminence of a death, rightly run up against the vigilance of banks and notaries, whose role is precisely to guarantee that transactions affecting assets reflect the free and informed will of those who make them. This requirement of legal certainty, though it may at times seem burdensome, is in reality the best protection of vulnerable persons and their relatives against abuse and later disputes.

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