Fraudulent Transfer: The Bank Is Liable When It Drafts the Payment Order (Cass. com., 4 March 2026, No. 25-11.959, Published in the Bulletin)

French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation), Commercial, Financial and Economic Chamber, 4 March 2026, appeal No. 25-11.959

The Facts: A Bank Details Fraud in a Property Transaction

The Context of the Transaction

The case decided by the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) on 4 March 2026 perfectly illustrates a type of fraud that has unfortunately become common in property transactions. Mr and Mrs K., customers of the bank BNP Paribas, were about to complete a major property project: the purchase of a property requiring partial bank financing. As in any property transaction, this operation involved notarial professionals and required the payment of substantial funds.

In this context, the bank was involved in two capacities: first as lender, and second as payment service provider responsible for executing the transfers needed to settle the purchase. The bank’s dual role is not insignificant, because it entails distinct obligations which may, as we shall see, engage its liability in different ways.

How the Fraud Unfolded

Between 27 October and 10 November 2020, Mr and Mrs K. received several bank account details (relevés d’identité bancaire, RIB) by email. The first two, dated 27 and 28 October, concerned the notarial partnership (SCP) Allauzen Cochin de Koninck Duthion, which was assisting them with their purchase. The third RIB, received on 10 November 2020, was supposed to come from the notary’s office responsible for receiving the authentic deed and assisting the sellers.

It was precisely this third RIB that constituted the trap. It had been sent from an email address fraudulently imitating that of the notary’s office. The fraudsters, as is often the case with this type of sophisticated scam, had presumably intercepted the communications between the parties and created a fake email address similar enough to deceive the victims’ vigilance.

On 10 November 2020, in response to a request from their bank and in order to settle the transaction, Mr and Mrs K. sent BNP Paribas a detailed statement of the sums to be paid together with the third RIB they had received. This is where the decisive element of the case arises: the bank did not simply execute a transfer order previously drafted by its customers. It itself prepared, drafted and formatted the transfer order, incorporating the details of the fraudulent RIB, and then sent it by email to Mr and Mrs K. to obtain their signatures.

Once the transfer order had been signed by the couple and returned to the bank, the bank executed it. The sum of €60,343.69, representing the buyers’ personal contribution, was transferred to a bank account whose real holder remains unknown. The fraudsters had succeeded, taking advantage of a chain of trust broken at several levels.

The Victims’ Legal Action

Realising that they had been the victims of fraud, Mr and Mrs K. took legal action quickly. On 12 and 17 February 2021, about three months after the events, they summoned BNP Paribas before the courts. Their argument was based on the bank’s breach of its duty of vigilance. In their view, the bank, as a banking and financial professional, should have detected the anomalies in the fraudulent RIB before drawing up the transfer order.

This action forms part of a complex body of case law in which two lines of reasoning collide: on one side, the protection of customers who are victims of fraud; on the other, the limits of liability that banks seek to assert by relying on the specific regime governing payment services. The central question was whether the bank could shelter behind Article L. 133-21 of the Monetary and Financial Code (code monétaire et financier), which limits its liability when it executes an order that matches the unique identifier provided by the customer.

The Liability Regime Applicable to Transfers: A Complex Legal Debate

Article L. 133-21 of the Monetary and Financial Code: Limited Protection for the Bank

To understand what is at stake in this case, we must go back to the foundations of payment services law. Article L. 133-21 of the Monetary and Financial Code (code monétaire et financier), which transposes into French law Article 88 of European Directive 2015/2366, known as “PSD2” (Payment Services Directive 2), lays down a principle that protects banks: where a payment order is executed in accordance with the unique identifier provided by the user, that order is deemed to have been correctly executed with regard to the payee specified.

In other words, if the customer gives their bank an IBAN (International Bank Account Number) and the bank executes the transfer to that IBAN, the bank is presumed to have performed its task correctly, even if the final payee is not the person the customer thought they were paying. The article even provides that if the unique identifier provided by the customer is incorrect, the payment service provider is not liable for the non-execution or defective execution of the transaction.

This regime, which stems from European harmonisation, aims to facilitate cross-border payments and to clarify responsibilities within the payment services ecosystem. It rests on the idea that the unique identifier (the IBAN) is the determining factor: once the customer has communicated it, responsibility for its accuracy lies with them. The bank, for its part, is not required to check the consistency between the IBAN and the name of the payee stated on the transfer order.

The Limits of the Harmonised European Regime

However, this liability regime is not absolute. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had occasion to specify, in its judgment of 2 September 2021 (case CRCAM, C-337/20), that the harmonised liability regime for unauthorised or defectively executed transactions established by the PSD2 Directive may be “competed with by an alternative liability regime provided for by national law and based on the same facts and the same grounds only on condition that it does not prejudice the regime thus harmonised and does not undermine the objectives and effectiveness of that directive”.

This convoluted wording essentially means that Member States cannot create a parallel liability regime that would empty of substance the protection afforded to payment service providers by the European directive. The European legislature’s objective is to ensure legal certainty and predictability for all players in the payments market, whether established in France, Germany or any other Member State.

Nevertheless, the CJEU leaves some room for manoeuvre: the harmonised regime does not exclude the application of national contractual liability law in situations that fall outside the scope of the directive, or where the circumstances are such that applying the special regime would undermine the objectives of consumer protection.

The Bank’s Position: An Exclusive Regime

In the case decided by the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation), BNP Paribas put forward a legal argument consistent with its wish to limit its liability. The bank maintained that the regime of Article L. 133-21 of the Monetary and Financial Code excluded any application of the general rules of contractual liability. In its view, since a transfer had been executed in accordance with the unique identifier (the IBAN) provided by the customers, it could not be held liable for the fraud, even if the RIB contained anomalies.

The bank relied on three main arguments in its appeal on points of law:

First argument: The special regime of Articles L. 133-18 to L. 133-24 of the Monetary and Financial Code excludes the application of general contractual liability based on Article 1231-1 of the Civil Code (code civil). According to BNP Paribas, it would not be possible to apply these two regimes simultaneously or in the alternative. The European, and then French, legislature’s choice to create a specific framework for payment services would necessarily imply the displacement of the general rules of contract law.

Second argument: As the transfer order had been executed in accordance with the unique identifier provided by Mr and Mrs K. in their capacity as payers, the bank could not be regarded as liable for defective execution. It was irrelevant, in its view, that the RIB contained inconsistencies or apparent anomalies: as long as the IBAN was formally correct and the transfer had gone through, its task had been accomplished in accordance with the provisions of Article L. 133-21.

Third argument, in the alternative: Even supposing that the general law regime could apply, the bank was under no obligation to check the accuracy of the identifier provided by the customer. It therefore could not be penalised for failing to detect the alleged anomalies in the fraudulent RIB. This position followed a logic of shared responsibility: the customer is responsible for vigilance as to the accuracy of the bank details, while the bank is responsible only for the technical execution of the transfer.

These arguments, had they been accepted by the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation), would have considerably reduced the scope for fraud victims to obtain compensation for their loss from their bank. It is precisely this risk that explains the importance of the 4 March 2026 judgment.

The Contribution of the 4 March 2026 Judgment: The Fundamental Distinction Between Execution and Drafting

The Principle Laid Down by the Supreme Court

In its judgment of 4 March 2026, the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) rejects all of the bank’s arguments and establishes a fundamental distinction that will from now on structure the assessment of bank liability in cases of fraudulent transfers. The highest court states clearly that “while general contractual liability based on Article 1231-1 of the Civil Code does not apply to the execution by the payment service provider of a payment order in accordance with the unique identifier provided by the user, this is not the case where the payment service provider does not merely execute the payment order but drafts it itself before carrying out the payment transaction with the user’s approval”.

This wording deserves to be unpacked because it draws a crucial distinction between two situations:

First situation – simple execution: The customer drafts their own transfer order, by completing a paper or electronic form and entering all the necessary details (the payee’s IBAN, amount, reference, etc.). The bank then merely executes that order technically. In this scenario, Article L. 133-21 of the Monetary and Financial Code applies in full and the bank benefits from the protection it offers: it is not liable if the IBAN is incorrect or fraudulent.

Second situation – drafting by the bank: The bank does not merely execute a pre-existing order passively. It takes the initiative of drafting the transfer order itself from the details provided by the customer (amount, payee’s RIB), formats the document, and then submits it for the customer’s signature. In this case, the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) considers that the bank steps outside the protective framework of Article L. 133-21 and may incur general contractual liability on the basis of Article 1231-1 of the Civil Code (code civil).

This distinction rests on an implacable logic: when the bank itself drafts the transfer order, it no longer behaves as a mere technical executor that simply routes a payment flow. It intervenes actively in preparing the transaction, becomes a co-author of the legal act that the transfer order constitutes, and thereby takes on increased responsibility. It can then no longer shelter behind the mere technical conformity of the transfer with the IBAN provided.

The Notion of “Crude Forgery” and the Bank’s Duty of Vigilance

Beyond the distinction between execution and drafting, the 4 March 2026 judgment also introduces a notion of particular importance for fraud victims: that of “crude forgery” (faux grossier). The Amiens Court of Appeal (cour d’appel), whose decision was upheld by the French Supreme Court, had found that the fraudulent RIB contained “apparent and manifest inconsistencies which could leave no doubt, for a normally diligent professional, that the identifier was a crude forgery”.

This characterisation as a “crude forgery” is not insignificant. It implies that the anomalies in the fraudulent document were such that they should have been obvious to any minimally vigilant professional. This is not a sophisticated fraud requiring complex technical means of investigation, but inconsistencies visible to the naked eye on a simple examination of the document.

What might these inconsistencies characteristic of a crude forgery be? Without the judgment exhaustively detailing the anomalies found in this case, several frequently encountered situations come to mind:

Discrepancies between the account holder’s name shown on the RIB and the context of the transaction (for example, a RIB in the name of an individual when the expected payee is a notary’s office); fanciful bank or branch codes corresponding to no real branch; IBAN formats that do not comply with international standards (wrong number of characters, incorrect check digits); aberrant details for the institution holding the account; poor graphic quality of the document (unusual font, approximate layout, pixelated logo); or missing mandatory information.

The existence of such a “crude forgery” engages the bank’s duty of vigilance. This duty, which flows from the general obligation of loyalty and good faith in the performance of the banking contract, requires the banker to alert its customer when it detects, or should have detected, a manifest anomaly that may reveal an attempted fraud. The bank is not required to carry out an in-depth investigation into every transaction, but simply to show a minimum of attention when handling banking documents in the course of its duties.

The French Supreme Court thus endorses the analysis of the court of appeal: where the bank itself drafts the transfer order and should, as a normally diligent professional, have detected the crude anomalies in the RIB provided, its breach of this duty of vigilance constitutes a contractual fault engaging its liability.

The Return to the General Law of Contractual Liability

By setting aside the application of Article L. 133-21 of the Monetary and Financial Code in this type of situation, the French Supreme Court opens the way to the application of the general law of contractual liability, namely Article 1231-1 of the Civil Code (formerly Article 1147). This fundamental provision states that “the debtor shall be ordered to pay damages, where appropriate, either by reason of the non-performance of the obligation or by reason of delay in performance, unless he proves that performance was prevented by force majeure”.

The application of this general regime has several favourable consequences for victims of bank fraud:

First consequence: The burden of proof is reversed. Whereas Article L. 133-21 protects the bank that has executed the order in accordance with the identifier provided, the general law requires the bank, as debtor of a contractual obligation, to prove that it has properly performed its obligations or that the non-performance results from an external cause that cannot be attributed to it. The victim must of course demonstrate the existence of a loss and a causal link with the bank’s breach, but does not have to prove a specific fault on the part of the bank: the breach of the contractual obligation alone is sufficient.

Second consequence: The scope of the bank’s obligations widens. Under the special regime of Article L. 133-21, the bank has only a limited technical obligation: to route the payment to the IBAN provided. Under the general law, it is bound by all the obligations flowing from the banking contract, including in particular the duty to advise, the duty to warn, and above all the duty of vigilance mentioned above.

Third consequence: Full compensation for the loss is required. Article 1231-1 provides for no limitation of liability: the bank must compensate the entire loss suffered by its customer. In the case decided, BNP Paribas was accordingly ordered to pay Mr and Mrs K. the full amount of the fraudulent transfer, namely €60,343.69, without being able to invoke any cap.

Fourth consequence: The applicable limitation periods are more favourable. Whereas certain specific actions in the field of payment services are subject to short time limits (notably the obligation to dispute an unauthorised transaction within 13 months), an action in general contractual liability is time-barred after five years from the day on which the right holder knew or should have known the facts enabling them to bring the action (Article 2224 of the Civil Code).

The Practical Consequences for Victims of Bank Fraud

Wider Possibilities for Compensation

The 4 March 2026 judgment is a major step forward for victims of bank fraud, and more particularly for those who have been trapped in property transactions. These scams, often called “fake RIB frauds” or “CEO frauds” when they target companies, have multiplied in recent years with the digitalisation of communications and the sophistication of phishing techniques.

Until now, victims regularly came up against a legal wall: their bank systematically invoked Article L. 133-21 of the Monetary and Financial Code to escape any liability, arguing that it had correctly executed the transfer order in accordance with the IBAN provided. Customers then found themselves in a dead end: they had lost their money to untraceable fraudsters, and their bank refused any compensation.

The contribution of the 4 March 2026 judgment radically changes the situation. From now on, where the bank has taken the initiative of drafting the transfer order itself from the details provided by its customer, it can no longer shelter behind the protective regime of Article L. 133-21. It becomes fully liable under the general law and must answer for its breach of its duty of vigilance if the fraudulent RIB contained apparent anomalies.

This solution is all the more important because it corresponds to an extremely widespread banking practice. Indeed, in the vast majority of transfer transactions, particularly where they involve large sums or form part of a particular context (a mortgage, a notarial transaction, etc.), it is not the customer who fills in a transfer form. It is the bank adviser or the department concerned who prepares the transfer order from the information provided by the customer, and then submits it to them for signature. This practice, convenient and apparently harmless, now brings the bank within the scope of the general law of contractual liability.

The Criteria for Assessing Bank Fault

The practical application of this judgment nevertheless raises several questions about the criteria for assessing the bank’s fault. Not all frauds are alike, and not all fake RIBs are equally obvious. It is therefore important to understand what the courts will rely on to determine whether the bank breached its duty of vigilance.

The “normally diligent professional” criterion: The Amiens Court of Appeal (cour d’appel), approved by the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation), refers to the standard of the “normally diligent professional”. This is a classic reference in professional liability law: the professional’s actual conduct (here the bank’s) is compared with that of an average, competent and conscientious professional placed in the same circumstances. Excellence is not required, but rather the normal diligence expected of a banker.

A simple and quick visual examination: The judgment expressly states that the inconsistencies in the fraudulent RIB “are apparent on a simple and quick visual examination”. This means that the bank is not required to carry out in-depth technical checks, such as complex IT controls or enquiries with other institutions. It must, however, carry out a visual examination of the document, which is the bare minimum for a professional who handles RIBs every day.

The manifest and apparent nature of the anomalies: The terms used are important. It is not enough that there are objective anomalies on the RIB; they must also be “apparent” and “manifest”, that is, they must stand out without requiring any particular investigation. A simple typing error in an IBAN, if it is discreet, will probably not be enough to engage the bank’s liability. By contrast, a RIB showing flagrant inconsistencies (payee name unrelated to the context, aberrant bank details, amateurish graphic format) will constitute a “crude forgery” that the bank cannot ignore.

The context of the transaction: Although the judgment does not expressly develop the point, the courts are likely also to take into account the context in which the transfer takes place. A transfer of €60,000 as part of a property purchase, an inherently sensitive and formalised transaction, calls for particular vigilance on the part of the banker. Conversely, a small routine transfer to a regular supplier might justify a less thorough examination. The amount of the transaction, its nature and the degree of formality surrounding it are all factors that may modulate the assessment of the bank’s diligence.

Any prior history of fraud: If the bank is aware of a surge in fraud in a particular sector (for example, property transactions), or if it has already faced attempted fraud targeting the same customer, its duty of vigilance is reinforced. Banks regularly receive alerts from supervisory authorities or professional associations informing them of new fraud techniques. This collective knowledge of the banking sector may be relied on to show that the bank should have been particularly attentive.

The Burden of Proof

A crucial aspect for fraud victims concerns the question of the burden of proof. Who must prove what in a liability action based on the 4 March 2026 judgment?

What the victim must prove: To engage the liability of their bank, the victim customer must establish several elements. First, they must show that the bank itself drafted the disputed transfer order. This proof is generally easy to provide: it is enough to produce the email sent by the bank containing the pre-filled transfer order, or any other document establishing that the initiative for drafting lay with the bank and not the customer.

Second, the customer must establish the existence of manifest anomalies on the fraudulent RIB. To do so, they can produce the RIB in question, compare it with a genuine RIB of the notary’s office concerned, have the inconsistencies recorded by an expert if necessary, or produce a certificate from the notary’s office confirming that the RIB does not match its real bank details.

Third, the customer must show their loss, which is generally straightforward: it is the amount of the fraudulent transfer, evidenced by an account statement. They must also establish the causal link between the bank’s breach and their loss: had the bank detected the anomalies in the RIB and alerted them, the transfer would not have been made and they would not have suffered any loss.

What the bank must prove: Once the customer has shown that the bank drafted the transfer order containing a fraudulent RIB with apparent anomalies, the burden of proof shifts. It is now for the bank to prove that it properly performed its duty of vigilance, or that its breach caused no loss, or that an external cause (force majeure, fault of the victim, act of a third party) relieves it of liability.

In practice, this proof will be difficult for the bank to provide. How could it prove that it was vigilant when the fraudulent transfer was indeed executed on the basis of a fake RIB? It might try to show that the anomalies were not so manifest that they should have attracted its attention, or that the customer should himself have detected the fraud at an earlier stage, but these arguments are rarely convincing in the face of a “crude forgery”.

Recommendations for Taking Effective Action Against Your Bank

Act Quickly After Discovering the Fraud

Time is absolutely crucial when you discover that you have been the victim of bank fraud. Every day that passes reduces the chances of recovering the funds and may complicate the legal situation. As soon as you become aware of the fraud, several steps must be taken immediately.

Alert the bank immediately: Contact your bank as soon as you discover the fraud, ideally by telephone for a rapid response, followed by written confirmation by email or by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt. Ask for the immediate blocking of the payee account of the fraudulent transfer if it is known, and request a recall of the funds. Although the chances of a successful recall are slim once the funds have left the fraudster’s account, some banks can act quickly if alerted within hours of the transfer.

Document the facts meticulously: Immediately gather all documents relating to the fraud: the emails received (including those containing the fake RIB), exchanges with the bank, the signed transfer order, account statements, and documents relating to the underlying transaction (in the case of a property purchase: preliminary sale agreement, loan offer, etc.). Take time-stamped screenshots of all emails and electronic documents. This documentation will be invaluable in building your legal file.

Check the applicable time limits: Even though an action in general contractual liability benefits from a five-year limitation period, certain specific actions in banking matters are subject to shorter periods. For example, Article L. 133-24 of the Monetary and Financial Code requires the payer to dispute an unauthorised payment transaction within thirteen months. Although this period does not apply directly to an action based on the 4 March 2026 judgment, it is prudent to act quickly to avoid any risk of being time-barred.

Build a Solid File

To maximise your chances of succeeding against your bank, building a complete and well-argued file is essential. This file must make it possible to demonstrate unambiguously that your situation falls within the scope of the 4 March 2026 judgment.

Prove that the bank drafted the transfer order: This is the trigger for the application of the general law regime. You must produce the email or letter by which the bank sent you the pre-filled transfer order. If the transfer order was prepared during a meeting at the branch, ask for a statement from your adviser or produce any document establishing that it was the adviser who entered the information. Also keep any trace of your prior exchanges with the bank (transfer request, forwarding of the RIB, explanations of the purpose of the transaction).

Identify and document the anomalies in the fraudulent RIB: This is the heart of your argument. You must be able to show that the fraudulent RIB contained manifest and apparent anomalies. Several techniques can be used for this. Compare the fake RIB with a genuine RIB of the impersonated body (notary’s office, company, etc.) and highlight the differences. Have a bailiff (huissier de justice) record the inconsistencies present on the document. Request a certificate from the body whose identity was usurped, confirming that the RIB does not match its bank details and stating what its genuine details are. If necessary, call on an expert (IT, banking) to prepare a technical report identifying the anomalies.

Establish the context and circumstances of the transaction: Show that the transaction took place in a particular context that should have alerted the bank. For example, was it a large transfer as part of a property transaction? Was it the first transfer to this payee? Was the bank aware of the purpose of the transaction and of the context (property purchase, works, etc.)? Produce all documents that help to put it in context: preliminary sale agreement, mortgage offer, exchanges with the bank adviser explaining your project, etc.

Demonstrate the extent of your loss: Produce the account statements establishing the exact amount of the fraudulent transfer. If you have suffered additional losses (legal fees, loss of the property sale, bank administration fees, non-material loss linked to the stress and anxiety caused by the fraud), document these precisely as well. In the case of an aborted property transaction, you may for example quantify the loss of a chance to acquire the property you wanted, especially if you had paid an immobilisation indemnity or if the property market has moved unfavourably in the meantime.

Seek the Help of a Banking Law Lawyer

Given the complexity of the legal issues and the power of the legal departments of the major banks, the assistance of a banking law lawyer is strongly recommended, and indeed essential to maximise your chances of success.

The necessary legal expertise: The 4 March 2026 judgment introduces a legal subtlety that only a legal professional can handle effectively. The distinction between “execution” and “drafting” of the transfer order, the interplay between the special regime of Article L. 133-21 and the general law of contractual liability, and the assessment of the notion of “crude forgery” all require solid legal expertise. A specialist lawyer will know how to identify the relevant arguments, anticipate the bank’s counter-arguments, and build an unassailable legal case.

Litigation strategy: Should you favour an amicable negotiation phase with the bank? Or should you bring legal proceedings immediately? Which court should be seized? What claims should be made? Should you seek urgent measures (référé) or favour an action on the merits? An experienced lawyer will know how to define the strategy best suited to your particular situation, taking into account the specifics of your case, the profile of the bank concerned, and the time you can afford.

Gathering and presenting the evidence: Even if you have gathered many documents, a lawyer will know how to organise them, rank them, and above all present them in a way that builds a convincing demonstration. They can also guide you towards any additional expert input that may be needed (bailiff, IT expert, etc.) and will know how to usefully seek investigative measures before the judge (production of documents by the bank, court-appointed expert, etc.).

The balance of power with the bank: A bank faced with a compensation claim coming directly from an individual customer will tend to dig in and systematically invoke Article L. 133-21 to reject any liability. By contrast, faced with a lawyer who has mastered the recent case law and is able to demonstrate the relevance of the 4 March 2026 judgment to your situation, the bank will be more inclined to negotiate an amicable settlement to avoid being ordered by a court. A lawyer’s involvement radically changes the balance of power.

Optimising compensation: A lawyer will not simply claim reimbursement of the amount of the fraudulent transfer. They will identify all compensable losses: direct material loss (the transfer), indirect material losses (loss of a property opportunity, costs incurred), non-material loss (stress, anxiety, sense of betrayal by one’s bank), and will seek global compensation. They will also obtain an order that the bank pay costs and a sum under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure (code de procédure civile) to cover your legal fees.

Conclusion

The judgment of the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) of 4 March 2026 marks a decisive turning point in the protection of victims of bank fraud. By drawing a clear distinction between the passive execution of a transfer order and the active drafting of that order by the bank, the highest court denies banks the possibility of systematically sheltering behind the protective regime of Article L. 133-21 of the Monetary and Financial Code.

This decision has the merit of restoring a balance between the parties to the banking contract. Where the bank intervenes actively in preparing the transfer order, it takes on increased responsibility and must show the vigilance that one is entitled to expect of a professional. Detecting “crude forgeries”, that is, fraudulent RIBs containing manifest anomalies, now falls fully within the scope of its contractual obligations.

For fraud victims, this judgment opens up new prospects. It is no longer a matter of resigning oneself to the bank’s refusal of compensation, but of asserting one’s rights on the basis of the general law of contractual liability. The burden of proof, once it has been established that the bank drafted the order and that the RIB contained apparent anomalies, shifts to the bank, which must justify its diligence.

Beyond its technical contribution, this judgment also carries an important moral and social dimension. It reminds us that banks, as professionals holding specific expertise and occupying a position of trust in their relationship with their customers, cannot content themselves with a mechanical and blind execution of transactions. They must practise their profession with professional conscientiousness, and that conscientiousness includes detecting crude frauds that could ruin their customers.

Victims of bank fraud now have a solid legal tool to obtain compensation for their loss. However, putting this case law into practice requires prompt action, rigorous preparation of the file, and ideally the assistance of a specialist lawyer able to navigate the complexity of banking law. The fight against banking institutions remains unequal, but the 4 March 2026 judgment helps to rebalance the forces in favour of victims.

Finally, this judgment should encourage banks to strengthen their internal control and vigilance procedures. Rather than multiplying disputes, they would do well to develop tools for the automatic detection of anomalies on RIBs, to train their teams to identify fraud, and to put in place systematic alerts when a sensitive transaction displays unusual characteristics. Prevention remains the best protection, for customers and banks alike.

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