Attachment of Debts: Badly Served Judgment Declared Null and Void (Paris Court of First Instance, Enforcement Judge, 10 July 2026, No. 26/80487)

Paris Court of First Instance (tribunal judiciaire), enforcement judge, 10 July 2026, RG No. 26/80487

What Happened in This Case?

The starting point is a loan granted by a regional savings bank (caisse d’épargne). In the absence of repayment, the bank sued its borrower before the Lyon High Court (tribunal de grande instance). She did not appear. On 31 October 2019, the court ordered her to pay €13,830.56, plus contractual interest at the rate of 6.75% per annum from 25 September 2018, with capitalisation of interest due for a full year from 27 November 2018, as well as €500 under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Provisional enforcement was ordered.

On 5 December 2019, this judgment was “served” on the debtor, in reality delivered by way of a record of unsuccessful searches, at the address that had been hers when the loan contract was concluded. No one at that address received anything.

The company EOS France, which presents itself as succeeding to the rights of the savings bank as assignee creditor (a capacity that the debtor would contest and on which the judge ultimately did not have to rule), had an attachment of debts carried out on 10 July 2025 on the debtor’s accounts for €17,030.05. The attachment proved unsuccessful.

By a summons of 6 February 2026 delivered to her in person, the debtor sued the recovery fund before the enforcement judge of the Paris Court of First Instance, challenging the attachment of debts. She asked for the 2019 judgment to be declared null and void, claimed €1,000 in damages for wrongful attachment and, at the hearing, further raised the nullity of the record of service of 5 December 2019.

Her argument has two stages. First stage: the service is void because it was not carried out at her last known address. Second stage: since the judgment was not properly served within six months of its date, it is null and void, and the attachment therefore rests on a title that has no effect.

The recovery fund objects that the enforcement judge has no jurisdiction to rule on the nullity of the summons, that the address used by the court bailiff was the debtor’s official address, that the alleged new address was never confirmed and that letters sent there were returned marked “addressee unknown at this address”. It adds that it has standing to act as assignee creditor and disputes the existence of a fault, a causal link and a loss.

On 10 July 2026, the enforcement judge annulled the act of service, declared the judgment of 31 October 2019 null and void, dismissed the debtor’s claim for damages, rejected the fund’s claim under Article 700 and ordered it to pay the costs as well as €1,500 in irrecoverable costs.

Could the Enforcement Judge Annul the Service of the Judgment?

This was the creditor’s first line of defence: the enforcement judge would have no jurisdiction to assess the validity of the acts that led to the 2019 judgment. The objection is sound in principle, but it missed its target.

The enforcement judge may neither modify the operative part of the decision serving as the basis for the proceedings, nor suspend its enforcement: that is the rule laid down by Article R. 121-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures (code des procédures civiles d’exécution). He does not retry the merits, he does not re-examine the debt, he cannot say that the Lyon court ruled wrongly in 2019.

But the debtor was asking nothing of the kind of him. The enforcement judge notes “as a preliminary point” that she “does not raise the nullity of the summons that gave rise to the judgment of 31 October 2019, but only, in her pleadings, the nullity of the service of the enforceable title, which falls within the jurisdiction of the enforcement judge, so that the arguments of EOS France in that regard are moot”.

The distinction is crucial and deserves to be remembered by anyone challenging an enforcement measure:

In other words, the enforcement judge is not asked to redo the trial: he is asked to find that the title relied upon was not put in a condition to produce its effects. This nuance often decides the outcome of the challenge.

Why Was the Record of Unsuccessful Searches Annulled?

What Is the Nullity Regime for a Court Bailiff’s Act?

The enforcement judge first recalls the framework. The record of service is an act of a court bailiff, the nullity of which is governed by the provisions that govern the nullity of procedural acts, pursuant to Article 649 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The conditions for its validity are subject to Article 114 of the same Code for formal rules, and to Article 117 for substantive rules.

The practical consequence is well known but often underestimated: “An irregularity affecting a formal rule of a procedural act entails its nullity only if the person relying on it shows that the irregularity caused him prejudice.” No prejudice, no nullity. It is on this ground that most challenges fail, and it is precisely here that this one succeeded.

What Do Articles 654, 655 and 659 of the Code of Civil Procedure Require?

Service follows a strict hierarchy, which the judgment sets out:

Article 659 is therefore not a convenience: it is a final safety net, reserved for the case where the addressee is genuinely untraceable. It requires the court bailiff to draw up a record “in which he sets out precisely the steps he has taken to search for the addressee of the document”. And the text adds a formality that the judgment emphasises: on the same day, or at the latest on the first business day following, on pain of nullity, the court bailiff sends the addressee, at the last known address, by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt, a copy of the record together with a copy of the document served.

What Was the Debtor’s “Last Known Address”?

The whole case turns on this. The record of 5 December 2019 was drawn up at the address the debtor occupied when the loan contract was concluded, a fact that the judge notes as uncontested. Yet between the signing of the loan and the service, the debtor had moved and had let it be known.

The evidence accepted by the enforcement judge is remarkably simple: the debtor produces account statements for 2015, as well as for November 2017 and December 2018, which establish that the savings bank was sending her documents to a new address. The judge deduces from this that she “declared a new address to her original creditor, prior to the act of service of the enforceable title of 5 December 2019”.

The evidential lesson is valuable. It is not necessary to produce a change-of-address letter, a signed form or an acknowledgement of receipt from the bank. It is enough to show that the bank itself was writing to the new address. Account statements, which every account holder keeps or can request, are in this respect the best evidence: they come from the creditor itself.

Did the Letters Returned “Addressee Unknown” Save the Service?

The recovery fund produced two formal notices sent by registered letter on 3 and 18 April 2018, whose acknowledgements of receipt had been returned marked “addressee unknown at this address”. The argument seemed serious: if the letters sent to the new address came back, it was because that address was wrong.

The enforcement judge dismisses the argument for a very concrete reason: “It cannot be deduced from the formal notices sent by registered post on 3 and 18 April 2018, whose acknowledgements of receipt were returned marked ‘addressee unknown at this address’, that this address was not confirmed or did not exist, given that the details written on the letters were incomplete”, two address details having been omitted from the envelopes, and given that the documents produced showed that the bank had indeed been informed of its customer’s change of address.

A negative postal return is therefore not proof that the address does not exist where the address on the envelope was itself truncated. The creditor cannot rely on the failure of a mailing that it worded badly. For a debtor who challenges, the check is immediate: compare, line by line, the address on the returned mail with the full address actually declared.

The judge’s conclusion: “It follows that the document was served by record of unsuccessful searches at a place other than the last known address.” The formal irregularity is established. That leaves the prejudice.

How Had the Debtor Suffered Prejudice?

The creditor argued that the irregularity, assuming it was established, had caused no prejudice: the debtor in fact had available the relief from the expiry of the time limit (relevé de forclusion) under Article 540 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be relieved from the loss of the right to appeal. The argument is a classic one in this area of litigation, and here it is dismissed on two grounds.

First ground, on the substance of the prejudice: “This formal irregularity of the document necessarily caused prejudice to Ms [the debtor] since she was deprived of the possibility of becoming aware of the judgment of 31 October 2019 and of appealing within the required time limits.” The word “necessarily” deserves to be noted. Where an irregular service purely and simply deprives the addressee of knowledge of the judgment, the prejudice does not have to be demonstrated by extrinsic evidence: it flows from the very deprivation of the right of appeal.

Second ground, on the objection based on Article 540: “Moreover, Article 540 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to relief from the expiry of time limits is not applicable in the event of an alleged irregularity of the service, so that it does not prevent the debtor’s prejudice from being established.” The reasoning is logical. Relief from the expiry of the time limit presupposes a valid notification of which the addressee was not aware in good time through no fault of his own; it cannot serve as a resit for the creditor who served badly. The remedy is not to ask the debtor to repair, at his own expense and subject to conditions, his opponent’s error.

The record of service of 5 December 2019 is therefore annulled.

How Does a 2019 Judgment Become “Null and Void” in 2026?

Why Was the Classification of the 2019 Judgment Decisive?

The annulment of the service would have been only an interim victory had the 2019 judgment been an ordinary adversarial judgment. It is its classification that opens the second part of the reasoning.

Article 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure distinguishes according to two criteria: whether the decision is final (without appeal) and how the summons was delivered. Where the defendant does not appear, the judgment is given by default if the decision is final and if the summons was not delivered in person. It is deemed adversarial where the decision is open to appeal or where the summons was delivered to the defendant in person.

In this case, the debtor had not appeared before the Lyon High Court, and the originating summons had not been delivered in person, the judgment itself mentioning delivery by record of unsuccessful searches. The enforcement judge deduces from this that “the decision was therefore classified as a judgment deemed adversarial solely on the ground that it was open to appeal”.

This purely mechanical finding places the 2019 judgment squarely within the scope of Article 478.

What Does Article 478 of the Code of Civil Procedure Say?

The text is brief and formidable: a judgment given by default or a judgment deemed adversarial solely on the ground that it is open to appeal is null and void if it has not been served within six months of its date. The article specifies that the proceedings may be resumed after the original summons has been reissued.

The purpose of this provision is protective. A judgment given without the defendant having appeared, at the end of proceedings of which he may never have been aware, cannot remain suspended indefinitely over his head. The legislature therefore requires the successful claimant to serve promptly, on pain of losing the benefit of his victory.

How Did the Judge Make the Calculation?

The enforcement judge puts it bluntly: “This judgment therefore had to be served on Ms [the debtor] by 30 April 2020 at the latest. As the service delivered on 5 December 2019 has been annulled and no other service of the judgment within the stated period is relied on, the judgment of 31 October 2019 must be declared null and void.”

Note on reading: the operative part of the judgment refers to an act of service “delivered on 5 March 2019”, whereas all of the reasoning and the statement of the dispute consistently use the date of 5 December 2019. This is in all likelihood a clerical error; this commentary sticks to the date given in the reasoning.

The whole force of the reasoning lies in the articulation of the two stages. An annulled service is not a late service: it is a service that never existed. The six-month period therefore ran out to no effect, and it can no longer be made up, since the text sets a deadline, not a starting point.

What Are the Concrete Consequences for the Debtor and for the Recovery Fund?

Does the Debt Disappear with the Title?

We must be precise, because confusion is common. A judgment declared null and void does not make the debt disappear: it makes the enforceable title that recorded it disappear. The contractual debt, for its part, subsists as such.

But the difference is considerable in practice. Without an enforceable title, the creditor can no longer, by virtue of Article L. 111-2 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures, pursue compulsory enforcement: no attachment of debts on bank accounts, no attachment of earnings, no seizure and sale of movables. He becomes an ordinary creditor who, if he wants to recover, must obtain a new judgment, and therefore resume the proceedings on the merits, as Article 478 itself contemplates.

Can the Creditor Really Start Again?

In theory, yes. In practice, it is another matter, and this is where the decision takes on its full strategic value for the debtor.

Resuming the proceedings means issuing a fresh summons, several years after the events giving rise to the claim. The debtor, who this time appears, can then put forward her defences on the merits. The judgment discussed does not specify the exact nature of the loan in dispute, but by way of general reminder and depending on the circumstances, the range of possible arguments includes: challenging the statement of the debt, the validity of the effective global rate (taux effectif global), the annual information of the guarantor where a guarantee is involved, breach of the duty to warn, or the forfeiture and limitation periods specific to consumer credit. Each of these arguments is, however, subject to its own conditions and time limits, which must be checked case by case. The debtor may also challenge the assignee’s standing to act with regard to the enforceability against third parties of the assignment of the debt, governed by Article 1324 of the Civil Code (code civil).

Above all, the question of the limitation of the original action arises acutely and must be examined case by case: the nature of the loan, the date of the first unpaid instalment not regularised and the effects attached to the old proceedings determine the analysis. It goes without saying that, in many cases, the judgment declared null and void marks the real end of recovery, and not a mere parenthesis.

What Does the Operation Cost the Creditor?

The recovery fund emerges from these proceedings ordered to pay the costs on the basis of Article 696 of the Code of Civil Procedure, its own claim for compensation dismissed, and ordered to pay €1,500 to the debtor under Article 700. The judge takes the opportunity to recall how that provision works: the judge orders the party liable for the costs or the losing party to pay the other party a sum that he determines in respect of the costs incurred and not included in the costs, taking into account equity or the economic situation of the party ordered to pay, and may even decide of his own motion that no order is to be made.

To this is added, for the creditor, the cost of an unsuccessful attachment of debts pursued on the basis of a title now deprived of effect. The economics of the case are completely reversed.

Why Was the Claim for Damages for Wrongful Attachment Rejected?

This is the only point on which the debtor fails, and it deserves to be analysed without complacency, because it is the most counter-intuitive lesson of the decision.

Article L. 121-2 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures gives the enforcement judge the power to order the release of any unnecessary or abusive measure and to order the creditor to pay damages in the event of wrongful attachment. The provision exists and is effective, but it follows the ordinary law of liability: fault, loss, causal link.

Here, the judge notes that the debtor “relies on non-material loss that she does not substantiate, even though the attachment of debts referred to was unsuccessful”. Having failed to demonstrate a loss, she is dismissed.

The criticism that can be made of this part of the judgment is not legal but evidential: the solution is orthodox, it merely recalls that a claim for compensation is not pleaded in a single line. In a case where the attachment had frozen funds (salary, benefits, a precautionary savings cushion), the demonstration would have been far easier, and the outcome probably different. From the moment of the summons before the enforcement judge, the compensation part must therefore be built with the same rigour as the procedural part, supported by documents.

What Should You Do if an Attachment of Debts Hits Your Account on the Basis of an Old Judgment?

The decision discussed outlines, by implication, a method of verification. It applies to anyone who discovers, often through a call from their bank or a simple frozen balance, the existence of a judgment of which they have never heard.

One point deserves particular vigilance: the way you word your letters to the creditor and to your bank during the challenge can durably weaken your position. Any writing may be produced against you.

Finally, do not confuse speed with haste: a debtor who proposes or accepts a payment schedule acknowledges the debt, which interrupts the limitation period and starts a new period running for the creditor’s benefit (Article 2240 of the Civil Code). Before any step of this kind, have the title checked.

What Is the Scope of This Decision?

This is a first-instance judgment given by an enforcement judge, unreported and open to appeal. It does not set case law and cannot be presented as a reversal of precedent. Its interest lies elsewhere: it illustrates, on a perfectly ordinary case, the effectiveness of an argument that debtors being pursued almost never raise.

Three lessons emerge, all transferable.

First lesson. The record of unsuccessful searches is a fragile act. It is valid only if the addressee is genuinely untraceable and if the registered letter provided for by Article 659 was sent to the last known address. Whenever the creditor had a more recent address (and a bank, which sends periodic statements, almost always does), the act is open to nullity.

Second lesson. Prejudice, the usual obstacle to nullities for defective form, is easily established where the irregularity deprived the addressee of knowledge of the judgment and of his right of appeal. The objection based on relief from the expiry of the time limit, often raised by creditors, does not succeed on this ground.

Third lesson. Article 478 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a delayed-action weapon. In the case discussed, the argument succeeded almost seven years after the judgment, on the occasion of an enforcement measure. The age of the title therefore does not necessarily make it unassailable, which runs against common intuition. This case-specific solution cannot, however, be elevated into a principle that the argument is never time-barred: the conditions in which a judgment’s null and void status may be invoked, notably where the debtor has complied with the judgment or acquiesced in it, call for a case-by-case analysis.

One limit remains, which the judgment itself sets out: this procedural success does not automatically translate into compensation. The debtor wins the disappearance of the title, the costs and her irrecoverable costs, but nothing more if she does not document her loss. Enforcement litigation rewards rigorous evidence, never indignation.

What Should Be Taken from This Judgment?

An outdated address, a record of unsuccessful searches delivered somewhere other than the last address of which the creditor had been informed, and an entire recovery chain collapses. The Paris enforcement judge did not retry the loan; he confined himself to checking that the title relied on had been properly brought to the attention of the person ordered to pay. It had not been.

For people being pursued by recovery funds on the basis of old decisions, often given in their absence, the decision is a reminder that an enforceable title is not a fortress. It rests on procedural acts, each of which can be verified, and whose irregularity sometimes comes at a heavy price for the creditor. It still has to be checked within the time limits, with documents in hand.

FAQ: Service, Null and Void Judgments and Attachment of Debts