Borrower Protection: Judge Sets Aside Unfair Clause of His Own Motion and Penalises Cofidis (TJ Coutances, 23 February 2026, No. RG 25/00305)

Court of First Instance (Tribunal Judiciaire) of Coutances, Consumer Protection Judge, 23 February 2026, No. RG 25/00305

I. The Background to the Dispute: A Debt Consolidation Loan and Unpaid Instalments

A. A Debt Consolidation Contract Concluded in 2020

On 5 September 2020, Mr and Mrs K. entered into a personal debt consolidation loan agreement with Cofidis. The purpose of the transaction was to bring several of their existing debts together into a single loan, in order to simplify the management of their budget and reduce their monthly payments.

The characteristics of the loan were as follows: an amount borrowed of €16,500 (excluding optional insurance), repayable in 96 monthly instalments (95 instalments of €211.97 and a final one of €210.87), with an annual borrowing rate of 5.39% and an annual percentage rate of charge (APR) of 5.36%. The total repayment period therefore extended over eight years.

As in most consumer credit contracts, the loan contained a joint and several liability and indivisibility clause between the co-borrowers: Mr and Mrs K. therefore both undertook, jointly and severally, to repay the entire loan.

B. The Borrowers’ Default and the Bank’s Reaction

For nearly four years, Mr and Mrs K. met their monthly payments. However, from 13 May 2024, they stopped paying the loan instalments. This situation often reflects a significant deterioration in the borrowers’ financial position, as confirmed by the fact that Mr K. filed an over-indebtedness application with the Banque de France on 16 August 2024, which was declared admissible on 19 September 2024.

Faced with these unpaid instalments, Cofidis implemented the procedure provided for by the Consumer Code. It first sent Mr and Mrs K. a formal notice by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt dated 25 February 2025. This notice demanded the regularisation of arrears of €1,487.01. Having obtained no favourable response, the bank moved on to the next step.

By registered letters dated 17 March 2025, Cofidis notified Mr and Mrs K. of the acceleration of the contract (déchéance du terme). In practical terms, this meant that the bank declared the entire outstanding principal immediately due, namely €11,433.51, even though the contract originally provided for staggered repayment until 2028. This abrupt acceleration of the instalments is one of the central points of the dispute.

Unable to obtain amicable payment of this sum, Cofidis summoned Mr and Mrs K. before the Consumer Protection Judge (juge des contentieux de la protection) of the Court of First Instance of Coutances. The summonses were served on 26 August 2025 by a bailiff (commissaire de justice) at their joint home.

II. The Judge’s Active Role in Protecting the Consumer

A. Raising Public Policy Grounds of the Court’s Own Motion

One of the most remarkable aspects of this decision is the active role played by the judge in protecting borrowers. Although Mr and Mrs K. neither appeared nor filed any written defence, the court did not automatically grant the bank’s claims. On the contrary, it carried out a scrupulous review of the compliance of the contract and of the procedures followed by Cofidis with the requirements of the Consumer Code.

This approach rests on several solid legal foundations. Article R. 632-1 of the Consumer Code expressly provides that “the judge may raise of his own motion all the provisions of this code in disputes arising from its application”. This provision confers considerable power on the judge: even if the parties do not invoke them, he may and must verify that the rules protecting consumers have been complied with.

This ability to raise grounds based on the Consumer Code of the court’s own motion stems from the particular nature of these rules: they are matters of public policy (ordre public). Article L. 314-26 of the same code states this explicitly for the provisions relating to consumer credit. This means that the parties cannot derogate from them by agreement, and that the judge must ensure their application, even of his own motion, in order to preserve contractual balance and consumer protection.

In practical terms, at the hearing of 8 December 2025, the judge raised several grounds of his own motion:

First, he examined compliance with the provisions of the Consumer Code on debt consolidation loans, in particular the pre-contractual information obligations imposed by Articles L. 312-12 and L. 312-14.

Second, he questioned the validity of the contractual clause providing for acceleration of the contract and early enforceability of the debt, in light of European Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

Finally, he noted non-compliance with the provisions of Article R. 314-20 of the Consumer Code concerning the content of the information document specific to debt consolidation loans, and relied on a recent judgment of the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) (First Civil Chamber, 13 March 2024, No. 22-24.349).

B. Respect for the Adversarial Principle Despite the Absence of the Defendants

The adversarial principle (principe du contradictoire) is a fundamental pillar of a fair trial. Under Article 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure (code de procédure civile), the judge may not base his decision on legal grounds that he has raised of his own motion without first inviting the parties to submit their observations. This principle is intended to ensure that each party can debate all the arguments, including those raised spontaneously by the court.

In this case, the judge scrupulously complied with this requirement. After raising the grounds protecting the borrowers of his own motion at the hearing of 8 December 2025, he gave Cofidis, represented by its counsel, the opportunity to put forward its arguments in defence. The case was reserved for judgment on 9 February 2026, then extended to 23 February 2026, with the bank being allowed to submit a note during the deliberation period until 5 January 2026.

Cofidis made use of this opportunity and submitted its observations by a note received on 18 December 2025. In this note, it attempted to justify the regularity of its loan offer and to contest the failings identified by the judge, in particular by producing a two-page document entitled “information document specific to debt consolidation loans”.

This procedural approach ensures that, even in the absence of the defendants (who neither appeared nor were represented), the adversarial debate did take place, at least with the claimant. The judge was thus able to base his decision on a lawful footing, after hearing Cofidis’s observations on the grounds raised of his own motion.

Article 472 of the Code of Civil Procedure moreover provides that the defendant’s absence does not prevent a decision being given on the merits of the dispute. The judge simply has to satisfy himself of the regularity of the summons (that is, that the defendant was duly informed of the proceedings), of the admissibility of the claim and of its merits.

III. The Unfair Nature of the Acceleration Clause

A. The Legal Framework: The European Directive and the Consumer Code

The notion of an unfair term is at the heart of European consumer law. Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts laid down the principle that certain contractual provisions, although formally accepted by the consumer, may be set aside if they create a significant imbalance to the consumer’s detriment.

In French law, this directive was transposed into the Consumer Code. Article L. 212-1 provides that “in contracts concluded between professionals and consumers, terms which have as their object or effect to create, to the detriment of the consumer, a significant imbalance between the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract are unfair”. The assessment of this imbalance concerns neither the main subject matter of the contract (here, the loan of money) nor the adequacy of the price (the interest rate), but the ancillary clauses that govern the performance and termination of the contract.

Article R. 212-2 of the same code establishes a list of terms presumed to be unfair. Among them, at point 4°, is the term “recognising the professional’s right to terminate the contract without reasonable notice”. This presumption is rebuttable: the professional may attempt to adduce evidence to the contrary, but it is for him to demonstrate that the disputed term does not create a significant imbalance.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) clarified the criteria for assessing the unfair nature of acceleration clauses in two major judgments. The first, delivered on 26 January 2017 (Case C-421/14), concerned a mortgage loan agreement. The CJEU indicated that the national court must examine several cumulative elements:

Does the professional’s right to declare the entire loan due depend on the consumer’s failure to perform an obligation which is essential within the contractual relationship? In credit matters, repayment of the instalments is obviously an essential obligation.

Is that right provided for in cases where such non-performance is sufficiently serious in light of the term and amount of the loan? In other words, is the clause proportionate to the seriousness of the breach?

Does the clause derogate from the ordinary rules of law applicable in the absence of specific contractual provisions? If national law already provides for mechanisms of termination in the event of serious non-performance, the clause may appear unbalanced.

Does national law provide adequate and effective means enabling the consumer subject to the application of such a clause to remedy the effects of the loan becoming due? For example, is there a notice period or an opportunity to regularise the situation?

The second CJEU judgment, delivered on 8 December 2022 (Case C-600/21), clarified that these criteria are to be understood neither as cumulative nor as alternative, but as forming part of the overall circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract. The national court must therefore carry out a global and concrete assessment of the clause, taking into account all relevant circumstances.

B. The Concrete Analysis of the Disputed Clause

The debt consolidation contract concluded between Cofidis and Mr and Mrs K. contained, in the paragraph entitled “Conditions and procedures for termination of the contract”, the following provision: “Termination by the lender: the lender may terminate your credit contract if several monthly instalments remain unpaid after a formal notice has remained unsuccessful. In that case, the lender will demand immediate repayment of the outstanding principal, increased by accrued but unpaid interest. Until the date of actual payment, the sums remaining due shall bear default interest at a rate equal to that of the loan.”

At first reading, this clause may seem balanced: it makes acceleration conditional on the existence of “several monthly instalments” being unpaid and on a prior formal notice being sent. However, the judge identified several major flaws that make it unfair.

First, the number of unpaid instalments is not specified. The term “several” legally refers to a minimum of two instalments. Yet, in a loan repayable over 96 months, the non-payment of only two instalments (roughly €424) represents a tiny fraction of the total credit (€16,500). This imprecision leaves the lender an excessive margin of discretion and creates legal uncertainty for the borrower.

Second, and this is the central point, the clause provides for “immediate” enforceability of the outstanding principal, without any notice period. The borrower moves abruptly from a situation in which he had to repay roughly €212 per month over several years to one in which he must immediately pay several thousand euros. This sudden worsening of the repayment conditions may precipitate the over-indebtedness of a consumer who is already in a fragile position.

The court held that this total absence of notice was “very unfavourable to the borrowers in view of the sudden worsening of the repayment conditions”. In other areas of consumer law, such as the termination of subscription contracts, the law systematically requires reasonable notice so that the consumer can make arrangements. The absence of such a mechanism in credit matters constitutes a manifest imbalance.

Third, the court assessed the proportionality of the sanction. Even if the non-performance concerns one of the borrower’s essential obligations (repaying the loan), providing for immediate enforceability of the loan on non-payment of a minimum of two instalments appears disproportionate in light of the amount and term of the original commitment. On a €16,500 loan repayable over 96 months, two unpaid instalments represent about 2% of the total amount and 2% of the term. Making 100% of the outstanding principal immediately due in such circumstances creates a flagrant imbalance.

Finally, the judge found that the clause provided no mechanism enabling the borrower to remedy effectively the effects of early enforceability. True, a formal notice is sent, but it sets a period of only 8 days (in this case, the formal notice of 25 February 2025 allowed that period to pay €1,487.01). This very short period does not constitute an “adequate and effective means” within the meaning of the CJEU case law, especially for a borrower in financial difficulty.

C. The Consequences: The Clause Deemed Unwritten

When a clause is found to be unfair, the sanction is radical: it is deemed unwritten (réputée non écrite). This legal expression means that the clause is considered never to have existed in the contract. It is erased retroactively, as if the parties had never agreed it. The rest of the contract remains valid and continues to produce its effects, to the extent that it can survive without the clause that has been set aside.

This is exactly what the Coutances court ruled: “It is therefore appropriate to find that the early enforceability clause on which these letters are based is unfair, and to declare it unwritten.” This wording implies that the letters sent by Cofidis on 17 March 2025 (notifying the acceleration of the contract and demanding €11,433.51) have no legal value.

As a direct consequence, Cofidis’s principal claim for payment, based on the finding of acceleration, was rejected outright. The court considered that, since the clause was unwritten, the bank could not rely on an acceleration that could never lawfully have occurred. The loan should therefore have continued to be repaid according to the original schedule, that is, by monthly instalments until 2028.

This solution effectively protects the consumer against unbalanced clauses. It restores contractual equality by depriving the professional of the undue advantage he had reserved for himself. It also has a deterrent effect: credit institutions now know that they cannot impose acceleration clauses without complying with the requirements of proportionality, notice and the possibility of regularisation.

However, the rejection of the claim based on acceleration does not mean that the bank loses all recourse. The court examined the alternative claim for judicial termination of the contract, which is governed by other rules and may be ordered even in the absence of a valid contractual clause, on the basis of the general law of contract.

IV. Breaches of the Pre-Contractual Information Obligations

A. The Specific Obligations for Debt Consolidation Loans

A debt consolidation loan, also known as a credit buy-back or debt restructuring, is a particular financial transaction in which a borrower consolidates several existing loans into a single credit, generally with a reduced monthly payment but a longer term. This transaction may seem attractive for a borrower in difficulty, but it carries risks: a longer total repayment period, a sometimes higher overall cost of credit, and the possibility of taking on new debts while the consolidation loan is being repaid.

This is why the legislator has provided for enhanced information obligations for this type of credit. Article L. 312-12 of the Consumer Code requires the lender or the credit intermediary to give the borrower, before the contract is concluded, the information necessary to compare different offers and enabling the borrower “to clearly understand the extent of his commitment”.

Article L. 312-14 of the same code specifies that “the lender or the credit intermediary shall provide the borrower with explanations enabling him to determine whether the proposed credit contract is suited to his needs and financial situation”. These provisions are intended to make the lender accountable and to prevent vulnerable borrowers from taking out credit unsuited to their situation.

For debt consolidation transactions, the Consumer Code goes even further. Article R. 314-20 lists exhaustively the information that the pre-contractual information sheet specific to consolidation must contain. This sheet must include no fewer than sixteen categories of detailed information, covering all aspects of the transaction: characteristics of the credits to be consolidated, characteristics of the new credit, repayment schedule, consequences of the consolidation, and so on.

Among this mandatory information are in particular the envisaged date of early repayment of the credits to be consolidated (Article R. 314-20, 1° b), the date on which payments or direct debits made for the instalments of the credits to be consolidated must stop (Article R. 314-20, 4° c), and the statement that the consolidation will result in a longer repayment term (Article R. 314-20, 4° 5).

B. The Judge’s Rigorous Verification

In the exercise of his role, the Consumer Protection Judge carried out a meticulous verification of compliance with these information obligations. This verification was not requested by the parties (it should be recalled that the borrowers did not appear and that Cofidis obviously could not invoke its own failings), but was carried out by the court of its own motion, in accordance with Article R. 632-1 of the Consumer Code.

In its note of 18 December 2025, Cofidis attempted to show that it had complied with the regulations by producing exhibit No. 6, entitled “information document specific to debt consolidation loans”, two pages long. This document should have contained all the information required by Article R. 314-20 of the Consumer Code.

The court examined this document with the greatest care and found that it did not comply with the legal requirements. Three specific failings were identified. First, the document did not specify, as the provision requires at 1° b, the envisaged date of early repayment of the credits to be consolidated. This information is nevertheless essential: the borrower must know when his old credits will be settled by the lender, because he remains in principle bound to keep repaying them until that date.

Second, the document did not state, contrary to what 4° c of Article R. 314-20 requires, the date on which payments or direct debits made for the instalments of the credits to be consolidated were to stop. Here again, this information is vital: if the borrower keeps paying his old credits while the new loan has already begun, he ends up paying the same debts twice.

Third, the document did not contain the statement prescribed by 4° 5 of Article R. 314-20 that the consolidation would result in a longer repayment term. This information is crucial because it alerts the borrower to a frequent and often underestimated consequence of debt consolidation: the monthly payment does fall, but at the price of a sometimes considerable lengthening of the total period of indebtedness, which increases the overall cost of the credit.

The judge concluded unambiguously: “Consequently the violation characterised above of the provisions of L. 312-12 and L. 312-14 must be sanctioned by forfeiture of the right to interest from the outset, by application of Articles L. 341-1 and L. 341-2 of the Consumer Code.”

C. The Sanction: Forfeiture of the Right to Interest

Forfeiture of the right to interest (déchéance du droit aux intérêts) is one of the heaviest sanctions provided for by the Consumer Code in credit matters. It is a genuine civil sanction, distinct from nullity of the contract, and is intended to punish a lender who has failed to comply with its information or formal obligations.

This sanction is provided for by Articles L. 341-1 et seq. of the Consumer Code. Article L. 341-1 provides that the lender forfeits its right to interest “in the event of failure to comply with the requirements set out in Chapters I, II and IV of Title I of Book III and in Titles II and III”. Among these requirements are precisely the pre-contractual information obligations of Articles L. 312-12 and L. 312-14, non-compliance with which was found in this case.

In practical terms, forfeiture of the right to interest means that the lender permanently and retroactively loses the right to receive contractual interest. The borrower remains liable only for repayment of the principal borrowed, that is, the amount he actually received. Interest already paid since the start of the contract must be returned to the borrower or set off against the outstanding principal.

Article L. 341-8 of the Consumer Code specifies how this sanction operates: “In the event of forfeiture of the right to interest, the borrower is liable only for repayment of the principal in accordance with the agreed schedule, and the sums received by way of interest are returned to the borrower or set off against the outstanding principal.” This provision ensures that the borrower benefits fully from the sanction by recovering all of the interest paid.

Moreover, forfeiture of the right to interest precludes the lender from obtaining payment of the early repayment indemnity provided for by Articles L. 312-19 and D. 312-16 of the Consumer Code. This indemnity, which compensates the lender’s loss of earnings in the event of early repayment of the credit, cannot be claimed where the lender has committed breaches sanctioned by forfeiture.

The scope of this sanction is considerable. In the present case, the initial credit was €16,500, repayable with interest at 5.39% per year. Over the total term of the loan (96 months), the interest amounted to several thousand euros. By ordering forfeiture of the right to interest, the court deprived Cofidis of all of its remuneration on this credit. The bank will be able to claim only the pure principal, reduced by the sums already paid by the borrowers.

V. Judicial Termination of the Contract and Calculation of the Debt

A. The Conditions for Judicial Termination

Although the acceleration clause was declared unwritten and Cofidis’s principal claim was rejected, the bank had put forward an alternative claim: judicial termination of the loan contract. This claim, based on the general law of contract and not on a contractual clause, is governed by different rules.

Judicial termination is founded on Articles 1224 et seq. of the Civil Code (code civil), which result from the reform of contract law carried out by the Ordinance of 10 February 2016. Article 1224 provides that “termination results either from the application of a termination clause or, in the event of sufficiently serious non-performance, from a notification by the creditor to the debtor or from a court decision”. Article 1227 specifies that “termination may, in any event, be sought before the courts”.

The judge has a broad power of assessment. Under Article 1228 of the Civil Code, “the judge may, depending on the circumstances, record or order termination or order performance of the contract, possibly granting the debtor a period of grace, or award damages only”. It is therefore for the trial courts to assess, with sovereign discretion, in the event of partial non-performance, whether it is sufficiently serious to justify termination (résolution) or, in the case of a contract performed in successive instalments, discontinuance (résiliation) of the contract.

The distinction between résolution and résiliation is important. Résolution annihilates the contract retroactively: everything proceeds as if it had never existed, and the parties must mutually return what they have received. Résiliation, by contrast, operates only for the future: it ends the contract but does not call into question what has been properly performed in the past. For a contract performed in successive instalments, such as a credit repayable by monthly instalments, it is résiliation that applies.

The Coutances court therefore examined whether the borrowers’ non-performance was serious enough to justify termination of the contract. The facts were beyond dispute: from May 2024, Mr and Mrs K. paid no further instalments. Despite the formal notice of 25 February 2025 giving them 8 days to settle €1,487.01, and despite the letter sent to them on 17 March 2025, neither co-borrower took any step to settle the debt.

The court held that this non-performance, which had lasted about 21 months at the time of the judgment (from May 2024 to February 2026), was “sufficiently serious to justify ordering judicial termination of the loan contract concluded between the parties”. It noted that the contract expressly contained a joint and several liability and indivisibility clause, thereby binding both spouses jointly. The obligation to repay the loan is the borrower’s essential obligation in a credit contract. Its prolonged and total non-performance unquestionably justifies termination.

Judicial termination was therefore ordered, ending the contract for the future. Mr and Mrs K. are no longer required to pay the future instalments, but they must settle the outstanding principal, less the sums already paid and on the terms set by the court.

B. Calculation of the Sums Due: Principal Only

Once judicial termination had been ordered, the exact amount that Mr and Mrs K. had to repay to Cofidis remained to be determined. This calculation is directly affected by the sanction of forfeiture of the right to interest imposed by the court.

Cofidis initially claimed €11,588.18, calculated as at 25 June 2025, with interest at the contractual rate of 5.39% per year on €10,473.82 and at the statutory rate for the balance. This sum comprised the outstanding principal, accrued contractual interest, default interest and various charges.

The court carried out a complete recalculation, applying Article L. 341-8 of the Consumer Code. This article provides that, in the event of forfeiture of the right to interest, the borrower is liable only for repayment of the principal, and that the sums received by way of interest must be returned to the borrower or set off against the outstanding principal.

On the basis of the account history produced by Cofidis, the judge drew up the following statement. The principal originally borrowed was €16,500. From the start of the contract (September 2020) until payments stopped (May 2024), Mr and Mrs K. had paid a total of €8,833.02. This amount comprised both principal and interest, in accordance with the loan’s original amortisation schedule.

Because of the forfeiture of the right to interest, this €8,833.02 must be set off entirely against the principal borrowed, without distinction between the principal portion and the interest portion contained in the instalments paid. The calculation therefore becomes very simple: principal borrowed (€16,500) minus payments made since the outset (€8,833.02) equals outstanding principal (€7,666.98).

This is exactly the amount the court adopted: “Consequently, Mr [A] [K] and Mrs [U] [J], wife [K], should be ordered jointly and severally to pay the sum of €7,666.98 in settlement of the credit.”

This recalculation perfectly illustrates the effect of forfeiture of the right to interest. Instead of claiming more than €11,000 (principal + interest + charges), Cofidis can obtain only €7,666.98 of pure principal. The difference, roughly €3,900, corresponds approximately to the contractual and default interest that the bank can no longer claim because of its failings.

C. The Total Absence of Interest to Ensure the Effectiveness of European Law

One last point deserves particular attention: the court not only denied Cofidis the right to receive contractual interest, but also excluded the application of statutory interest and default interest on the outstanding principal. This solution, which may be surprising at first sight, is founded on European Union law and on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

In principle, under Article 1231-6 of the Civil Code, damages owed for delay in the payment of a sum of money consist of interest at the statutory rate, from the date of the formal notice. Article L. 313-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code (code monétaire et financier) also provides that this statutory interest rate is automatically increased by right two months after a court decision has become enforceable.

However, the court considered that applying these provisions would undermine the effectiveness of the sanction provided for by European law. The judge expressly referred to two CJEU judgments: the judgment of 27 March 2014 (Case C-565/12) and the judgment of 9 November 2016 (Case C-42/15). These decisions require national courts to ensure the effectiveness of European Union law, of which the national provisions are merely the transposition.

According to this case law, the sanctions provided for the lender’s failings must be genuinely dissuasive and proportionate. Yet if forfeiture of the right to contractual interest is ordered while the lender is allowed to receive statutory or default interest, the scope of the sanction is considerably weakened. The lender would retain remuneration on the principal lent, admittedly lower than the contractual interest, but which would soften the deterrent effect of the measure.

The court therefore decided to exclude “any application of Articles 1231-6 of the Civil Code and L. 313-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code” and to state that the sum of €7,666.98 “shall bear no interest, even at the statutory rate”. This wording is unambiguous: Mr and Mrs K. must repay €7,666.98 of pure principal, without interest of any kind.

This solution complies with the requirement of effectiveness of European law. It ensures that the sanction of forfeiture of the right to interest retains its full deterrent force. A lender that fails to comply with its information obligations receives absolutely no remuneration on the principal lent. It finds itself in the position of a mere interest-free lender, which is an economically heavy sanction and one likely to encourage credit institutions to exercise the greatest rigour in complying with their obligations.

VI. The Practical Scope of This Decision

The decision of the Court of First Instance of Coutances of 23 February 2026 is of considerable practical importance for all borrowers facing repayment difficulties and the recovery procedures of banks. It illustrates several essential lessons.

First, it is a reminder that the contractual clauses imposed by banks are not untouchable. Even if the borrower has signed the contract and formally accepted all its provisions, the judge may and must set aside unfair terms that create a significant imbalance. Acceleration clauses, which are very common in consumer credit contracts, are particularly closely scrutinised. To be valid, they must satisfy strict criteria of proportionality, provide for a reasonable notice period and offer the borrower effective means of regularisation.

Second, the decision underlines the crucial importance of the judge’s role in consumer law. Even where the borrower does not appear and presents no defence, the court examines of its own motion the compliance of the contract and the procedure with the protective requirements of the Consumer Code. This judicial vigilance is an essential safeguard against abuse, particularly for the most vulnerable consumers or those least informed of their rights.

Third, the judgment highlights the enhanced information obligations borne by credit institutions in relation to debt consolidation loans. These transactions, often presented as a miracle solution for indebted people, carry significant risks. The legislator has therefore required lenders to provide exhaustive and precise information, enabling the borrower to clearly understand the extent of his commitment. Failure to comply with these obligations, even in part, exposes the lender to the heavy sanction of forfeiture of the right to interest.

Fourth, the decision illustrates the interplay between national and European consumer law. French judges do not merely apply the provisions of the Consumer Code mechanically: they interpret them in light of European Directive 93/13/EEC and the case law of the CJEU, in order to ensure the effectiveness of consumer protection. This approach may lead to setting aside certain rules of French general law (such as statutory interest) where their application would weaken the scope of European sanctions.

Fifth, the judgment is a reminder that judicial termination of the contract, distinct from contractual acceleration, remains possible even where the acceleration clause is set aside. Where the borrower’s non-performance is sufficiently serious and prolonged, the judge may order termination on the basis of the general law of contract. However, this termination takes place on terms that are far more protective of the borrower: judicial assessment of the seriousness of the non-performance, the possibility of granting periods of grace, and calculation of the debt according to the rules of the Consumer Code (in particular in the event of forfeiture of the right to interest).

Finally, the decision shows that the financial consequences of a bank’s failings can be considerable. In this case, Cofidis claimed more than €11,500 and ultimately obtained only about €7,600, without any interest. The gap, close to €4,000, represents the direct loss suffered by the bank as a result of its failings. This significant economic sanction should encourage credit institutions to exercise the greatest rigour in drafting their contracts and in complying with their legal obligations.

Conclusion

The decision of the Court of First Instance of Coutances of 23 February 2026 is an exemplary illustration of the judicial protection enjoyed by borrowers against credit institutions. By declaring the acceleration clause unfair and by sanctioning Cofidis’s breaches of the pre-contractual information obligations with total forfeiture of the right to interest, the judge firmly reminded us that consumer law is not a mere legislative facade, but a body of effective and enforced rules.

This decision forms part of a broader movement in case law, driven in particular by the Court of Justice of the European Union, aimed at rebalancing contractual relations between professionals and consumers. Acceleration clauses, long used by banks as instruments of pressure on borrowers in difficulty, are now subject to rigorous scrutiny. To be valid, they must be proportionate, accompanied by reasonable notice and offer effective possibilities of regularisation.

Beyond the specific case, this case law sends a message of hope to the many borrowers facing abusive recovery procedures. It reminds them that they have rights, that these rights are monitored by judges of their own motion, and that banks’ failings can be heavily sanctioned. It also calls on credit institutions to exercise the greatest vigilance in drafting their contracts and in scrupulously complying with their legal obligations, on pain of significant economic sanctions.

If you are facing a similar situation, do not hesitate to consult a lawyer specialising in banking law. The professionals at lebot-avocat.com can assist you in analysing your credit contract, challenging an unfair acceleration clause, and defending your interests against your bank. Consumer protection is not an empty phrase: it is a concrete legal reality, to which this decision bears striking witness.

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