CEO Fraud by Fax: Gross Negligence Cannot Be Upheld Once Fax Is No Longer the Agreed Instrument (Cass. com., 8 Oct. 2026, No. 25-17.510)

A company that fell victim to CEO fraud (fraude au président) had an international transfer order bearing a forged signature sent to its bank by fax. The bank executed the order, then sought to escape all liability by invoking its customer’s gross negligence (négligence grave). The French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) rejects this reasoning: where fax is no longer the payment instrument agreed between the parties, a bank that agreed to execute the order cannot accuse the customer of gross negligence in its use.

French Supreme Court, Commercial, Financial and Economic Chamber (Cass. com.), 8 October 2026, appeal No. 25-17.510 (published in the Bulletin): quashing the judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal of 28 May 2025

🔑 Key takeaways

  • In the event of an unauthorised payment transaction, the bank can escape liability only if the customer, through gross negligence, failed to comply with its obligations relating to the payment instrument issued to it.
  • A method of placing orders abandoned by mutual agreement cannot serve as the basis for gross negligence, especially where the bank agreed to execute an order sent through that channel.
  • In this case, fax had been used until March 2017, then replaced by a secure remote transmission system. The bank nevertheless executed an order sent by fax in December 2019.
  • The judgment does not relieve the customer of the duty of vigilance: it places the burden of proving gross negligence on the bank, and measures it against the instrument actually agreed.
Table of Contents ▼

CEO fraud (fraude au président) is one of the most widespread scams against businesses. A third party, posing as the company’s manager or as an adviser, persuades an employee, often under time pressure and under cover of confidentiality, to carry out a transfer to an account that does not belong to the announced beneficiary. Once the funds have disappeared, the company turns to its bank. The legal question is then simple to state but delicate to resolve: must the bank reimburse, or can it set up the customer’s own fault against it, and in particular gross negligence in the use of the payment instrument?

In its judgment of 8 October 2026, the Commercial Chamber gives a clear answer on one precise point: the customer’s gross negligence cannot be upheld where the payment instrument used is no longer the one the parties had agreed. The judgment is published in the Bulletin, making it a decision of principle intended to guide the lower courts and practitioners. It does not settle every CEO fraud dispute, but it provides a framework of reasoning that banks and victim companies alike must now factor into their strategy.

What did the French Supreme Court decide on 8 October 2026?

The Court quashes the judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal of 28 May 2025 and remits the case to the same court, differently composed. It holds that the court of appeal infringed Articles L. 133-16 and L. 133-19, IV of the French Monetary and Financial Code (Code monétaire et financier), interpreted in the light of Articles 69 and 74 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 on payment services.

The Court’s reasoning has two steps. It first restates the general rule: in the event of an unauthorised payment transaction, the payment service provider can escape liability only if the user, through gross negligence, failed to comply with its obligations to use the payment instrument issued to it in accordance with the terms governing its issue and use, or failed to take all reasonable measures to keep its personalised security credentials safe.

It then notes that the court of appeal itself had found that fax had no longer been the payment instrument agreed between the parties since March 2017. In those circumstances, the bank, which had agreed to execute a payment transaction by means of such an instrument, could not accuse the company of gross negligence. The court of appeal therefore infringed the legislation by upholding that negligence.

This second step is decisive. The Court does not rule on whether the transaction was authorised or not, nor on the customer’s possible carelessness in the broader sense. It identifies an inconsistency: the bank cannot rely on non-compliance with a method of placing orders that it had itself ceased to regard as valid, while nevertheless agreeing to execute orders sent through that channel.

Why does CEO fraud raise a particular legal problem?

CEO fraud relies on social engineering rather than on a technical flaw. The fraudster does not break into the company’s IT system. They exploit hierarchical trust, time pressure and the apparent secrecy of the transaction. The employee who carries out the order believes they are acting on behalf of their manager, and the transfer leaves for a foreign account, then disappears within hours.

Legally, this fraud pits two logics against each other. On the one hand, the company gave an order, at least in appearance, and the transaction therefore seems to be authorised. On the other, the order does not genuinely come from the manager, which may lead to the transaction being characterised as unauthorised. Between these two characterisations, the allocation of losses is the essential question. The payments regime, derived from the European directive transposed into the Monetary and Financial Code, allocates the risk according to who committed a fault.

The bank, for its part, often invokes the customer’s gross negligence, for example because the order was transmitted without verification, or because the employee did not follow internal procedures. This is a powerful lever: if gross negligence is established, the bank can be released from liability. But it presupposes that the customer breached an obligation that genuinely weighs on it, within the framework of the agreed payment instrument. That is precisely the point that the judgment of 8 October 2026 clarifies.

What were the facts of the case?

The administrative assistant of the company’s president was contacted by a person posing as the company’s lawyer. This correspondent obtained the transmission, by fax, of a transfer order to a bank in Hungary, to finance an alleged financial transaction. The order bore a signature imitating that of the manager. It was confirmed by an email from the same assistant on the same day.

The bank executed the international transfer on 17 December 2019. Having discovered the fraud, the company asked the bank to reimburse the sum and to compensate its losses. The Paris Court of Appeal dismissed these claims, in particular on the ground of the company’s gross negligence.

The contractual history is central to the solution. The parties had been bound since 2009 by an agreement on remote transmission of orders, which the bank presented as a factor increasing security. A second contract, signed on 10 March 2017, organised a secure system for submitting international transfers remotely, by means of dedicated software and a remote transmission protocol.

It emerges from the findings of the court of appeal that, until March 2017, the company transmitted its orders by fax, then had them confirmed. From that date, it no longer used fax. The personalised security device to which it had subscribed, a dedicated digital key, had not been used for the disputed transfer. The court of appeal had deduced from this that the special regime of Article L. 133-19, IV, relating to instruments with a personalised security device, was not applicable. It had nevertheless accepted that the bank could escape liability on the sole basis of Article L. 133-16, by invoking gross negligence. It is this second point that the French Supreme Court quashes.

📖 Definition: CEO fraud (fraude au président)

A scam in which the perpetrator poses as a manager, or as an adviser to the company, in order to obtain from an employee the execution of an urgent and confidential transfer. The fraudster relies on hierarchical pressure and on the exceptional nature of the transaction to bypass the usual procedures.

What is the legal framework for gross negligence?

The regime for unauthorised payment transactions is organised by Articles L. 133-18 et seq. of the Monetary and Financial Code. The principle is protective of the user: when the user reports an unauthorised transaction, the payer’s provider must reimburse it, in principle without delay. This principle nevertheless has exceptions, and the most important is the user’s gross negligence.

Article L. 133-16 requires the user, as soon as it receives a payment instrument, to take all reasonable measures to keep its personalised security credentials safe, and to use the instrument in accordance with the terms governing its issue and use. Those terms must be objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate. Article L. 133-19, IV, for its part, provides that the payer bears the losses where it failed, intentionally or through gross negligence, to meet its obligations, in the case where the transaction was carried out using an instrument with personalised security credentials.

The French Supreme Court holds that the bank can escape liability in the event of an unauthorised transaction only where the user, through gross negligence, fails to comply with its obligations to use the payment instrument issued to it, or does not take reasonable security measures. This framework is demanding for the bank, which must establish its customer’s breach.

European law informs these provisions. Articles 69 and 74 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 require Member States to provide for the payer’s liability only in strictly defined cases, and the French Supreme Court interprets national law in the light of these texts. This requirement of European conformity reinforces a strict reading of gross negligence.

For institutions, this framework interacts with the obligations relating to strong authentication of payment transactions, arising from the European Commission’s technical regulation, which supplements the directive. A bank that accepts an order channel must ensure that this channel meets the applicable security requirements. It cannot simply require the customer to behave prudently with regard to an instrument that it did not, in reality, require.

What is the customer’s gross negligence?

Gross negligence is a central notion of payments law. It determines how losses are shared between the bank and its customer under the regime for unauthorised transactions. Where the customer has committed gross negligence in the use of its payment instrument, it bears the losses, whereas in principle the bank would have had to reimburse. The provision was designed to encourage account holders to protect their codes, identifiers and means of access.

📖 Definition: gross negligence (négligence grave) (Article L. 133-16 of the Monetary and Financial Code)

A characterised failure by the customer to use the payment instrument in accordance with the terms of its issue and use, or to keep its personalised security credentials safe. Gross negligence presupposes a fault of particular seriousness, which the bank must establish.

The difficulty lies in the nature of the instrument at issue. Gross negligence is measured against the payment instrument, that is, the means agreed between the bank and its customer for giving orders. A customer who transmits an order through a channel that the bank accepted for a period, then abandoned by mutual agreement, cannot be accused of having misused an instrument that no longer existed, at least not in that form, in the contractual relationship.

This reading is not automatic. It is necessary to verify, in each case, which instrument was agreed, which methods were actually practised, and whether the bank, by its conduct, accepted a change. Proof of these elements is often decisive. Email exchanges, amendments, transmission records and consistent practices are essential evidence.

Why was fax no longer the agreed instrument?

The Court relies on a finding of fact that underpins the whole solution: since March 2017, the company no longer transmitted its orders by fax. It used the secure remote transmission system provided for by the contract of 10 March 2017. The court of appeal had noted this itself, to conclude that the transaction was not authorised within the meaning of the legislation.

If fax was no longer the agreed means, the bank could not reasonably accept an order transmitted through that channel without treating it as irregular. The fact that it executed it creates an inconsistency that the Court does not let pass: the bank had, in practice, admitted a method of placing orders different from that of the contract. It cannot, after the event, accuse the customer of having used that method in conditions that the bank itself did not check.

This solution is consistent with the logic of the payments regime. The provider must execute orders in accordance with the agreed terms, and it bears the risk linked to its own practices. A customer who relied on its bank’s practice should not alone suffer the consequences.

Reasoning diagram

Order transmitted by fax → ↓
Bank executes the order → ↓
Customer disputes (unauthorised transaction) → ↓
Bank invokes gross negligence → ↓
Was the payment instrument still the agreed means? → ↓
No: gross negligence cannot be upheld → ↓
Bank obliged to reimburse

What does the French Supreme Court not say?

Prudence requires reading the judgment for what it says, and no further. The Court does not decide that the customer is free of all fault. It does not hold that the bank must automatically reimburse every CEO fraud. Nor does it say that email confirmation or the presence of a forged document is unimportant.

It remits the case to the Paris Court of Appeal, differently composed. That court will have to examine the other elements of the file, in particular whether the transmission by fax and the confirmation by email were sufficient warning signs, for a diligent bank, in view of the earlier practice. The quashing penalises an error of law: it does not amount to recognition of a right to compensation.

One may also ask whether the solution would withstand a situation where the customer itself had proposed the use of fax, or had used it regularly, without reservation from the bank, after 2017. The Court did not have to answer this question. The lower courts will face it, and the answer will depend on the exact chronology of the exchanges between the parties.

What is the scope of this judgment?

The judgment has significant practical scope. For banks, it is a reminder that they cannot accept methods of transmitting orders that depart from the contract without weighing the legal consequences. Accepting an order through an abandoned channel amounts, in some cases, to giving up the right to rely on the customer’s gross negligence on that channel.

For businesses, the judgment offers a solid argument when the bank tries to shift the cost of the fraud onto them by invoking a fault. It invites them to reconstruct the history of the methods of transmitting orders, which may reveal practices contrary to the contract.

Its generality should not, however, be overestimated. The solution rests on a precise situation: an abandoned instrument, a bank that executed the order despite that abandonment, and findings by the court of appeal on the contractual history. A customer that continued to use a non-agreed channel, without the bank noticing, might see its own negligence discussed in different terms.

What scope should be given to this judgment: quashing of a line of reasoning or recognition of a right?

The Court’s reasoning is a quashing for infringement of the rule on gross negligence. It does not establish an absolute right to reimbursement. This distinction matters for litigation strategy: a victim relying on the judgment must still show that the bank could not invoke the customer’s gross negligence, and that the conditions for reimbursement are met.

The criticism that can be made concerns the overall balance of the system. A bank that has accepted for several years orders through a channel not provided for in the contract benefits, in practice, from a de facto service for which it has not necessarily put appropriate controls in place. In this sense, the Court’s solution encourages institutions to clarify the permitted methods of transmission, and to refuse orders that fall outside the agreed framework. It is a healthy incentive, but it does not resolve the question of the security of orders given by telephone, email or messaging, which remain frequently used channels in practice.

Lastly, the decision says nothing about the criminal liability of the perpetrators of the fraud, or that of any accomplices. It concerns only the civil relations between the bank and its customer.

What should you do in the event of CEO fraud?

In practice, several reflexes determine what follows. First, gather the history of the methods of transmitting orders between the bank and the company: contracts, remote transmission agreements, amendments, exchanges on how orders are placed, transmission records. This history often reveals that the channel used for the fraudulent order was not the one in the contract. This is a central point in the discussion on gross negligence.

Next, ask the bank, in writing and without delay, to reimburse the unauthorised transaction, enclosing the relevant documents. An attempt to recall the funds from the beneficiary’s bank should be started in parallel, because speed often determines recovery. Relying on the regime for unauthorised transactions also requires disputing the transaction within the time limits set by the contract and by law. A late challenge may complicate the discussion.

Finally, assess the company’s internal responsibility. A transfer validation procedure that provides for confirmation by a second person and through a separate channel is the best prevention. It also has legal significance: it makes it possible to show that the company took the reasonable measures that the legislation expects of it.

A criminal complaint is not a condition of reimbursement. The right to reimbursement falls under the civil regime for unauthorised payment transactions, independent of any criminal proceedings. If the company decides to file a complaint, it is prudent to limit the statements to the strictly necessary facts: dates, amounts, method of contact and disputed transactions, without legal characterisation or speculation about the means of the fraud. Our article on bank fraud and the criminal complaint covers this question in detail: Bank fraud: what to say and not to say to your bank and in your complaint.

These steps depend on the case. An individualised analysis of the contracts, the exchanges and the time limits remains indispensable before taking any action.

To place this judgment in the context of fraudulent transfer litigation, readers will find it useful to look at the conviction of a bank for transfers obtained by a fake adviser, handed down by the Paris Court of Appeal, as well as the Angers Court of Appeal judgment on the burden of proving authentication.

FAQ: CEO fraud and gross negligence

Can the bank always invoke the customer’s gross negligence in a CEO fraud case?
Yes, in principle, but the bank must establish gross negligence in the use of the agreed payment instrument. If the channel used for the order was no longer the one provided for in the contract, and the bank accepted it, gross negligence cannot be upheld on that basis.
Is an order sent by fax automatically an unauthorised transaction?
No. The characterisation depends on the contract and on the practices between the parties. In the case decided on 8 October 2026, the court of appeal had held that the transaction was not authorised, which the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) did not call into question. The question of gross negligence is dealt with separately.
What is the difference between an unauthorised transaction and an authorised but deceptive one?
An unauthorised transaction is one to which the account holder did not consent. An authorised transaction was consented to, even if the consent was obtained by deception. This distinction determines the applicable regime and the allocation of losses.
Does a customer who confirmed an order by email lose the right to reimbursement?
Not necessarily. An email confirmation is one element of the file, but it is not enough on its own to establish gross negligence. The court assesses all the circumstances, including the methods of placing orders agreed between the parties.
Is it necessary to file a criminal complaint to obtain reimbursement?
No. Reimbursement falls under the civil regime for unauthorised payment transactions, regardless of any complaint. If a complaint is filed, it is advisable to set out only the facts that are strictly necessary.
What is the time limit for challenging a fraudulent transaction?
The time limit depends on the account agreement and the applicable law. It is prudent to act without delay as soon as the fraud is discovered, and to keep all evidence of how the order was transmitted.
Is a lawyer necessary for this type of case?
It is not mandatory for an amicable approach, but the complexity of the issues of characterisation, gross negligence and evidence often justifies legal assistance from the outset.
In conclusion: the judgment of 8 October 2026 is a reminder that gross negligence is measured against the payment instrument actually agreed. A bank that accepts an order through an abandoned channel cannot use that against its customer. It remains to be seen how the Paris Court of Appeal, differently composed, will assess the other elements of the file.

This article is a general analysis of case law. It does not constitute legal advice on any particular situation. For any question relating to a specific case, you should consult a banking law attorney.

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