Loan Signed Online: Screenshots Do Not Prove the Electronic Signature (CA Paris, 26 February 2026, No. 25/04368)

CA Paris, Pôle 4 ch. 9-A, 26 February 2026, No. RG 25/04368

What Happened in This Case?

The facts are so commonplace that they should give every borrower pause. The Caisse d’épargne et de prévoyance Grand Est Europe claims to have issued a personal loan offer of €30,000, repayable in 69 monthly instalments of €497.02 excluding insurance, at an interest rate of 4.70% per year (APR of 4.99%), accepted by two co-borrowers “by electronic signatures of 22 February 2019”. The funds were released on 4 March 2019.

For several years, the instalments were paid, for a total of €19,390.82. Then some instalments went unpaid. The bank relied on acceleration of the debt (déchéance du terme), which it dated to 28 August 2023, and summoned the two borrowers on 9 April 2024 before the protection litigation judge (juge des contentieux de la protection) of the Court of First Instance of Sens (tribunal judiciaire de Sens). The borrowers did not appear, either at first instance or on appeal, where the documents were served on them in the manner provided for in Article 659 of the Code of Civil Procedure (code de procédure civile). No one therefore came to contest the signature. That is precisely what makes the judgment so interesting.

What Amounts Did the Bank Claim?

Before the court, the bank put forward a cascade of claims: primarily, €17,260.06 with interest at the contractual rate of 4.70% on €16,607.36 from 29 August 2023, in performance of the contract following acceleration of the debt or judicial termination; in the alternative, in the event of forfeiture of the right to interest, €11,785.78; in the further alternative, on the basis of recovery of undue payments (Articles 1302 and 1302-1 of the Civil Code), €10,609.18, being the principal of €30,000 less the €19,390.82 already paid, with interest at the statutory rate from the release of the funds.

The gap between the first and the last claim, nearly €6,700 excluding interest, measures exactly what is at stake in the reliability of the electronic signature: everything above the net principal presupposes a validly accepted contract.

What Had the Protection Litigation Judge Decided?

By a judgment deemed adversarial (réputé contradictoire) of 13 November 2024, the first-instance judge dismissed all of the Caisse d’épargne’s claims. The judge noted that the bank “produced no electronic signature evidence file as such, since it produced only screenshots internal to the bank, nor any other document demonstrating the reliability of the signatures” attributed to the borrowers. Without proof of the signature, there is no contract; without a contract, there is no contractual claim.

The judge went further and even refused return of the principal on the basis of undue payment, considering that “restitution of undue payments was possible only in the case of a legitimate error, which must not be culpable”, whereas “the bank made an error resulting from a failure to comply with the regulatory provisions on electronic signatures”. A radical solution, which would not survive the appeal.

Before the Court of Appeal, the pre-trial judge (conseiller de la mise en état) raised of his own motion the issues of limitation (forclusion) and several grounds for forfeiture of the right to interest, asking the bank to produce the full account history, the formal notice preceding acceleration of the debt, the offer and its riders, the pre-contractual information sheet (FIPEN) and proof of its delivery, the dialogue sheet, the proof of consultation of the register of credit repayment incidents (FICP), the insurance notice and, since the contract was signed electronically, “the certificate of the qualified trust service provider (PSCE) and all useful evidence on the reliability of the electronic signature”. This list is a genuine roadmap for any borrower sued for payment.

Can the Judge Examine the Electronic Signature When the Borrower Does Not Appear?

This is the bank’s first argument, and it is not without skill. It argues that the first-instance judge “could not raise of his own motion a challenge to a signature not raised by the contracting party itself”, a signature challenge not being a ground derived from the Consumer Code (code de la consommation), the only area in which Article R. 632-1 of that Code authorises a judge to raise points of his own motion. It adds that nothing suggested that the borrowers had not signed, “since the loan was repaid for many months without giving rise to any objection”, and asks for the judgment to be annulled.

The Court rejects this ground by distinguishing two things that the bank was trying to conflate: the verification of handwriting under Article 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an incidental procedure opened when a party denies its signature, and the ordinary review of the merits of the claim, which Article 472 of the same Code requires of the judge where the defendant does not appear. In the event of default, the judge “grants the claim only to the extent that he considers it regular, admissible and well founded”. The reasoning forms the foundation of the whole decision:

“it does not follow from these statements that the first-instance judge intended to carry out of his own motion a verification of signature within the meaning of Article 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereas it falls within his role, particularly in the absence of the defendant’s appearance in a payment action, to verify that the conditions for applying the provisions relied on are met and that the documents produced are sufficient to found a judgment against the defendant, the signature of a contract, even an electronic one, forming an integral part of the evidence put before the court.”

The practical significance is considerable: in the mass litigation of consumer credit, lenders often count on the borrower’s default to obtain a judgment without any real scrutiny. The borrower’s silence is not an admission.

Does Repayment of the Instalments Amount to Acknowledgment of the Contract?

The bank argued, in the alternative, that the payment orders for the instalments constituted a commencement of written evidence within the meaning of Article 1362 of the Civil Code, corroborated by the offer, the amortisation schedule, the account history and the absence of any challenge. The Court does not go down that road: it finds that “no document emanating from” the borrowers “demonstrates that they accepted its conditions”. The direct debits prove that a sum was paid back; they do not prove that the borrowers accepted a rate of 4.70%, an acceleration clause or a termination indemnity. This distinction explains why the principal must be returned, but not the ancillaries.

Why Does the Court of Appeal Reject the Bank’s Electronic Signature?

The Court first recalls the legal framework. Article 1366 of the Civil Code gives an electronic document the same evidential weight as a paper document, “provided that the person from whom it emanates can be duly identified and that it is drawn up and stored in conditions such as to guarantee its integrity”. Article 1367, paragraph 2, defines the electronic signature as “the use of a reliable identification process guaranteeing its link with the act to which it is attached”, and presumes its reliability only “when the electronic signature is created, the identity of the signatory ensured and the integrity of the act guaranteed, under conditions set by decree of the Conseil d’État”. That decree is Decree No. 2017-1416 of 28 September 2017, Article 1 of which reserves the presumption to the qualified electronic signature alone, in accordance with Articles 26, 28 and 29 of the eIDAS Regulation.

Three requirements emerge: identification of the signatory, integrity of the act and the link between the signature and the act. It is by this yardstick that the Court reviews the bank’s documents, with almost clinical precision.

What Exactly Did the Bank’s File Contain?

“To justify the electronic signature process, the appellant produces in its exhibit 2 a document entitled ‘properties of the signature’ comprising eight pages of screenshots manifestly emanating from the bank’s software, which make it possible to know neither the processes used to guarantee the identity of the signatories nor the archiving method, together with a document described as the ‘transaction timeline’ containing no element enabling it to be linked to the credit offer, since the transaction identifier is perfectly illegible, and no number links it to the contract offer. The only relevant element is the mention of the borrowers’ names. The bank also provides a document presented as an evidence file, which is in reality merely a run-through of the certification operation in XML format consisting of a long series of illegible characters and symbols over six pages. It also produces the certificate of conformity issued by the company LSTI concerning the body Certinomis.”

Four criticisms emerge. The origin of the documents: screenshots “manifestly emanating from the bank’s software” are documents the bank produced for itself. The link with the act: the timeline contains no legible identifier linking the signature to the offer in dispute; a name can appear on ten different documents. Intelligibility: six pages of raw XML are not evidence for a judge, but data that no one in the proceedings can interpret. The confusion between the provider’s qualification and the reliability of the signature: the LSTI certificate attests that Certinomis is a trust service provider, but says nothing about the signature of 22 February 2019 or the level of signature actually used.

What Consequence Does the Court Draw From This Failure?

The conclusion is implacable: the bank “fails to demonstrate that it implemented an electronic signature whose reliability could be presumed and therefore cannot benefit from that presumption”. It follows that:

“Proof of the signature of the contract, which implies the borrower’s acceptance of the contractual provisions including the interest rate, is therefore not established and, accordingly, none of the contractual provisions can be enforced against Mrs [B] [Z] and Mr [R] [T], it being observed that no document emanating from them demonstrates that they accepted its conditions.”

The bank is therefore “dismissed from its main claim seeking payment of sums in performance of contractual provisions, with a finding of acceleration of the contract’s term and, failing that, termination”. The 4.70% rate, the acceleration clause, the termination indemnity: everything disappears, for want of a proven contract.

What Must a Bank Produce to Prove an Electronic Signature?

The judgment does not draw up a positive list, but its criticisms can be read in reverse as a set of specifications. Combining Articles 1366 and 1367 of the Civil Code, the 2017 decree and the Court’s reasoning, four pillars emerge.

Identity: a copy of an identity document in the file is not enough, as the Court notes; it must be shown that this identity was linked to the signature certificate, for example by a one-time code sent to a number verified beforehand, the trace of which the evidence file retains. The link with the act: the evidence file must contain a unique, legible transaction identifier, which also appears on the offer itself, together with a digital fingerprint of the signed document; failing that, nothing proves that the signature relates to this offer rather than to another document. Integrity and archiving: the bank must justify its method of storage, generally through a third-party archiver, and the possibility of verifying that the document produced in court is identical to the one that was signed. The level of signature: most online credit journeys use a “simple” or “advanced” signature with an on-the-fly certificate, which benefits from no presumption; the bank must then prove reliability by any means, which brings it back to the first three pillars. And the trust service provider’s certificate changes nothing: the provider’s qualification is a general document, whereas proof of the signature is an individual one.

What Is the Scope of This Judgment Compared With the Fortuneo Case Law?

This judgment forms part of a line of authority that the same chamber (Pôle 4, chamber 9-A) has helped to build. The firm has already commented on the judgment delivered against Fortuneo on 23 January 2025, in which an online bank was held liable for opening an account in the name of a person whose identity had been stolen, on the sole strength of an electronic signature whose reliability was not demonstrated: Electronic Signature and Fraudulent Account Opening: Fortuneo Held Liable.

The two cases echo each other: in Fortuneo, the electronic signature was used by the bank to escape liability towards a victim of identity theft; here, it underpins a claim for payment. In both cases, the same grid applies: the words “signed electronically” have no autonomous value, and it is for the party relying on them to prove the process.

What Does the Decision of 26 February 2026 Add?

Three contributions deserve emphasis. The first concerns the judge’s role: the verification of the documents relating to the signature falls under Article 472 of the Code of Civil Procedure, not under the verification of handwriting under Article 287. The judge need not wait for the borrower to deny the signature before questioning its reliability. This solution neutralises the argument, very common among lenders, that “since the signature is not contested, the bank need not provide additional evidence”.

The second concerns the concrete description of the insufficient documents: few judgments describe so precisely the electronic signature file of a major retail bank. The third concerns the interplay between the absence of a contract and restitution, which must be treated honestly: the judgment is not a licence to keep the money from an unproven loan.

Does Return of the Principal Limit the Favourable Scope of the Judgment?

The failure of the signature does not remove the obligation to return the money received. As the release of the funds is “established on 4 March 2019” by the account statement and the history, the Court applies Articles 1302 et seq. of the Civil Code: “what has been paid without being due is subject to recovery”. The borrowers therefore owe 30,000 – 19,390.82 = €10,609.18, with interest at the statutory rate from 4 March 2019. The Court thus reverses the first-instance judge, who had refused restitution because of the bank’s fault; its position is legally more orthodox, since the fault of the person who paid does not, in principle, bar recovery of undue payments.

In practical terms, the borrowers escape contractual interest on the outstanding principal, the termination indemnity and the bank’s charges. Statutory interest does run from 2019, but on a base reduced to the net principal and at a rate incommensurate with the contractual rate. This is a clearly favourable result, obtained without the borrowers even appearing.

What Can a Borrower in the Same Situation Do?

What Documents Should You Demand From the Bank?

The first step is to demand disclosure of the complete electronic signature file, and not merely the offer bearing the words “signed electronically”. The list drawn up by the pre-trial judge in this case is an excellent model. As regards the signature specifically, you should ask for the legible evidence file generated by the provider (and not a raw XML export), the transaction identifier and its counterpart on the offer, the digital fingerprint of the document, the description of the authentication process, the certificate issued in the borrower’s name and the archiving conditions. Every missing document is an argument.

Should You Formally Challenge Your Signature?

The judgment shows that a formal challenge is not indispensable, since the judge must in any event verify the documents. It is nevertheless preferable, where the borrower is assisted, to expressly raise the insufficiency of the evidence and, if necessary, to request the verification of handwriting under Article 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure. You must, however, remain consistent: if the borrower has themselves admitted, in writing or to the bank, that they signed and accepted the loan, that admission may be used against them. This caution is particularly necessary where the loan was taken out without the borrower’s knowledge by an impostor: the challenge to the signature is then accompanied by a criminal complaint and a written claim to the lender, the terms of which must be chosen with care.

What Other Grounds Can Be Combined With the Signature Challenge?

Challenging the signature does not exclude the classic grounds of consumer credit law, quite the contrary. If the signature were ultimately held to be reliable, the borrower can still obtain forfeiture of the right to interest for lack of proof of delivery of the FIPEN, failure to consult the FICP or an incomplete dialogue sheet, as our analyses of proof of consultation of the FICP and of forfeiture of the right to interest for lack of supporting documents illustrate. It is, moreover, significant that, in this case, the bank claimed to prove delivery of the FIPEN by the same electronic evidence file: if that file is illegible for the signature, it is also illegible for the FIPEN. The two-year limitation period (forclusion biennale), the regularity of the acceleration of the debt and of the prior formal notice, and the unfair nature of certain clauses complete the arsenal; these grounds can be combined and reinforce one another.

Should You Challenge an Electronic Signature on a Loan?

The judgment of 26 February 2026 sends a clear message to lenders: the dematerialisation of subscription journeys does not lighten the burden of proof, it shifts it. A bank that collects electronic signatures must be able, years later, to produce a complete evidence file that is legible and attributable to the act. Failing that, it loses the benefit of all the contractual stipulations and is reduced to claiming the net principal.

For borrowers, the lesson is twofold. A summons for payment of a loan signed online is never a lost cause in advance: screenshots and an XML file do not make a contract. But challenging the signature does not relieve you of the obligation to return the money received; it makes it possible to knock out the interest, indemnities and charges, which often represent several thousand euros. Every case is different: the level of signature, the quality of the evidence file, the borrower’s earlier statements and the combination with other grounds determine the strategy. If you are sued for payment of a loan that you did not sign or whose terms you dispute, have the bank’s documents analysed by a banking law attorney before responding.

FAQ: Electronic Signature and Consumer Credit