Banking Failings in Wealth Management: How Caisse d’Épargne Île-de-France Reimburses Its Clients (AMF, Administrative Settlement Agreement, 12 November 2025)

French Financial Markets Authority (AMF), Administrative Settlement Agreement, 12 November 2025

The Facts: An Inspection That Revealed Systemic Malfunctions

A Marginal Activity but Defective Practices

On 2 April 2024, the French Financial Markets Authority launched a targeted inspection of the practices of the Caisse d’Épargne et de Prévoyance Île-de-France. This inspection mission, which ran until 4 October 2024, covered the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2023. The aim was to examine how this banking institution complied with its professional obligations in marketing its discretionary portfolio management offer.

Discretionary portfolio management (gestion sous mandat, GSM) is a financial service in which an investor entrusts the management of his portfolio of financial instruments to a professional. The manager then takes investment decisions entirely independently, within a mandate setting out the management objectives and constraints. This service is generally aimed at clients with significant financial assets who are seeking personalised professional management.

In the case of CEIDF, this activity accounted for an extremely marginal share of its overall business. The figures are telling: at 31 December 2023, only 1,574 clients (out of approximately 2.5 million clients in total, i.e. 0.06%) held a management mandate, for total assets under management of €241 million. The net banking income (produit net bancaire, PNB) generated by this activity represented only 0.04% of the bank’s total PNB in 2023.

Despite this marginal nature, the inspection team’s investigations revealed serious and systemic failings. Examination of a sample of 50 client files brought to light malfunctions affecting fundamental obligations: assessment of the suitability of advice, transparency of remuneration, management of conflicts of interest and internal control arrangements.

A Complex Operating Structure Involving Several Players

To properly understand the failings identified, it is essential to grasp the complexity of the operating structure put in place by CEIDF. Contrary to what clients might think, the bank did not manage the portfolios itself, even though it holds the authorisation to provide the portfolio management service on behalf of third parties.

In reality, the discretionary management offer marketed by CEIDF relied on a division of tasks between several BPCE group entities, formalised in a partnership agreement dating from 2011. This organisation can be outlined as follows:

This fragmented organisation created a structural opacity. CEIDF presented itself as the distributor of the service and kept the commercial relationship with the client, but delegated the actual management to another group entity. This configuration posed two major problems:

First, it made it difficult for the client to understand the real financial flows: who received what, for which service actually rendered? The remuneration passed through several entities before possibly being retroceded, creating a tangle of flows that lacked transparency.

Second, it generated potential conflicts of interest that had to be identified, documented and managed. When the distributor receives remuneration linked to the investment choices made by the manager, in particular on group products, how can it be ensured that the client’s interest remains the priority?

It was precisely on these points that the AMF’s inspection revealed systemic deficiencies, leading to the notification of five distinct but interconnected complaints.

The Five Complaints Notified by the AMF

First Complaint: Failure to Check the Suitability of Advice

The obligation to assess the suitability of the services provided to the client is a cornerstone of investor protection. It requires the investment services provider to make sure that the service or product recommended genuinely matches the client’s situation, objectives and risk profile.

Under the structure put in place by CEIDF, the bank considered that it delivered investment advice in two stages: initial advice, embodied in the recommendation to subscribe to the discretionary management offer, and then ongoing advice covering the client’s entire assets, including the financial instruments falling under the GSM. This continuing advice was supposed to be reflected in the annual delivery of a suitability report making it possible to check that the client’s overall asset position remained consistent with his profile.

However, examination of the client files revealed four major deficiencies in this arrangement:

First deficiency: a complete absence of suitability reports for 72% of mandates. For all mandates whose account-keeping and custody were provided by an external account keeper (i.e. 72% of mandates at 31 December 2023), no periodic suitability report was provided, or, where one was, it did not include the assets under discretionary management in the calculation of overall risk. In concrete terms, the bank claimed to monitor the suitability of the overall portfolio, but in fact excluded three quarters of its GSM business from this check. This situation made the ongoing verification arrangement totally defective for the majority of clients.

Second deficiency: an incomplete suitability check for the other mandates. For “profiled” mandates (mandats profilés) where CEIDF was the account keeper and custodian, the suitability check relied solely on determining the percentage of risky assets, without taking into account the other criteria imposed by the regulations. Article 54 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 nevertheless requires that changes affecting the services, the instruments concerned or the client’s situation also be examined. By limiting itself to a single indicator, CEIDF only imperfectly fulfilled its assessment obligation.

Third deficiency: insufficient updating of client information. Analysis of the sample revealed that in 41% of cases, the risk questionnaire (compiling information on the client’s financial knowledge and experience as well as his risk profile) was not up to date. Even more worrying, in 14% of the files analysed, the information had not been updated for at least two consecutive years, and in 6% of the files, this lack of updating extended over at least three years.

This deficiency was particularly serious because it deprived any suitability reports that were prepared of substance. How can one verify that the portfolio matches the client’s risk profile if that profile has not been updated for two or three years? An investor’s personal, professional and asset circumstances naturally change over time. A client approaching retirement does not have the same profile as someone in mid-career; a person who has suffered a life event (divorce, bereavement, health problem) sees his asset situation and objectives change.

The inspection even identified three suitability reports in which the risk profile was recorded as “undetermined”. How, in these conditions, can one claim to verify the suitability of investments?

Fourth deficiency: no effective corrective measures where unsuitability was found. Where the check revealed that the share of risky assets exceeded the threshold authorised for the client’s profile, CEIDF merely informed the client of the situation and invited him to contact his adviser. No concrete corrective action was taken by the bank itself.

The figures are telling: for 20% of the files in the sample (10 files out of 50), the share of risky assets exceeded the authorised threshold for at least two consecutive financial years, without this situation giving rise to anything other than simple information being given to the client.

This passivity ran counter to the very spirit of the suitability obligation. When an investment services provider delivers ongoing advice, it cannot be content with noting an unsuitability without acting. It must propose concrete measures to restore consistency between the portfolio and the client’s profile: reallocation of assets, switching to less risky products, changing the management profile, and so on.

In conclusion on this first complaint, by providing an ongoing investment advice service without the suitability of the recommendation being verified under the conditions laid down by the regulations, CEIDF failed in its obligation to assess the suitability of the service to be provided, as set out in Article 54 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565.

Second Complaint: An Irregular Remuneration Scheme

The second complaint notified by the AMF concerned the remuneration scheme governing the discretionary management offer. Analysis of the financial flows between the various players (CEIDF as distributor and account keeper and custodian for certain mandates, the external account keeper for mandates predating November 2017, and the management company for the actual management) revealed several serious irregularities.

To properly understand the failings identified, it is necessary to set out precisely the various remuneration received under this complex structure:

This operating structure appeared non-compliant with the regulations for several distinct but cumulative reasons.

First irregularity: receipt of entry fees on OPC managed by a company of the same group. The AMF considered that CEIDF received entry fees on OPC managed by a group company in breach of the rules on conflicts of interest. These rules prohibit a manager from retaining this type of remuneration, as it would create a financial incentive to favour group products to the detriment of the client’s interest.

In this case, when a client subscribed, under his management mandate, to an OPC managed by a BPCE group entity, CEIDF received entry fees. This practice was problematic on two counts: first, it created an unmanaged conflict of interest (the adviser had an interest in steering the client towards commission-generating group products); second, it constituted an undue remuneration taken at the client’s expense.

For the period from 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2023, these undue entry fees amounted to €435,055. CEIDF even voluntarily extended the scope of reimbursement to the period from 1 January 2024 to 5 May 2025, bringing the total amount to €664,502 (€435,055 + an additional €229,447).

Second irregularity: full retrocession of management fees without justification of an improvement in the service. CEIDF had the management company retrocede to it the entirety (100%) of the management fees from the mandates it marketed. This retrocession was supposed to remunerate the ongoing advice service provided by CEIDF.

However, remuneration paid by third parties and received by a provider supplying non-independent investment advice falls under the inducements regime. This highly regulated regime requires proof that the remuneration received is designed to enhance the quality of the service provided to the client. More precisely, under Article L. 533-12-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code and the applicable provisions of the AMF General Regulation, the provider must prove that an additional or higher-level service is provided to the client, and that this service is proportionate to the inducement received.

In CEIDF’s case, two problems arose cumulatively:

First, the retrocession of 100% of the management fees appeared disproportionate. What added value did CEIDF actually bring that would justify capturing all of these fees, when it was the management company that carried out the actual management of the portfolio?

Second, and above all, the ongoing advice service supposed to justify this retrocession was not properly provided, as the first complaint showed. In the absence of the actual provision of a quality service, receipt of these retrocessions became unjustified.

Third irregularity: retrocession of entry fees on external OPC without any real service. For mandates with an external account keeper and custodian, CEIDF had entry fees on OPC managed by companies outside the group retroceded to it. These retrocessions were also supposed to remunerate the ongoing advice service.

However, for the same reasons as above, by failing to properly provide an ongoing advice service (breach covered by the first complaint), CEIDF had these entry fees retroceded to it without justification. The provider could not rely on the inducements regime to justify receiving remuneration when it was not delivering the corresponding service.

Fourth irregularity: retrocession of custody fees without the client’s prior agreement. For mandates opened before November 2017 (whose account-keeping and custody was provided by an external keeper), CEIDF had 90% of the custody fees retroceded to it, with the remaining 10% staying with the external account keeper.

This practice raised a specific legal difficulty. Custody fees are remuneration paid on behalf of the client for the account-keeping and custody service. Yet, under Article L. 533-12-4 of the CMF and the applicable provisions of the AMF General Regulation, any remuneration received on behalf of the client must be subject to the client’s prior and express agreement.

In the absence of that agreement, the retrocession amounted to a misappropriation of funds: the client paid custody fees to the external keeper for a custody service, but 90% of those sums were paid over to CEIDF without the client being clearly informed or having given explicit consent.

In conclusion on this second complaint, the remuneration scheme put in place by CEIDF breached several fundamental texts: Articles 33 and 34 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 (management of conflicts of interest), Articles L. 533-10 II 3° and L. 533-12-4 of the CMF and the applicable provisions of the AMF General Regulation (inducements regime and remuneration received on behalf of the client).

Third Complaint: Incomplete Pre-Contractual Information

The third complaint flowed logically from the previous one: if the remuneration scheme was irregular and opaque, it is hardly surprising that the information given to the client before signing the management mandate was found to be incomplete.

The pre-contractual information obligation is a pillar of investor protection. Before entering into a contractual commitment, the client must have all the information needed to make his decision in full knowledge of the facts. This requirement is particularly important when the service offered is somewhat complex, as is the case with discretionary management involving several parties and different remuneration flows.

The AMF found that CEIDF did not inform its clients, before the management mandate was signed, of four essential points:

First, the absence of information on the retrocession of 100% of the management fees. Clients were unaware that all of the management fees paid to the management company were then retroceded in full to CEIDF. This information was nevertheless crucial to understanding the economic reality of the service: who was really being paid, and for what service?

This opacity prevented the client from properly assessing the cost structure and questioning the appropriateness of this allocation. Why did the company carrying out the actual management pay all of its remuneration over to the distributor? What added value did the latter bring that justified this total capture of the fees?

Second, the absence of information on the retrocession of 90% of the custody fees. For mandates opened before November 2017, clients paid custody fees to the external keeper without knowing that 90% of those sums were then paid over to CEIDF. Here again, this information was essential: the client believed he was paying a specialist provider for a custody service, when in reality most of that remuneration was being captured by his banking distributor.

Third, the absence of information on the existence of transaction fees and OPC entry fees. Clients were not clearly informed of the existence of these additional costs. Yet transaction fees (charged on each purchase or sale of securities) and OPC entry fees (charged on subscribing to a fund) can represent significant amounts and have a major impact on the portfolio’s net performance.

This lack of information prevented the client from assessing the real overall cost of the service and comparing it with other competing offers. It also created a risk of perverse incentive: the more transactions the manager carries out (portfolio turnover), the more transaction fees accumulate, without the client being fully aware of it.

Fourth, the absence of information on the conflicts of interest arising from the remuneration scheme. CEIDF did not inform its clients of the structural conflicts of interest inherent in the organisation put in place. Yet these conflicts were numerous and significant:

• Conflict linked to steering towards group OPC: the manager could have an interest in favouring in-house funds, which generated entry fees for CEIDF.
• Conflict linked to portfolio turnover: the manager could have an interest in multiplying buy-sell transactions, generating transaction fees for CEIDF or the external keeper.
• Conflict linked to CEIDF’s dual capacity: as both adviser and beneficiary of the retrocessions, CEIDF could have an interest in recommending a service (the GSM) from which it profited itself, regardless of the client’s real interest.

Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 nevertheless requires full transparency on these aspects. Article 50 requires that the client be clearly informed of the nature and the basis of calculation of all remuneration. Article 44 requires information on conflicts of interest to be provided. Articles L. 533-10 II 3°, L. 533-12 and L. 533-12-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code, together with the applicable provisions of the AMF General Regulation, reinforce these obligations.

By failing to inform its clients before the management mandate was signed of these four essential points (retrocession of management fees, retrocession of custody fees, existence of transaction fees and entry fees, conflicts of interest inherent in the structure), CEIDF failed in its pre-contractual information obligation, thereby breaching the provisions of Articles 44 and 50 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 as well as Articles L. 533-10 II 3°, L. 533-12 and L. 533-12-4 of the CMF and the applicable provisions of the AMF General Regulation.

Fourth Complaint: No Management of Conflicts of Interest

The fourth complaint concerned specifically the arrangements for managing conflicts of interest. It was no longer merely a matter of noting that the client had not been informed of these conflicts (third complaint), but that CEIDF had quite simply not put in place the tools to identify, document and manage them.

Conflicts of interest are a central concern of modern financial law. They arise when a service provider finds itself in a situation where its own economic interests, or those of related entities, may diverge from the client’s interest. In such situations, there is a risk that the provider will favour its own interest to the detriment of the client’s, consciously or unconsciously.

The regulations therefore require financial institutions to put in place an organisation and procedures to prevent this risk. This obligation breaks down into several successive stages: identification of potential conflict situations, documentation in a risk map, implementation of management measures (Chinese walls, segregation of duties, specific controls), and, as a last resort, disclosure to the client.

Yet the AMF’s inspection revealed that CEIDF had not put in place an arrangement for detecting and managing conflicts of interest relating to the investment advice activity on the client’s overall portfolio, including the financial instruments subject to the GSM.

More precisely, two types of structural conflicts of interest should have been identified and managed:

First conflict: incentive to favour group OPC. The investment universe of the management mandates included OPC managed by the management company as well as by other BPCE group companies. In this context, the management company could have an interest in favouring group OPC, since this choice made it possible to increase its own remuneration (through the management fees of those OPC) or that of other group entities.

What is more, CEIDF itself received entry fees on group OPC, creating a direct incentive to steer clients towards these products. This conflict was all the more acute because CEIDF played a dual role: adviser (supposed to recommend investments in the client’s exclusive interest) and economic beneficiary of the investment choices made.

Second conflict: incentive to excessive portfolio turnover. Clients paid transaction fees (on each buy-sell transaction) as well as OPC entry fees. Yet these fees benefited CEIDF directly (in its capacity as distributor and account keeper and custodian for certain mandates) or the external keeper (for the other mandates).

This structure created a perverse incentive: the more transactions the management company carried out (portfolio turnover), the more the remuneration of the group’s players increased, regardless of the actual performance generated for the client. A manager might thus be tempted to multiply switches and movements, not because the investment strategy requires it, but because it generates additional fees.

Yet CEIDF had not included these conflicts in its risk map. This map is an essential document which must comprehensively list all the situations in which the institution, its managers, its employees or related persons might have an interest diverging from that of the client. For each conflict identified, the map must specify the management measures put in place: segregation of duties, reinforced controls, limitation of powers, escalation procedures, and so on.

By failing to include in its map the effects induced by the remuneration scheme of its investment advice offer, CEIDF deprived itself of any possibility of effectively managing these conflicts. How can safeguards be put in place if the risks have not been identified?

This deficiency was all the more serious because it concerned one of the most significant risks in terms of investor protection: the risk of mis-selling (inappropriate sale) motivated by the pursuit of remuneration rather than the client’s interest.

Articles 33 and 34 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 nevertheless require investment firms to maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements with a view to taking all reasonable steps to prevent conflicts of interest from adversely affecting the interests of clients. This obligation necessarily implies, upstream, identifying those conflicts.

In conclusion on this fourth complaint, by failing to include in its conflicts of interest map the effects induced by the remuneration scheme of its investment advice offer, CEIDF breached the provisions of Articles 33 and 34 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565.

Fifth Complaint: Deficiencies in Internal Control

The fifth and final complaint concerned internal control arrangements. This is a failing that is particularly revealing of the seriousness of the situation: not only had CEIDF not complied with its substantive obligations (suitability, remuneration, information, conflicts of interest), but it had not even put in place the tools to verify compliance with those obligations.

Internal control is one of the pillars of modern financial regulation. It rests on the principle that institutions must monitor themselves continuously, without waiting for the regulator to intervene. This monitoring is organised according to a three-level model, known as the “three lines of defence”:

Yet the AMF’s inspection revealed that, over the Inspected Period (2020-2023), CEIDF had put in place neither ongoing control (first and second levels) nor periodic control (third level) on the subject of discretionary management. CEIDF moreover acknowledged this deficiency.

In concrete terms, this meant that no one within the bank was checking:

• The compliance of the suitability reports (are they delivered? do they include all assets? are they based on up-to-date client information?)
• The compliance of the remuneration scheme (are the inducements justified? are the retrocessions documented?)
• The completeness of the pre-contractual information (do the documents given to clients mention all fees and conflicts of interest?)
• The effectiveness of the management of conflicts of interest (are the conflicts identified the subject of management measures? are those measures applied?)

This total absence of control explains why the failings identified were able to persist for years without being detected or corrected. Without a monitoring arrangement, abuses can take hold and become systematic without the institution even being aware of it.

Articles 21 c) and e) and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565, Article L. 533-10 II 1° of the Monetary and Financial Code and the applicable provisions of the AMF General Regulation nevertheless require investment services providers to put in place a complete internal control arrangement proportionate to the risks.

Article 21 c) requires the firm to take reasonable steps to ensure continuity and regularity in the performance of its investment services and activities, which necessarily implies checking that those services are provided in accordance with the regulations.

Article 21 e) requires control and safeguard mechanisms for IT systems to be put in place and, more generally, the integrity of data and processes to be ensured.

Article 22 sets out the requirements relating to ongoing control: the firm must establish, implement and maintain adequate internal control policies and procedures, designed to ensure compliance with decisions and procedures, and intended to detect any risk of failure to comply with its obligations.

By putting in place no ongoing and periodic control arrangement to verify the compliance of the investment advice offer on the overall portfolio including the financial instruments subject to the GSM, CEIDF breached all of these provisions.

This fifth complaint therefore reveals a systemic failure: the failings identified did not result from one-off errors or isolated anomalies, but from a structural absence of compliance monitoring and steering.

The Remediation Undertakings: Reimbursement and Reorganisation

Reimbursement of Clients: A Minimum of €435,055

Faced with the five complaints notified, CEIDF accepted the principle of an administrative settlement agreement rather than risk a referral to the AMF’s Enforcement Committee (Commission des sanctions). This agreement, concluded on 12 November 2025, contains several sets of undertakings, the first and most immediate of which concerns reimbursement of the clients harmed.

CEIDF undertook to reimburse each eligible client for the OPC entry fees on group funds unduly charged. “Eligible clients” means all clients who held, over the period from 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2023, a management mandate in respect of which CEIDF received entry fees on OPC managed by a company of the BPCE group.

The maximum total amount of these payments is estimated at €435,055 for the 2021-2023 period. This amount corresponds to the entry fees unduly received by CEIDF in breach of the rules on conflicts of interest and the inducements regime.

But CEIDF went beyond what the AMF strictly required. For the sake of consistency and transparency towards its clients, the bank voluntarily decided to extend the scope of reimbursement to the period from 1 January 2024 to 5 May 2025 (the date on which CEIDF stopped charging such entry fees on group OPC). This additional amount was estimated at €229,447 (€196,854 for 2024 and €32,593 for 2025).

In total, CEIDF will therefore reimburse €664,502 (€435,055 + €229,447) to the clients concerned.

The administrative settlement agreement sets out the practical arrangements for this reimbursement. CEIDF has six months from the approval (homologation) of the agreement to pay these sums to eligible clients. This period may seem long, but it is explained by the complexity of the operations to be carried out.

Indeed, CEIDF must carry out all of the following steps:

Identify eligible clients precisely. It is not only a matter of listing the clients who held a management mandate during the period, but of determining precisely which of them actually paid entry fees on group OPC. Some clients may have since left the bank, others may have died (in which case their beneficiaries must be identified). This identification phase requires meticulous cross-checking of data and research.

Determine the amount due to each client. The calculation must be individualised: for each client, the history of his investments in group OPC under his mandate must be reconstructed, the amounts subscribed identified, and the entry fee rates actually charged on each transaction applied. This calculation can prove complex if the client made several subscriptions on different dates, in different OPC, at varying rates.

Make the payments and keep proof of them. Once the amounts have been calculated, CEIDF must make the actual payments. For clients who have kept an account with the bank, the transfer can be made directly. For those who have left the institution, their current bank details must be obtained. Proof of each payment must be kept (transfer notice, confirmation of receipt).

Make all traceability documents available. CEIDF must be able to demonstrate that it has carried out all the steps required. These documents will be made available to the audit mission provided for by the agreement (see below) and to the AMF’s departments. In concrete terms, this means putting together a complete file including: the list of eligible clients identified, the details of the calculations made for each, the proof of payments, the documentation of the reminders and searches carried out for clients who could not be reached, and so on.

Finally, the agreement provides for a safeguard mechanism to ensure that the entire sum of €435,055 (for the 2021-2023 period) will actually benefit either the clients or the French Treasury. Indeed, despite all of CEIDF’s efforts, it is possible that some eligible clients cannot be traced or contacted. In that case, the sums that should have been paid to them cannot be kept by the bank.

That is why the agreement stipulates that within 2 months of the audit report being sent (which will occur 12 months after approval), CEIDF must pay the French Treasury the difference between €435,055 and the sums actually paid to clients. Thus, if for example CEIDF manages to reimburse €400,000 to the clients identified, it will have to pay €35,055 to the French Treasury.

This mechanism guarantees that the entire sum corresponding to the entry fees unduly charged will indeed be returned, either to the direct victims or to the community via the French Treasury, without any part remaining to CEIDF’s benefit.

Payment to the French Treasury: €600,000

In addition to reimbursing clients, CEIDF undertook to pay the French Treasury the sum of €600,000. This payment, separate from the reimbursement of the undue entry fees, is in a way the financial counterpart of the administrative settlement agreement.

It is important to understand the legal nature of this sum properly. The administrative settlement agreement is neither a sanction nor an admission of guilt on the part of CEIDF. CEIDF moreover expressly recalled in the agreement that it accepted it precisely because it does not have these characteristics.

That said, this €600,000 payment is not insignificant. It reflects the seriousness of the failings identified and the regulator’s desire to ensure a proportionate response. This sum must be put into perspective with the activity concerned: let us recall that the net banking income generated by the discretionary management activity represented only 0.04% of CEIDF’s total PNB in 2023. The amount of €600,000 therefore appears significant in relation to this marginal activity.

The payment must be made within a very short period: fifteen days from the approval of the agreement by the AMF’s Enforcement Committee. This short period is explained by the nature of the undertaking: it is a single, immediate payment, not requiring the complex steps needed for individualised reimbursement of clients.

In total, CEIDF’s financial undertakings therefore amount to a minimum of €1,264,502 (€600,000 + €435,055 + €229,447), a significant sum that testifies to the real cost of regulatory compliance failings.

Structural Compliance Measures

Beyond the financial aspects, the administrative settlement agreement contains an essential set of structural measures intended to ensure that the failings identified will not recur. These remediation undertakings are detailed and ambitious, covering all of the complaints notified.

1. Regarding the regular assessment of the suitability of the advice service

To remedy the deficiencies identified in the suitability verification arrangement, CEIDF undertook to put in place or continue several measures:

Generalisation of the annual delivery of a suitability report compliant with Article 54 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565. This report will now have to include all the financial instruments in the client’s portfolio, including those under discretionary management, regardless of the entity providing account-keeping and custody. The exclusion of mandates with an external account keeper is therefore at an end.

Formalised revision of internal procedures to ensure that the suitability assessment is based on all the regulatory criteria: not only the percentage of risky assets, but also changes affecting the client’s situation, the services provided or the instruments held.

Introduction of a procedure for periodic updating of client knowledge data. It will no longer be acceptable for a risk questionnaire to remain without an update for two or three years. The bank will have to define a clear frequency (for example, systematic annual review, or a review triggered by certain events: change in professional situation, approaching retirement, etc.).

Formalisation and monitoring of a corrective action plan where assets in risky investments exceed the thresholds defined for each risk profile. It will no longer be enough to inform the client of the unsuitability and invite him to contact his adviser. The bank will have to implement active measures: systematic contact with the client, analysis of the causes of the excess, proposal of corrective switches or, where appropriate, revision of the risk profile if the client’s situation has actually changed.

2. Regarding the remuneration arrangement and inducements

The most radical measures concern the remuneration scheme, the main source of the irregularities identified:

Ending the receipt of entry fees on OPC managed by a group entity or, failing that, putting in place a mechanism for full retrocession to the client. CEIDF has in fact stopped receiving these entry fees on group OPC since 6 May 2025. This measure ends the most obvious conflict of interest: the incentive to steer the client towards group products that generate commissions for the distributor.

Limitation of the amounts retroceded to CEIDF by the management company in respect of management fees. These retrocessions may no longer represent 100% of the fees. They must be limited to the amounts that can be considered proportionate to the added value actually provided by CEIDF. The agreement specifies that a formalised analysis must support the level of retrocessions applied. This analysis will be sent to the audit for review and annexed to the audit report.

In concrete terms, CEIDF will have to document precisely the services it actually renders: initial advice, ongoing monitoring, suitability reports, client interface, complaint handling, and so on. It will then have to demonstrate that the level of retrocession chosen corresponds to the value of those services, no more and no less. This approach requires a rigorous and transparent economic analysis.

Migration of mandates whose account-keeping is provided by an external keeper to account-keeping provided directly by CEIDF. This migration will standardise practices and simplify the remuneration flows, thereby reducing the opacity of the arrangement.

Formalisation of an analysis highlighting the impact of all the measures taken by CEIDF on the cost structure, with a particular focus on the change in fees for management mandates. This analysis will make it possible to verify that the remediation measures actually benefit clients in the form of lower overall costs, and do not amount to a mere shifting of remuneration from one budget line to another.

3. Regarding information given to the client before signing the management mandate

CEIDF undertakes to continue updating the pre-contractual documentation given to clients when they subscribe to the discretionary management offer. This documentation will now have to ensure complete transparency on:

The remuneration flows received in connection with the marketing of management mandates, including the retrocessions of management fees. The client will have to know precisely who receives what, for which service, and on what calculation basis.

The existence of potential conflicts of interest linked to the remuneration structure. The documents will have to spell out the situations in which CEIDF or group entities could have an interest diverging from that of the client: steering towards group OPC, incentive to portfolio turnover, and so on.

The nature and extent of the ongoing advice service provided, in respect of which some of this remuneration is received. The client must clearly understand what he is paying for: is it solely initial advice at the time of subscription, or ongoing support? What concrete services are included in this follow-up (periodic reports, annual meeting, availability of the adviser, etc.)?

4. Regarding the management of conflicts of interest

CEIDF undertakes to continue updating its risk map and its documentation on the management of conflicts of interest in order to include the following situations, previously unidentified:

Potential conflict between the client’s interest and the remuneration received by CEIDF in connection with investments in BPCE group OPC. This conflict must be formally documented, with identification of the management measures put in place (elimination of entry fees, specific checks on the relevance of investment choices, justification of steering towards group OPC, etc.).

Incentive to excessive portfolio turnover linked to the receipt of transaction fees. Here again, the conflict must be identified and management measures defined: capping the number of transactions, regular analysis of portfolio turnover, justification of each switch, specific reporting to the control bodies, and so on.

Potential conflict linked to the dual capacity of adviser and beneficiary of the retrocessions. CEIDF advises its clients on whether to subscribe to a management mandate, while receiving remuneration arising from that subscription. This structural conflict must be explicitly acknowledged and managed, in particular through enhanced information to the client and checks on the relevance of the recommendations.

5. Regarding the internal control arrangement

Finally, to remedy the total absence of control identified over the Inspected Period, CEIDF undertakes to continue rolling out a reinforced internal control arrangement:

Inclusion in the annual control plan of a dedicated theme on the marketing and monitoring of management mandates. This theme will have to appear permanently in the control plan, with specific control sheets defining the points to be checked, the methodology, the frequency, and so on.

Introduction of first-level controls covering suitability reports, updating of client data and the consistency of risky assets with profiles. These operational controls, carried out by client managers or their managers, will allow rapid detection of anomalies.

Implementation of second-level controls verifying the quality and traceability of the first-level steps. The Compliance function will have to ensure that the operational controls are actually carried out, documented and followed up where an anomaly is detected.

Traceability of the controls carried out and periodic reporting to the internal compliance steering bodies. The results of the controls will have to be consolidated, analysed and reported to the governing bodies (risk committee, audit committee, executive management) in order to ensure effective governance.

The agreement specifies that CEIDF must send the audit mission, for analysis and annexation to the audit report, an updated plan of first- and second-level ongoing controls, together with the business procedures relating to those controls.

6. The compliance audit: an obligation to account

To ensure the effective implementation of all of these undertakings, the agreement provides for an in-depth audit obligation. CEIDF undertakes to have its Internal Audit Department carry out an audit of the implementation of all the remediation measures described above.

This audit must be carried out twelve months after approval of the agreement by the Enforcement Committee. This one-year period will allow CEIDF to deploy the measures and to demonstrate that they are actually operational, not just on paper but in daily practice.

The audit report must be sent to the BPCE group’s general inspectorate and to the AMF. It will constitute essential evidence of CEIDF’s good faith and of compliance with its undertakings. If this audit revealed deficiencies or delays in implementation, CEIDF would be exposed to a breach of the agreement and a possible referral to the Enforcement Committee on the basis of the complaints originally notified.

Legal Significance and Lessons for Investors

Administrative Settlement: An Alternative to Sanctions

The agreement concluded between the AMF and CEIDF illustrates the use of a mechanism in the French regulator’s arsenal: administrative settlement (composition administrative). This mechanism deserves attention because it profoundly changes the way breaches of professional obligations can be dealt with.

Traditionally, when the AMF found breaches, it referred the matter to its Enforcement Committee, which conducted adversarial proceedings that could result in financial and/or disciplinary sanctions (reprimand, warning, ban from practising, etc.). These proceedings, which safeguard the rights of the defence, could prove lengthy and uncertain in their outcome.

Administrative settlement offers an alternative route: rather than referring the matter to the Enforcement Committee, the AMF’s Secretary General may propose that the person concerned enter into an agreement. This agreement sets out the undertakings of the person concerned (payment of a sum to the French Treasury, reimbursement of victims, remediation measures) in return for which the Enforcement Committee will not be seised.

This mechanism has several advantages for all parties:

For the regulator, it makes it possible to obtain quickly a response suited to the failings identified, without having to conduct long contentious proceedings that tie up significant resources. It also ensures the effective implementation of remediation measures, since these are formalised contractually and can be monitored (in particular through the audit).

For the institution concerned, it avoids the uncertainty of contentious proceedings whose outcome is unpredictable, both as to whether a sanction would be imposed and as to its amount. It also avoids the negative reputational effect of a ruling against it by the Enforcement Committee. The agreement moreover expressly states that it is neither a sanction nor an admission of guilt.

For potential victims, it guarantees prompt and certain compensation, since the agreement explicitly provides for the arrangements and timetable for reimbursement, whereas contentious proceedings could take several years to lead to a possible order to pay compensation.

However, this mechanism also raises questions. The absence of an admission of guilt may frustrate some victims who would like to see their provider’s liability established publicly. Moreover, the amount paid to the French Treasury (€600,000 in this case) results from a negotiation between the regulator and the institution, without it being possible to know precisely what sanction the Enforcement Committee would have imposed had the matter been referred to it.

It remains the case that administrative settlement has established itself as an effective regulatory tool, making it possible to ensure a proportionate, rapid and pragmatic response to the failings identified, while safeguarding the interests of victims.

The Rights of Clients Who Are Victims of Banking Failings

The CEIDF case is a useful reminder to investors that they have effective rights in the face of failings by their bank or investment services provider. These rights are built around several complementary mechanisms.

The right to information and transparency

Before subscribing to any financial product or service, the client has the right to be informed in a clear, precise and understandable manner about the nature of the service, its characteristics, its risks, its costs and potential conflicts of interest. This information must not be buried in incomprehensible technical or legal documents, but presented in an accessible way.

If this information was not provided, or if it was incomplete or misleading, the client has several remedies. He may first refer the matter to the AMF Ombudsman or to his bank’s internal ombudsman. He may also bring a civil liability claim to obtain annulment of the contract and/or damages.

The right to appropriate advice

When the bank gives investment advice (which was the case for CEIDF in the structure analysed), it must ensure that this advice is suited to the client’s situation. This suitability obligation (or, depending on the case, appropriateness obligation) requires the provider to collect information about the client (financial situation, objectives, knowledge and experience, risk tolerance) and to recommend only products or services that are genuinely appropriate.

If the advice proves unsuitable and causes the client loss (loss of capital, tying up of savings in products that are too risky or insufficiently liquid, etc.), he may hold his provider liable. The case law is now well established: breach of the duty to advise engages the provider’s liability and gives rise to compensation.

The right to restitution of sums unduly charged

As the CEIDF case illustrates, when an institution has charged fees or commissions in breach of the regulations (here, entry fees on group OPC), clients are entitled to full restitution of those sums.

In the present case, this reimbursement is organised under the administrative settlement agreement. But even in the absence of such an agreement, clients could have acted individually to obtain reimbursement of these undue sums, on the basis of unjust enrichment (enrichissement sans cause) or contractual liability.

The right to refer matters to the supervisory authorities

Any investor who believes he has been the victim of a failing by his provider may report it to the AMF via the mediation portal or directly to the Authority’s departments. If the report is sufficiently substantiated and reveals potentially systemic failings, it may trigger an investigation or inspection, as was the case for CEIDF.

This possibility of reporting is essential: clients are often the first to detect irregular practices, and their reports enable the regulator to target its investigations.

The right to bring legal proceedings

Finally, clients always retain the possibility of bringing legal proceedings to obtain compensation for their loss. This action may be individual or, in certain cases, collective (class action). The limitation period is generally five years from knowledge of the damage or the failing.

It is important to note that the administrative settlement agreement concluded between the AMF and CEIDF does not deprive clients of this right of individual action. If a client considers that he has suffered a loss greater than the mere reimbursement of the undue entry fees (for example, because of unsuitable advice that led to capital losses), he remains free to bring the matter before the courts.

The Obligations of Institutions in Financial Distribution

Beyond the lessons for investors, the CEIDF case forcefully recalls the obligations incumbent on financial institutions in the distribution of investment products and services. These obligations, stemming in particular from the MiFID II Directive (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) transposed into French law, form a demanding and detailed body of rules.

The obligation to classify clients

Before providing any service, the institution must classify its clients into three categories: retail clients (benefiting from the highest level of protection), professional clients (presumed to have sufficient knowledge and experience) and eligible counterparties (minimum level of protection). This classification determines the intensity of the obligations that apply.

The know-your-customer obligation (KYC)

The institution must collect and keep up to date information on the client’s financial situation, his investment objectives, his financial knowledge and experience, and his ability to bear losses. This information must be updated regularly, as the AMF recalled in criticising CEIDF for not having updated the questionnaires for several years.

The obligation to assess suitability or appropriateness

Depending on the nature of the service provided, the institution must assess either suitability (for advice and discretionary management) or appropriateness (for simple execution of orders) of the products recommended or offered. The suitability assessment, which is more demanding, requires verifying that the product or service matches the client’s profile perfectly on every level: financial, asset position, objectives, investment horizon, risk tolerance.

The obligation of transparency on costs and fees

Before any transaction, and annually for ongoing services, the institution must provide the client with detailed information on all costs and fees, direct and indirect, linked to the service and the financial instruments. This information must enable the client to understand the cumulative impact of costs on the return on his investment.

The CEIDF case showed the consequences of a failure to comply with this obligation: the lack of information on entry fees, transaction fees and retrocessions deprived clients of the ability to assess the real cost of the service.

The obligation to manage conflicts of interest

The institution must identify, prevent and manage conflicts of interest liable to harm its clients’ interests. This obligation implies putting in place a conflicts map, management procedures (Chinese walls, segregation of duties, specific controls) and, where these measures prove insufficient, informing the client of the nature and source of the conflict before the transaction is carried out.

The CEIDF case illustrated the importance of this obligation: the failure to identify the conflicts linked to steering towards group OPC and to portfolio turnover was a serious breach, exposing clients to the risk of biased advice.

The internal control obligation

Finally, the institution must put in place an internal control arrangement proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of its activities. This arrangement must make it possible to verify compliance with regulatory obligations on an ongoing basis and to detect any anomaly or drift quickly.

The total absence of control found at CEIDF over the discretionary management activity was a major systemic failure, explaining why the failings were able to persist without being detected or corrected.

These obligations are not mere administrative formalities. They form the foundation of the relationship of trust between the institution and its clients. Compliance with them determines the very legitimacy of the advisory and financial distribution business. When they are neglected, as was the case for CEIDF, the consequences can be heavy: harm to clients, regulatory sanctions, damage to reputation, remediation costs.

Conclusion

The administrative settlement agreement concluded between the AMF and the Caisse d’Épargne et de Prévoyance Île-de-France on 12 November 2025 is a textbook case of breaches of professional obligations in the distribution of financial services. Although it concerns a marginal activity (0.06% of the bank’s clients), this case reveals systemic malfunctions affecting fundamental obligations: assessment of the suitability of advice, transparency of remuneration, management of conflicts of interest and internal control.

The lessons of this case are many. For financial institutions, it is a reminder that compliance with regulatory obligations cannot be neglected, even for small-scale activities. The absence of adequate control arrangements exposes them to significant legal, financial and reputational risks. The total cost of putting things right for CEIDF exceeds €1.26 million, not counting the indirect costs linked to bringing itself into compliance and crisis management.

For investors, this case shows that their rights are effective and that failings can give rise to compensation. The reimbursement of more than €664,000 to the clients harmed illustrates the concrete possibility of obtaining restitution of sums unduly charged. Clients must be vigilant about the transparency of fees, the relevance of the advice they receive and the suitability of the products recommended to their personal situation.

For the regulator, the use of the administrative settlement mechanism confirms its effectiveness: a rapid and proportionate response, guaranteed reimbursement of victims, commitment to structural remediation measures, while avoiding long and uncertain contentious proceedings.

Finally, this case highlights the risks inherent in complex distribution structures involving several entities of the same group, with cross-cutting remuneration flows. The opacity of these arrangements creates structural conflicts of interest that must be identified, documented and managed rigorously. Transparency is not a luxury, but a fundamental requirement of the relationship of trust between the client and his financial adviser.

Clients who held a management mandate with CEIDF over the 2021-2025 period and who paid entry fees on group OPC will be contacted by the bank within six months of approval of the agreement to receive their reimbursement. Those who consider that they have suffered additional loss remain free to exercise their remedies.

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