Apparent Anomaly and Romance Fraud: €95,294 in Transfers to Belgium Are Not Enough (Cass. com., 25 March 2026, No. 24-18.093)

Cour de cassation, Commercial, Financial and Economic Chamber, 25 March 2026, appeal No. 24-18.093, judgment No. 145 F-B, appeal dismissed

Why Is This Judgment Important?

In recent years, so-called “romance” frauds (impersonating a deceased loved one, a fake notary, a fake bank adviser) have multiplied the number of victims among people living alone, often elderly, sometimes bereaved. The sums transferred run to several tens of thousands of euros, and the recurring question before the courts is the liability of the bank that executed the transfers without reacting. On 19 November 2025, the Commercial Chamber of the French Supreme Court handed down a series of four judgments that seemed to open the door to a stricter assessment of the duty of vigilance. The judgment of 25 March 2026 (No. 24-18.093, published in the Bulletin (collection C, F-B formation)) clarifies this line and rebalances it.

The message is clear: a bank that executes transfers duly authorised by its customer, from a sufficiently funded account, is not required to reinterpret every unusual transaction in order to detect a fraud. The duty of non-interference, a long-standing judge-made creation, retains its full force.

What Were the Facts of the Case?

A customer, the widow of an insured person, held accounts and investments with a savings and provident bank (caisse d’épargne et de prévoyance). Between 26 February and 25 April 2020, she ordered eight transfers to accounts opened with banks in Belgium, for a total of €95,294. She had fallen victim to a fraudulent scheme: someone had led her to believe that she had to pay sums in order to “close out” a life insurance policy taken out by her late husband.

The transfers were duly issued by the customer and executed by the bank. Once the fraud was discovered, the customer sued the savings bank for liability, alleging a breach of its duty of vigilance when executing these orders.

What Did the Court of Appeal Say?

The Rouen Court of Appeal (cour d’appel de Rouen), in its judgment of 23 May 2024, had dismissed the customer’s claim. It had held:

• that the transfers were authorised within the meaning of Article L. 133-6 of the Monetary and Financial Code;
• that the banker is bound by a duty of non-interference;
• that the customer’s account was sufficiently funded;
• that the international nature of the transfers, their sometimes large amounts, their number and the short period over which they were made did not constitute anomalies;
• that the bank was entitled to consider that the transactions were consistent with the customer’s wishes, particularly as one of the transfers bore the optional mention of the name of a person whom the bank could legitimately assume to be a family member.

The customer appealed to the French Supreme Court.

What Solution Does the French Supreme Court Adopt?

The Commercial Chamber dismisses the appeal. In a general statement of principle, it lays down the following:

“The banker is bound by a duty of non-interference which requires it not to carry out investigations into the origin, purpose or advisability of movements on its customer’s account. Having found that a bank had satisfied itself that the transfer orders placed by its customer were consistent with her wishes and that her account was sufficiently funded, a court of appeal was entitled to hold that, despite their international nature and their large amount, these transfers, having regard to their number and the short period over which they were made, did not constitute anomalies and that, consequently, the bank had not breached its duty of vigilance.”

The statement confirms that the transactions did not present any apparent anomalies easily detectable by a diligent professional. The bank therefore did not breach its duty of vigilance.

The Duty of Non-Interference Explained

Developed by the Commercial Chamber as far back as the 1980s and consistently reaffirmed, this principle protects the customer’s private financial affairs and prevents the bank from becoming a judge in equity of their choices. Conversely, it prohibits the bank in principle, save in particular cases, from holding back an order, asking for explanations or blocking a transfer solely because it “seems” risky.

What Is an Apparent Anomaly?

The judgment of 25 March 2026 restates this sharply: the unusual is not the abnormal. The international nature of a transfer, a high amount, the number of transfers, the short period over which they are made: none of these criteria, taken separately or together, is enough to turn a regular transaction into an apparent anomaly. To cross the threshold, there must be an element that is objectively detectable in the order itself: inconsistent mentions, a doubtful identity, a manifestly fraudulent legal structure.

Where Does This Judgment Stand After the Series of 19 November 2025?

The judgment expressly cites several decisions as case law to be read alongside it:

The series of 19 November 2025 had, in four published judgments, quashed lower-court decisions that had ruled out an apparent anomaly in a manner held to be insufficiently reasoned. These quashings could have suggested a tightening of the assessment of the duty of vigilance.

The judgment of 25 March 2026 qualifies that reading: through that series, the Commercial Chamber does not intend to turn the banker into a guardian of its customer’s financial choices. Where the objective elements of the order (sufficient funds, consistency with the customer’s wishes, a coherent identification of the beneficiary) are met, the “unusual” nature of the transaction is not enough to found a breach.

What Are the Practical Consequences for Victims?

The judgment sends a clear signal to victims of “romance” fraud: relying solely on the abnormal nature of a transaction, compared with the account’s earlier operation, will not be enough to engage the liability of the executing bank. To succeed, the lawyer’s work shifts to two fronts.

First front: showing a material anomaly visible in the order itself. An inconsistent mention of the beneficiary, a doubtful identity, a manifestly suspicious description (“notary’s fees” for a transaction that bears no resemblance to a payment made through a notary), an inconsistency between the amount and the category of the transaction.

Second front: showing that the bank, through the exchanges it had with its customer, knew the precise nature of the transaction and its probably fraudulent character. This requires emails, meeting notes, recorded telephone calls or an internal AML/CTF mechanism that should have been triggered.

Our Critical View of the Judgment

The judgment of 25 March 2026 (No. 24-18.093) does more than clarify the scope of the series of 19 November 2025: it considerably relativises its protective reach. For the victims our firm defends (retirees, widows and widowers, people living alone targeted by romance fraud), the solution raises questions on three levels.

The “Customer’s Will” Criterion: A Fiction Under Duress

The Court’s statement holds that the bank “satisfied itself that the transfer orders placed by its customer were consistent with her wishes”. This assurance, held to be sufficient, rests on a formal finding: the customer signed, validated and sent her orders. Yet the particular feature of romance fraud is precisely that the victim herself carries out the transactions under psychological duress. Her apparent will is, in almost every case, exactly what the fraudsters dictate to her. By its very construction, the criterion adopted by the Court can therefore almost never work in favour of the victim of modern fraud.

This equating of formal will (signing the order) with substantive will (free and informed consent) is questionable. French civil law has finer tools for defects of consent (mistake, fraud, moral duress in asymmetric relationships). Importing into banking law so crude a standard of “will” runs counter to the general movement to protect vulnerable consent.

An Apparent Anomaly That Has Become Almost Impossible to Find

The scope of the apparent anomaly is here reduced to a hard core: a visible material irregularity, a doubtful mention, an inconsistent identity. The following are expressly excluded from the body of evidence: the international nature, the large amount, the number, the short period, the departure from the customer profile. In practical terms, almost all the typical markers of modern fraud (rapid fragmentation towards foreign IBANs, a sharp break with the account history) are neutralised.

In practice, this is an almost insurmountable threshold. Yet the bank has, through its internal mechanisms (AML/CTF for compliance, algorithmic monitoring under the RTS derived from PSD2), scoring and configured alerts that react precisely to these signals. By refusing to draw civil consequences from them, the Court establishes a decoupling between regulatory vigilance (which the bank owes) and civil vigilance (which it no longer owes). This decoupling has, moreover, been expressly recorded by Cass. com., 4 March 2026, No. 24-19.588: AML/CTF obligations “have the sole purpose” of combating money laundering and cannot found compensation for a victim. What remains, however, is the less explored ground of the obligations arising from the RTS technical regulation, which can found civil liability where the bank disregards its standards on strong authentication or monitoring.

A Problematic Interplay with PSD2

The Payment Services Directive (PSD2) and the EBA’s technical standards distinguish finely between authorised and unauthorised transactions. Where consent to the transaction has been extorted by fraudulent manoeuvres, the classification as an “authorised transaction” in the technical sense of the directive is open to debate: what the victim authorised is not what she actually wanted. The CJEU, which has considered this question in several recent cases (notably in impersonation fraud disputes), is tending towards a reading that is more protective of consumers.

By endorsing a purely formal standard of the “customer’s will”, the judgment of 25 March 2026 exposes itself to tension with European law. For victims’ lawyers, this tension is a line of argument: it is possible to argue, on the ground of the specific liability regime of payment law (and no longer merely ordinary contractual liability), that the disputed transaction is in reality an unauthorised transaction within the meaning of PSD2 and gives rise to an immediate refund (Article L. 133-18 of the CMF).

Which Levers Remain Open?

Several routes remain, more demanding than in the past.

The apparent anomaly proper: there must be an element that a normally diligent professional should have detected. Manifestly contradictory descriptions (“notary reimbursement” but with the beneficiary’s identity entirely foreign to the profession), identity discrepancies, and repeated use of IBANs on an internal watch list are all serious leads.

The obligations arising from the RTS technical regulation: the bank, subject to the technical implementing regulation of PSD2 (the EBA’s Regulatory Technical Standards, supplementing in particular Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389), must comply with precise standards on strong authentication and monitoring of risky transactions. Disregard of these obligations can, unlike an AML/CTF failure (which cannot be relied on for compensation since Cass. com., 4 March 2026, No. 24-19.588), found civil liability. This lever remains under-used in practice and deserves to be examined systematically in transfer fraud cases.

Execution error: if the bank executes the transfer to an IBAN that does not match the identity given by the customer (which is a breach of the unique identifier rule within the meaning of payment law), it incurs specific liability under Articles L. 133-21 et seq. of the Monetary and Financial Code.

How Can You Protect Yourself from Romance Fraud?

A few simple reflexes, and far more effective than an after-the-fact claim.

First reflex: no “closing out” or “unlocking” of a contract (life insurance, estate, foreign inheritance) is ever settled by a prior transfer of funds to a third-party bank. Anyone who asks for a prior transfer is, in the overwhelming majority of cases, a fraudster.

Second reflex: have any unexpected transfer request checked by a relative, the family notary or your bank before executing the order. A bank approached in advance can raise the alarm and trigger checks; approached afterwards, it is legally hampered by the duty of non-interference.

Third reflex: be wary of artificial urgency. Time pressure is a classic sign of a scam (“you must pay before 6 p.m. to unlock the funds”).

Fourth reflex: report fraud attempts (PHAROS, the national platform, as well as the THESEE platform for online scams).

What to Remember

The judgment of 25 March 2026 (No. 24-18.093) clarifies the scope of the series of 19 November 2025 and considerably narrows the notion of apparent anomaly. Our firm nonetheless reads its choices with an openly stated reservation: the “customer’s will” as adopted by the Court is a formal standard that ignores the psychological duress characteristic of modern fraud; the decoupling between AML/CTF vigilance (regulatory) and civil vigilance undermines the coherence of the duty of vigilance; and the interplay with European payment law (PSD2 and CJEU case law) remains fragile.

For victims, and particularly for vulnerable people, living alone or bereaved, who make up the dominant profile in romance fraud, bank liability is not closed off; it is shifting. It is now won on more technical ground: classification as an unauthorised transaction within the meaning of PSD2, breaches of the obligations arising from the RTS technical regulation (still under-used), and parallel use of the criminal route and European standards. It should be noted that an AML/CTF failure, now expressly excluded as a basis for civil compensation (Cass. com., 4 March 2026, No. 24-19.588), is not part of this toolbox.

If you or a relative are facing such a situation, a review of the file by a lawyer experienced in banking litigation and European payment law will identify precisely the routes still open, including those that this judgment did not decide.

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